title: The Structure of Corporate Boards and Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from the Russian Stock Exchange
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Muravyev, Alexander A.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Berezinets, Irina V.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Ilina, Yulia B.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2014-01-28T13:26:08Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2014-03-17T05:42:19Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2014-01-28T13:26:08Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2014-03-17T05:42:19Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2013
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/789
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/789
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: This paper revisits the role of board size and composition in corporate governance using a measure of private benefits of control (PBC) as indicator of governance problems in firms. We calculate PBC using the voting premium approach for a sample of dual class stock companies traded on the Russian stock exchange between 1998 and 2009. Using fixedeffects regressions, we find a quadratic relationship between PBC and board size, implying the optimality of medium-sized (about 11 directors) supervisory boards. This result is substantially stronger for PBC than for traditional measures of corporate performance. There is also some evidence that director ownership helps mitigate governance problems. Most remarkably, we find that non-executive/independent directors are associated with larger PBC and thus do not seem to help improve corporate governance. In contrast, regressions with accounting performance measures as dependent variables tend to suggest a positive role of these directors in corporate governance.
metadata.lang: ru
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: English
metadata.lang: ru
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: Graduate School of Management, Saint Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Working Paper; #3 (E)-2013
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: board size
metadata.lang: ru
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: board independence
metadata.lang: ru
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: private benefits of control
metadata.lang: ru
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: dual-class stock companies
metadata.lang: ru
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Russia
metadata.lang: ru
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: The Structure of Corporate Boards and Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from the Russian Stock Exchange
metadata.lang: ru
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Working Paper
metadata.lang: ru
metadata.name: dc.contributor.altauthor
metadata.value: Муравьев, А. А.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.altauthor
metadata.value: Березинец, И. В.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.altauthor
metadata.value: Ильина, Ю. Б.
metadata.lang: -
resources.filename: 3(E)_2013.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/789/1/3%28E%29_2013.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 877,59 kB