title: THE CHALLENGES OF I-SPLITTING OR ICHSPALTUNG FOR THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EDITH STEIN AND GERDA WALTHER
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: CALCAGNO, ANTONIO
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2021-12-21T20:54:46Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2021-12-21T20:54:46Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2021-09
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: CALCAGNO A. THE CHALLENGES OF I-SPLITTING OR ICHSPALTUNG FOR THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EDITH STEIN AND GERDA WALTHER. Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology, 2021, vol. 10, issue 2, pp. 484–498.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2021-10-2-484-498
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/34026
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The phenomenon of I-splitting or Ichspaltung poses many challenges for phenomenology. In particular,
  one wonders how one and the same I can perform different acts while preserving its disinterested
  autonomy and identity. Moreover, as the I moves from the natural attitude to the phenomenological
  one, phenomenologists like Husserl defend the purity of the transcendental I to grasp the sense of what
  its lives. How can the I move from one attitude to the next without being affected or conditioned by the
  acts carried out and content seized by the I in both attitudes? For example, one wonders how trauma
  or intense emotional experiences may affect the transcendental or phenomenological I, if at all. Edith
  Stein and Gerda Walther are read here as deepening the problem of I-splitting, for they introduce a
  form of it that is not merely defined by the undertaking of different acts of consciousness, for example,
  the move from the natural to the phenomenological attitude; rather, they describe lived experiences in
  which the very fundamental unity of the individual, personal I is challenged or negated through intense
  forms of sociality and intersubjectivity achieved in community and telepathy as well as ruptures in the
  constitutive unity of persons through soullessness. I argue here that these phenomena seriously challenge
  not only the unity of I experience but also phenomenology’s claim of the capacity of a pure and
  absolute ego to grasp philosophically and scientifically the objective sense of its investigations.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology;Volume 10; Issue 2
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: I-splitting
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Ichspaltung
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: unity of consciousness
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: fragmentation of the I
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: identity
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: person and personhood
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: soullessness
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: THE CHALLENGES OF I-SPLITTING OR ICHSPALTUNG FOR THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EDITH STEIN AND GERDA WALTHER
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 07_Calcagno.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/34026/1/07_Calcagno.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 642,3 kB