title: Schelling Point as a Refinement of Nash Equilibrium
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Teng, Jimmy
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2018-07-24T11:40:13Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2018-07-24T11:40:13Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2018
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/10484
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description
metadata.value: In Contributions to game theory and management, vol. XI. Collected papers presented on the Eleventh International Conference Game Theory and Management / Editors Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich. - SPb.: Saint Petersburg State University, 2018. - 330 p.
  The collection contains papers accepted for the Eleventh International Game Theory and Management (June 28-30, 2017, St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia).
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: This article proposes using Schelling point as a refinement of Nash equilibrium. It also introduces an algorithm way to locate Schelling points in games. The paper shows that in pure coordination games and games with significant proportion of coordination (and certain proportion of conflict), the algorithm proposed could locate the Schelling points. The existence of a Schelling point means that the proportion of common interests versus
  conflict of interests has crossed a certain threshold and there-
  fore a
  ertain form of
  ooperation or
  oexisten
  e is possible. Besides, using
  S
  helling point as a re nement of Nash equilibrium narrows down the set of
  equilibriums to only stable equilibriums as unstable equilibriums
  ould not
  be S
  helling points. Finally, the paper shows that the proposed approa
  h
  ould solve a larger set of games than the
  urrent approa
  h based on Nash
  equilibrium. For instan
  e, it would be very di 
  ult to solve multiple sided
  in
  omplete information games under the
  urrent approa
  h based on Nash
  equilibrium while the proposed approa
  h
  ould readily solve multiple sided
  in
  omplete information games.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: Saint Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Schelling Point as a Refinement of Nash Equilibrium
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Other
metadata.lang: en_GB