title: Limits of tolerance
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Bystrov, Vladimir Yu.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2020-05-26T10:10:53Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2020-05-26T10:10:53Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2020-03
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Bystrov V. Yu. Limits of tolerance. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies, 2020, vol. 36, issue 1, pp. 24–34.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2020.102
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/17846
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The article considers one of the most important aspects of the problem of tolerance connected
  with determining its borders. To the extent that the idea of a tolerant state is the center of the
  liberal concept of tolerance, the practice of tolerance is connected with the passive adoption of
  norms and values of another. Tolerance understood in such a way contradicts the self-identification
  of individuals and social groups. The liberal concept of tolerance is draws criticism as
  not corresponding to the pluralism of values and to the realities of multiculturalism. There is a
  danger of such a distribution of the principle of tolerance when society is paralyzed by the aspiration,
  no matter what it takes, not to violate the norms and the principles of other subjects
  even at the expense of one’s own identity. “The tolerance paradox” (Slavoj Žižek) becomes
  apparent in that in a tolerant society priority is given to values and ideals of the subject, which
  openly breaks the principle of tolerance. It follows that this principle cannot be understood as
  maintaining the balance between respect for others and the need for one’s own freedom. Such
  a balance will always develop not in favor of the tolerant individual if the category of recognition
  in its contents comes down to passive recognition of the rights and beliefs of others. It
  is shown that the concept of “fight for recognition” exposed by Hegel in his dialectics of the
  Master and the Slave can be adopted by modern critics of the liberal concept of tolerance. It is
  possible to call the Hegelian approach to tolerance as transgressive since the attitude towards
  another subject appears as result and as a prerequisite of the fight for recognition.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: The research has been performed within the grant of Russian Foundation for Basic Research
  No. 19-011-00779 “Illiberal concepts of tolerance: history, practice, prospects”.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Vestnik of St Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies;Volume 36; Issue 1
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: tolerance
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: liberalism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: tolerant state
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: fight for recognition
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: identification
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Limits of tolerance
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 24-34.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/17846/1/24-34.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 618,55 kB