title: Nash Bargaining Solution as Negotiation Concept for Resource Allocation Problem with Groves-Ledyard Mechanism
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Korgin, Nikolay A.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Korepanov, Vsevolod O.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2021-11-26T19:35:44Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2021-11-26T19:35:44Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2021-10
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Korgin N. A., Korepanov V. O. Nash Bargaining Solution as Negotiation Concept for Resource Allocation Problem with Groves-Ledyard Mechanism. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, XIV, 216-226.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.16
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/33698
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: Motivated by research works on Zeuthen-Hicks bargaining, which
  leads to the Nash bargaining solution, we analyze experimental data of resource
  allocation gaming with Groves-Ledyard mechanism. The games were
  designed in the form of negotiation to allow players to reach consensus.
  Behavior models based on best response, constant behavior, and Nash bargaining
  solution are defined. Analysis conducted over decisions made by
  participants shows that a significant share of all decisions leads to an increase
  of the Nash bargaining value. It is even higher than the share of
  decisions that are in agreement with the best-response concept. Consensusended
  games show light attraction to the Nash bargaining solution, it's less
  than we obtained in games with the mechanism of Yang-Hajek from another
  class of so-called proportional allocation mechanisms. We discuss differences
  of consensus-ended games from timeout-ended games, what decisions lead
  to the situations with the Nash bargaining value increasing and differences
  between balanced mechanism Groves-Ledyard and unbalanced mechanism
  Yang-Hajek.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: This work is partially supported by the RFBR, project no. 19-29-07525
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Contributions to Game Theory and Management;Volume 14
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: resource allocation mechanisms
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Nash implementation
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Nash bargaining solution
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Groves-Ledyard mechanism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Nash Bargaining Solution as Negotiation Concept for Resource Allocation Problem with Groves-Ledyard Mechanism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 216-226.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/33698/1/216-226.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 482,48 kB