title: ONTOLOGY OF THE WILL — GEIGER, PFÄNDER, HUSSERL
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: NEUMANN, DANIEL
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2023-01-27T12:49:50Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2023-01-27T12:49:50Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2022-09
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: NEUMANN D. ONTOLOGY OF THE WILL — GEIGER, PFANDER, HUSSERL. Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology, 2022, vol. 11 issue 2, pp. 495–516.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-2-495-516
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/38907
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: A phenomenological approach to the ontology of the will could be rendered along three positions:
  Firstly, the willing I is completely immanent in its experience, such that one can only will, and know
  that one wills, by reflecting on the actual experience of willing. Secondly, one could hold that the
  will, while being analyzable as a conscious phenomenon, is itself a real psychic force driving one’s
  motivations and actions without one necessarily being aware of it. The third position would argue
  that the reality of the will is not exhausted by the way it is experienced, but that its real causes are not
  necessarily part of a complete phenomenological investigation. I discuss the phenomenology of the
  will of Alexander Pfänder, Moritz Geiger and Edmund Husserl along this realist-transcendentalist
  spectrum. My basic concern here is a critical examination of the phenomenological approach to an
  entity beyond experience which is responsible for the experienced volitions. I will proceed in three
  steps, based on the distinction of volitions into three parts. Firstly, I ask what antecedes a volition in
  order to determine its phenomenal and ontological causes. Secondly, the analysis of the apperception
  of willing clarifies in what sense an “I” is experienced as the real or phenomenal cause of its volition.
  Thirdly, the discussion of the realization of the volition will address the role that this “I” subsequently
  plays in the process of fulfilling its intent. The paper develops the ways in which the ontology
  of the “willing I” limits and shapes the conception of the intentional relation between willing and
  desiring consciousness and its contents.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology;Volume 11; Issue 2
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Pfänder
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Geiger
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Husserl
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: phenomenology
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: ontology
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: will
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: volition
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: ONTOLOGY OF THE WILL — GEIGER, PFÄNDER, HUSSERL
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 01_Neumann.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/38907/1/01_Neumann.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 659,78 kB