title: Expert examination as an epistemological phenomenon
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Pruzhinin, Boris I.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2021-11-01T19:54:51Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2021-11-01T19:54:51Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2021-09
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Pruzhinin B. I. Expert examination as an epistemological phenomenon. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies, 2021, vol. 37, issue 3, pp. 393–402.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2021.302
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/33386
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The article examines the epistemological parameters of the phenomenon of expert examination
  as well as the social and cognitive features of using scientific knowledge to substantiate
  the objectivity of expert evaluations. Today, the scope of expert activities has significantly
  expanded. Accordingly, the number of studies, including philosophical ones, considering this phenomenon, in particular, has increased primarily in connection with the growth of its role
  in assessing the social-humanitarian risks associated with the introduction of scientific-technical
  advances. At the same time, attention is directed to the fact that it is precisely due to the
  significant expansion of the scope of expert activity that the nature of the expert examination
  itself is distorted — its dependence on social contexts is increasing, but its objectivity is lost.
  The article aims to clarify the reasons for the growth of this dependence in connection with
  the specificity of the epistemological parameters of knowledge, which is used as a scientific
  basis for expert evaluations. This aspect of expert examination, as a rule, falls out of sight of
  both its researchers and the experts themselves. Modern philosophers and methodologists of
  science state the direct dependence of expert examination on applied (i. e., limited to practical
  requests) developments, while, in the author’s opinion, the condition for the objectivity of
  expert opinions is the obligatory appeal of experts to fundamental science, motivated by the
  commitment to expand the sphere of holistic knowledge concerning the world. This condition
  is highlighted due to the epistemological perspective of comprehending expert evaluations,
  which makes it possible to include additional criteria for their objectivity in the sphere of the
  expert’s self-awareness. The actualization of such criteria, according to the author, is now becoming
  a prerequisite for an effective expert examination that maintains a high social status.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Vestnik of St Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies;Volume 37; Issue 3
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: expert examination
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: expert evaluation
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: epistemology
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: fundamental science
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: applied developments
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: objectivity
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Expert examination as an epistemological phenomenon
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 393-402.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/33386/1/393-402.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 613,88 kB