

25-28 апреля в Лиссабоне состоялась ежегодная конференция Трехсторонней Комиссии, одной из наиболее влиятельных международных неправительственных организаций, объединяющей ведущих политиков и представителей деловых кругов США, Западной Европы и Японии. Впервые на обсуждение участников был вынесен вопрос, выходящий за рамки трехсторонних консультаций - об отношении Запада к политическому развитию в СНГ и о предоставлении экономической помощи. Второй аспект имел особое значение. Полгода, прошедшие после Вашингтонской конференции, рассматривавшей проблемы экономической помощи, свидетельствуют об отсутствии единой концепции и согласованных подходов Запада по отношению к СНГ. В последнее время в политических кругах США и Франции наметилась достаточно сильная тенденция к смене приоритетов, что может понизить доминирующую роль России в системе многосторонних взаимоотношений между Западом и СНГ, и способствовать созданию нового баланса сил на Востоке Европы, в котором Украина будет играть одну из ведущих ролей. С другой стороны, Германия, ориентация которой на Россию, как полюс стабильности экс-советского пространства, была совершенно очевидной в последние месяцы, больше не в состоянии на краткосрочную перспективу оказывать решающее влияние на политику Европейских Сообществ по отношению к СНГ. В первую очередь это связано с серьезными экономическими трудностями внутри страны и во многом исчерпанными инвестиционными возможностями в результате активного проникновения в страны Центральной и Восточной Европы.

В этом контексте от конференции в Лиссабоне по проблемам экономической помощи СНГ в политических кругах Запада не ожидают серьезных практических решений. Такое положение вещей заставило Трехстороннюю Комиссию выдвинуть официальное предложение, способное разблокировать ситуацию. Его смысл состоит в использовании стратегии "плана Маршалла" т.е. применении метода многостороннего сотрудничества, в котором все участники процесса предоставления и получения помощи будут выступать как равные партнеры, что позволит Западу избежать многих внутренних разногласий, а СНГ - избежать серьезных противоречий между главными партнерами на этапе окончательного определения степени правоприметности и места в системе формирующихся глобальных и региональных систем.

Практическая идея предложения, выдвинутого Европейским председателем Трехсторонней Комиссии Ж. Бертюзеном состоит в создании независимого Комитета Десяти, который должен быть назначен правительствами соответствующих государств. Его основной задачей станет разработка концепции и практических рекомендаций, исходящих из общих интересов всех участников, с последующей передачей на правительственный уровень.

Идея создания такого Комитета нашла неофициальную поддержку ряда западных государств. О ней проинформированы правительства США, Великобритании, Германии, Франции, Комиссия Европейских Сообществ.

Представляется, что данное предложение вызывает безусловный интерес и заслуживает его изучения. Учитывая сложные дискуссии на Мюнхенской встрече Большой семерки, куда приглашен Российский президент Борис Ельцин, его поддержка этой инициативы, как полагает Трехсторонняя Комиссия, могла бы стать наиболее взаимоприемлимым компромиссом по вопросу о правоприметстве бывшего СССР и системы взаимоотношений СНГ с Западом.

Trilateral Memorandum

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Session on Developments in the ex-Soviet Union:

How Should the Trilateral and Other Countries be Responding?

Georges Berthoin

A Trilateral Initiative

1. The International Coordinating Conference on Assistance to the New Independent States, held in Washington, D.C. last January 22-23, opened a path — which could be named "The Washington Process".
2. The follow-up conference in Lisbon (on May 23-24) should transform its original aim of coordinating short-term aid into a medium- and long-term strategy. For this purpose it should:
 - agree to the creation of a wise men committee of ten members;
 - proceed with its nomination;
 - define the committee's mandate with the view of elaborating a "CIS Development Program".
3. This mandate would build on the following ideas:
 - Evaluate what has been undertaken and draw on an overall picture of what is proposed in future assistance to the CIS;
 - build consensus on common, or at least overlapping objectives between all countries involved;
 - propose effective coordination and suitable implementation mechanisms;
 - detail the methods to be used and propose proper administrative and legal instruments.
 - In order to reach this goal, highlight the psychological, historic, and political aspects of this development strategy;
 - suggest a precise calendar for implementation;
 - examine how this program for the CIS articulates itself with Central and East European development strategies.
4. The ten wise men should be chosen for their independence, competence, and authority within different groupings of regions or countries participating in the May Lisbon Conference; i.e.,
 - The Russian Federation;
 - Ukraine;
 - The Central Asian republics;
 - Central & Eastern Europe;
 - The European Free Trade Association;
 - The European Community;

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- The Gulf states;
- Japan;
- North America; and
- The international financial institutions.

5. The procedure to be followed could be:

- i. On May 23-24, the Lisbon Conference appoints the Committee of Ten;
- ii. This Committee drafts an interim report to be presented at the G-7+1 Summit Meeting in Munich next July. Following the reaction from the Summit participants, the Committee would then contact the other regional groupings concerned in order to prepare a Final Report.
- iii. This report is presented next Autumn at the third follow-up conference of the "Washington Process" in Tokyo. At this conference, the appropriate recommendations are submitted for discussion and adoption.

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The Commission of the European Communities — in agreement with the OECD and any country prepared to underwrite financially this part of the "Washington Process" — would put at the disposal of the Committee of Ten the necessary means to execute its mandate.

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The creation of the Committee of Ten is only a mechanism — nothing more — in order to move beyond the present situation where dispersion and duplication of efforts, wastage of scarce resources could lead to an impasse. Furthermore, it could help alleviate potential tensions, or even rivalries between the G-7 partners, which could jeopardize trilateral solidarity.

