title: Information Collecting and Dissemination in the Network of Taxpayers: Bayesian Approach
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Kumacheva, Suriya Sh.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Tomilina, Galina A.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2021-11-26T19:51:49Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2021-11-26T19:51:49Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2021-10
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Kumacheva S. Sh., Tomilina G. A. Information Collecting and Dissemination in the Network of Taxpayers: Bayesian Approach. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, XIV, 236-256.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.18
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/33700
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The current research is based on the assumption that the result
  of tax inspections is not only collection of taxes and fines. The information
  about audited taxpayers is also collected and helps to renew a priori knowledge
  of each agent's evasion propensity and obtain new a posteriori estimate
  of this propensity. In the beginning of the following tax period the fiscal authority
  can correct auditing strategy using updated information on every
  taxpayer. Each inspection is considered as a repeated game, in which the
  choice of agents to audit is associated with their revealed tendency to evade.
  Taxpayers also renew the information on the number of inspected neighbors
  using their social connections, represented by networks of various con gurations,
  and estimate the probability of auditing before the next tax period.
  Thus, the application of the Bayesian approach to the process of collecting
  and disseminating information in the network of taxpayers allows to optimize
  the audit scheme, reducing unnecessary expenses of tax authority and
  eventually increasing net tax revenue. To illustrate the application of the
  approach described above to the indicated problem, numerical simulation
  and scenario analysis were carried out.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Contributions to Game Theory and Management;Volume 14
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: tax control
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: tax evasions
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: risk propensity
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: structured network
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: a posteriori information
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Bayesian approach
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Information Collecting and Dissemination in the Network of Taxpayers: Bayesian Approach
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 236-256.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/33700/1/236-256.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 13 MB