title: Monopoly on economic justice: Judges versus arbitrators
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Eremin, Viktor V.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2024-08-26T21:16:02Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2024-08-26T21:16:02Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2024-06
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Eremin, Viktor V. 2024. “Monopoly on economic justice: Judges versus arbitrators”. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Law 2: 354–370. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu14.2024.203 (In Russian)
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu14.2024.203
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/47312
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The article explores the relationships between state economic courts represented by judges
  and arbitration courts as a manifestation of the conflict between public and private justice.
  The consequences of changes in state policy after the arbitration reform of 2015–2017 are
  discussed. Firstly, through the lens of Bourdieu’s perspective, the key factors influencing
  the emergence of a negative attitude in the judicial environment towards private justice are
  analyzed. Secondly, the establishment of the specialization of a particular subgroup of judges
  from the appellate instance of arbitration courts, who year after year deal with cases related
  to arbitration courts, is examined. During the empirical part of the research and interviews
  with judges from the appellate instances, it was found that their primary reference point, in
  addition to the law and personal convictions, is the orientation towards the higher court — the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, where one judge largely determines the courts’
  policy towards arbitration courts. Judges exhibit normative isomorphism, as similar experiences
  and practices prompt them to adopt similar strategies to protect their field from private
  justice. The article is the result of qualitative research based on interviews. Based on the assumption
  of the homogenization of the judicial sphere and judges’ defensive tactics to protect
  their field from external, private courts using institutional analysis and Bourdieu’s theories
  of fields and capital, the conclusion is drawn that judges of state courts tend to accumulate
  symbolic capital. This allows them to act as the only possible interpreters of legal norms —
  monopolists of justice. Through the lens of isomorphism theory, the conclusion is drawn that
  state courts implement the practice of coercive isomorphism, which has no other goals except
  forcing private courts to mimic state courts.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Vestnik of St Petersburg University. Law;Volume 15; Issue 2
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: arbitration
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: arbitration courts
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: economic justice
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: monopoly of justice
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: arbitration community of judges
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: arbitration reform
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Monopoly on economic justice: Judges versus arbitrators
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 354-370.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/47312/1/354-370.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 706,89 kB