title: Developmental Institutions in the Russian Economy: Seeking for Schumpeterian Innovations or Political Rent?
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Sablin, Kirill S.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2019-11-27T10:19:19Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2019-11-27T10:19:19Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2019-09
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Sablin K. S. Developmental Institutions in the Russian Economy: Seeking for Schumpeterian Innovations or Political Rent? Political Expertise: POLITEX, 2019, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 367–382.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu23.2019.303
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/16696
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The article is devoted to revealing the role of developmental institutions for the innovative development
  of the Russian economy. It is noted that developmental institutions as organizational
  and economic structures are created in a certain institutional environment. The institutional
  environment predetermines a set of opportunities that make more profitable rent-seeking behaviour to find official privileges and benefits, but in other cases it is more profitable to realize
  productive activity leading to the extraction of innovative rent. The political and administrative
  market is a platform where the subjects of developmental institutions formation in the Russian
  economy interact. It is a hybrid of a classical political market as a way of making collective decisions
  on financing and producing public goods, and administrative market embedded in the
  structures of state authorities, which is the way to allocate resources through the use of status
  positions of specific groups of special interests within a formally unified power vertical. The result
  of the bargaining of interests in the Russian economy is not only developmental institutions
  that contribute to the generation of Schumpeterian innovations but also quasi-developmental
  institutions. Quasi-developmental institutions are developmental institutions with the formal
  function of transaction costs reducing for Schumpeterian innovators, but in fact used as a tool
  for allocating resources in the interest of political rent extraction. It is noted that the need for
  the Russian economy transition to the innovative path of development has been formed but the
  actors who are able to transform the need for innovation into demand are virtually absent, or
  they are not focused on a painstaking increment of the «economic pie» but on its active redistribution
  (rent-seeking).
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Political Expertise: POLITEX;Volume 15; Issue 3
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: developmental institutions
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Schumpeterian innovations
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: political rent
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: political-administrative market
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Developmental Institutions in the Russian Economy: Seeking for Schumpeterian Innovations or Political Rent?
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 367-382.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/16696/1/367-382.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 649,86 kB