Georges Berthoin

A TRILATERAL INITIATIVE

I was asked by the new leadership a few months ago to look at our relationship to the CIS. I met a lot of people, read a lot of papers, and came in a very brutal way to a conclusion. We the Trilateral countries have to put our act together very quickly. Otherwise we will become co-responsible for the confusion which is existing in the former Soviet Union. My proposal (see attached "Trilateral Initiative") provides a practical, diplomatic way to introduce some of our suggestions in the negotiating process between states which passes through Lisbon in late May and should end with concrete proposals in Tokyo in the autumn.

Marshall Plan and European Community Methods

One of the conclusions I reached is that Marshall Plan *methods* (not the Plan itself) are necessary. I suggest that for very practical reasons. I had the good fortune as a young man to be in 1947 at Harvard in the workshop which prepared, on the American side, the Marshall Plan. And then I was fortunate enough to be for two years in the private office of the French Minister of Finance on the receiving end of the Marshall Plan, at a time when French sovereignty had to be restored, we had to work with very unstable governments, and the Communist Party was commanding more than a quarter of the electorate. And we had to handle this very delicate operation, a sort of political, historical engineering (and that's a challenge we face today) with not only an acute perception of the mechanics of aid, but the psychological dimension of aid. One of the most difficult situations is not to give aid but to receive it, and to do it in such a way that you feel that your sovereignty, your dignity is respected. That requires very fine political and psychological tuning.

In 1948-50, all the Western European countries which benefited from the Marshall Plan were able to select, among the varied advice they were getting, what was good or not good for them. In other words, they had a certain autonomy of judgment. They were able to choose. In the case of the former Soviet Union, they have no experience of a market economy and no experience of democracy as we understand it. There are practically no parameters available to them to make a choice among the fantastic number of recommendations they receive from us. They are, as a result, in a higher degree of confusion than they would be if they had no advice at all.

At the same time, the Russian people and the people from the other republics are proud people. They are completely aware of the fact that what their country stood for for seventy years was defeated. I would like you to remember the very difficult relationship between defeated and victorious countries. We had, after World War II, this type of relationship with Italy,

Japan and Germany. The most difficult moment in a war, for the victorious power, is the victory. It is a magic moment, when the victorious power becomes responsible for the defeated country. The country perceived before, one hundred percent, as the enemy suddenly becomes the problem you have to solve. And you cannot solve the problem without having, within the defeated country, a high degree of legitimacy. When President Bush said, "We won the Cold War"; President Yeltsin answered, "We all won the Cold War". President Yeltsin was right. And we had the proof of that last August. It was the Russian people, under the leadership of President Yeltsin, who finally changed the condition of the slow-moving reform program of the Communist state led by President Gorbachev.

So, we reach now a time when the Trilateral countries should be fully aware that they will have in the future responsibility for the reform and revolutionary program which is taking place there.

Then comes this problem of sovereignty. Many people consider that international solidarity and multilateral aid programs are more or less incompatible with sovereignty. I don't think that is a right reading of modern circumstances. In some of the remarks made in our meeting, I had the feeling that people were not aware of the new method which has been used for forty years in international relations in Europe -- the European Community. One of the best examples of this practical experience is Portugal. In 1975, this country was considered lost for democracy. The courage of the Portuguese people and leaders was a very important component of the turning of the tide, but so was international solidarity, organized by some political foundations (in particular the German ones) and the European Community.

The European Community is a new method of organization of international affairs. A few years ago, I had a discussion with some Soviet leaders about German reunification. I told them that, from the French point of view and I thought from the Soviet point of view, there was no danger at all reunification -- because Germany is within the European Community, a form of relationship which is not based on the fatalistic view of history, which is not based on historical reminiscence. If we go that way and indulge in those historical reminiscences -- ask the Dutch what they think of the Japanese, ask the Belgians what they think of the Germans, ask the Serbs and the Croats what they think of each other -- we are bound to see each other as enemies. We cannot change the past. But we can change the future.

If we organize our aid program -- which involves financial transfers, economic advice, education, the formation of managerial groups and so on -- in a way which is considered, both by the CIS countries and by ourselves, as a joint operation, respecting each other's interests and dignity, then we are creating a kind of international relationship which might produce in former East-West relations the kind of climate and context which we see prevailing today in the western part of Europe. That is my first main suggestion.

**Joint Committee of Wise Men
to Develop Medium- and Long-Term Strategy**

The aim of the Washington conference last January was to coordinate short-term aid. My second suggestion is that the follow-up Lisbon conference (on May 23-24) transform this original aim into a medium and long-term strategy. For that purpose I suggest the creation of a committee of ten "wise men." A suggested mandate for the committee is set out in my attached proposal.

Their first task would be to evaluate what has been undertaken already. The IMF, World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Commission, Group of 24 -- everybody is competing for headlines. One of the dangers is that some aid programs are becoming public relations exercises. (Operation "Give Hope," for example, was not very well understood in Europe and not very well perceived in the former Soviet Union either.) We have to be careful. We are not only touching economic facts. We are touching the nerves and the patience of people who are already harassed by difficult economic and social conditions.

Then this committee of ten -- as the proposal details -- should try to build up a consensus on common objectives; propose effective coordination and implementation mechanisms; detail the administrative and legal instruments necessary for such a purpose; be aware of the psychological, historical and political aspects of such a strategy; and suggest a precise calendar for action.

I ask you to look at this proposal carefully, and see if, through the various channels we have with those in power, it could be rather quickly integrated into their diplomatic thinking. Before making the proposal, I took a number of precautions -- I tested the idea with people involved in that process. Up to now the Lisbon Conference at the end of May does not look very promising. There is a very great danger in that. It will be the first time that all the CIS republics will attend a multilateral conference. If the West does not take seriously this conference and does not come with practical suggestions, those countries of the CIS, attending for the first time together such a conference, will take a very cynical view indeed of what the West stands for.