title: Long-term implementation of the cooperative solution in a multistage multicriteria game
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Kuzyutin, Denis
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Smirnova, Nadezhda
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Gromova, Ekaterina
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2019-05-04T17:57:41Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2019-05-04T17:57:41Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2019-03-23
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Denis Kuzyutin, Nadezhda Smirnova, Ekaterina Gromova, Long-term implementation of the cooperative solution in a multistage multicriteria game, Operations Research Perspectives, Volume 6, 2019, 100107, ISSN 2214-7160, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orp.2019.100107. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221471601830321X)
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.issn
metadata.value: 2214-7160
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221471601830321X
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/15479
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: In order to find an optimal and time consistent cooperative path in multicriteria multistage game the minimal sum of relative deviations rule is introduced. Using this rule one can construct a vector-valued characteristic function that is weakly superadditive. The sustainability of the cooperative agreement is ensured by using an imputation distribution procedure (IDP) based approach. We formulate the conditions an IDP should satisfy to guarantee that the core is strongly time consistent (STC). Namely, if the imputation distribution procedure for the Shapley value satisfies the efficiency condition, the strict balance condition and the strong irrational-behavior-proof condition, given that the Shapley value belongs to the core of each subgame along the cooperative path, it can be used as a “supporting imputation” which guarantees that the whole core is STC. We discuss three payment schedules and check whether they can be used as supporting imputation distribution procedures for the considered multicriteria game.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: Elsevier
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Operations Research Perspectives;Vol. 6
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Dynamic game
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Multiple criteria decision making
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Multicriteria game
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Strong time consistency
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Shapley value
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Cooperative solution
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Long-term implementation of the cooperative solution in a multistage multicriteria game
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: Kuz_OPR_Post_print.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/15479/2/Kuz_OPR_Post_print.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 293,62 kB