title: J. Butler and P. Strawson on resentment
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Loginov, Evgeny V.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2023-10-05T13:51:38Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2023-10-05T13:51:38Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2021
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Loginov E. V. J. Butler and P. Strawson on resentment. Philosophy of the History of Philosophy, 2021, vol. 2, рр. 282–297. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu34.2021.118 (In Russian)
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu34.2021.118
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/44100
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: Resentment is one of the most important morally significant phenomena. It is therefore
  not surprising that it has attracted much attention from moral philosophers. This
  paper explores two approaches to the philosophical conception of resentment. The first was developed in Early Modern by Joseph Butler. The second was proposed in
  the mid-twentieth century by P. Strawson. Butler offered his ideas about the nature of
  resentment within the framework of preaching, which, however, does not mean that
  the theological context of his argumentation subordinates its philosophical content.
  Butler’s theory is closely related to his ideas about human nature as something holistic:
  we need resentment to balance another moral emotion, compassion. Butler also
  distinguished two kinds of resentment: sudden and deliberate. Strawson, for his part,
  presented his views on the nature of resentment in an academic lecture, which was
  then published as an article. His reasoning concerns the relation between freedom,
  moral reactions, and determinism. Strawson attempts to show that our conception
  of freedom is closely tied to practices of moral responsibility, the existence of which
  has nothing to do with determinism. A key point of his argument is the claim that we
  should stop over-intellectualizing moral experience. If we abandon the intellectualist
  illusion, we will see in the factuality of moral practices something more than mere
  factuality. Everything that is necessary for morality is already there, in moral practice
  itself: desert, resentment, justice, etc. If one realizes this fact, the problem of free will
  is solved. I conclude this paper by comparing Butler’s and Strawson’s approaches.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: This work is supported by the Russian Science Foundation under grant 21-78-
  10044, https://rscf.ru/project/21-78-10044/.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Philosophy of the History of Philosophy;Volume 2
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Butler
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Strawson
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: resentment
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: freedom
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: human nature
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: J. Butler and P. Strawson on resentment
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 282-297.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/44100/1/282-297.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 678,14 kB