title: Intentionalism and Deontology in the Early Stoic Ethics
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Seregin, Andrei V.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2022-10-06T13:58:13Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2022-10-06T13:58:13Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2022-06
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Seregin A. V. Intentionalism and Deontology in the Early Stoic Ethics. Philologia Classica 2022, 17 (1), 32–47. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu20.2022.103
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu20.2022.103
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/38244
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: In this paper, I demonstrate that the early Stoics adhered to a normative theory that may be
  called intentionalist: the moral significance of any action is not determined by its material
  content, but by the virtuous or vicious disposition of the agent’s soul and the intentions arising
  from this disposition. Since according to Stoics all people are divided into virtuous sages
  and vicious non-sages, all the actions of the former are morally right (κατορθώματα), whereas
  those of the latter are morally wrong (ἁμαρτήματα), even if they are materially identical. On
  the other hand, some statements in the Stoic fragments can rather be characterized as deontological:
  in this case, certain materially defined types of action (stealing, lying, adultery, etc.)
  seem to be presented as morally wrong in themselves. The paper’s central thesis is that such
  statements do not contradict the basic Stoic intentionalism but can be interpreted as consistent
  with it. Such an interpretation becomes possible under two conditions: firstly, if one takes
  into account how exactly the notions of κατόρθωμα and ἁμάρτημα relate to the Stoic notions
  of appropriate and inappropriate action (καθῆκον and παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον), and, secondly, if one
  examines the Stoic position on the moral status of lying, which is very revealing in this respect.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Philologia Classica;Volume 17; Issue 1
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: ancient ethics
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: deontology
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: intentionalism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Stoicism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Intentionalism and Deontology in the Early Stoic Ethics
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 14096-Текст статьи-46386-1-10-20220802.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/38244/1/14096-%d0%a2%d0%b5%d0%ba%d1%81%d1%82%20%d1%81%d1%82%d0%b0%d1%82%d1%8c%d0%b8-46386-1-10-20220802.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
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