title: Political justice: Essence, genesis, and evolution
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Yevsieiev, Оleksandr P.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2020-03-20T09:35:30Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2020-03-20T09:35:30Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2020-03
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Yevsieiev, Оleksandr P. 2020. “Political justice: Essence, genesis, and evolution”. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Law 1: 239–259.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu14.2020.117
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/17246
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The article deals with the phenomenon of the dependence of the judicial branch from the
  political authorities, known as “political justice”. Various forms of manifestation of this phenomenon
  in numerous types of legal proceedings (international, constitutional and criminal)
  are investigated. In addition to the politicization of justice, the opposite phenomenon is also
  observed — the judicialization of politics, which means more active listening by politicians
  to the position of the judiciary and more frequent appeals by politicians to legal means in
  order to achieve political goals. Indicators of judicial statistics are analyzed, indicative of the
  presence of an accusatory bias as a sign of politicization of the judiciary sui generis. Referring
  to specific trials (in particular, on former heads of state, political opponents of the ruling
  elite and Islamic extremists), different kinds of procedural tricks are used, which the judges
  resort to in resolving this category of cases. Positive and negative aspects of the interaction of
  courts with the legislative and executive branches of state power are highlighted. Psychological
  phenomena in the behavior and consciousness of judges that accompany “political justice”,
  in particular the so-called “strategic flight phenomenon”, can be analyzed where judges refrain
  from making decisions on high-profile cases, artificially delaying their consideration.
  The prevalence of a situation in which two parallel systems coexist peacefully in the structure
  of the judiciary is ascertained: ordinary courts and various kinds of emergency tribunals and
  other structures involved in political repressions. Reference is made to the practice of the
  European Court of Human Rights, in which the latter stated the political motivation of a number
  of criminal cases previously resolved by the national courts. In particular, a characteristic
  trick that lawyers resort to under conditions of political justice is to give retroactive force to
  the law.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Vestnik of St Petersburg University. Law;Volume 11; Issue 1
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: “political justice”
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: constitutional justice
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: political repression
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: accusatory bias
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: prosecution of heads of state
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: international criminal justice
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Political justice: Essence, genesis, and evolution
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 239-259.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/17246/1/239-259.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 689,59 kB