title: Modelling of collective actions: The significance of cooperative agreements
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Skarzhinskaia, Elena M.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Tsurikov, Vladimir I.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2019-11-27T11:19:47Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2019-11-27T11:19:47Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2019-09
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Skarzhinskaia E . M., Tsurikov V. I. 2019. Modelling of collective actions: The significance of cooperative agreements. Russian Management Journal 17 (3): 337–366.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu18.2019.303
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/16705
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: Using mathematical modelling methods, we investigate the collective’s ability to achieve results
  which are Pareto-dominant over Nash equilibrium. Egoistic urges of the members of the collective,
  under the law of diminishing returns, give rise to the free-rider problem. Cooperation
  among agents in an environment where some individuals are characterised by opportunistic
  tendencies is impaired within a large group due to deficit of trust, yet it is possible within
  a small group (a coalition) based on interpersonal trust. By deploying a coalitional strategy
  aimed at maximizing coalitional gains, each individual member of the large group increases their
  gain. To attain a stable coalition, an agreement must be formed among agents implying adherence
  to conditions of individual rationality by all members of the collective and compatibility
  stimuli for all members of the coalition. We further set down the content of such an agreement
  and calculate side payments that guarantee adherence to conditions necessary for sustainable
  cooperation, as well as the investment of requisite effort by coalition members.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Russian Management Journal;Volume 17; Issue 3
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: collective actions
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: cooperative agreement
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: trust
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: coalition
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: opportunistic behavior
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: free rider problem
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Modelling of collective actions: The significance of cooperative agreements
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 337-366.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/16705/1/337-366.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 288,87 kB