title: What and how Markus Gabriel proves in his book “I am Not a Brain”
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Vasilyev, Vadim V.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2023-10-05T13:08:32Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2023-10-05T13:08:32Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2021
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Vasilyev V. V. What and how Markus Gabriel proves in his book “I am Not a Brain”. Philosophy of the History of Philosophy, 2021, vol. 2, рр. 271–281. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu34.2021.117 (In Russian)
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu34.2021.117
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/44099
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The paper is a discussion of the book by the German philosopher Marcus Gabriel “I
  am Not a Brain” in the context of the distinction between Analytic and Continental
  philosophical traditions. Gabriel denies the benefit of such a distinction. However,
  his book may be a good illustration of the opposite. The paper shows why this is so.
  The main thing is that when presenting the theoretical positions of certain philosophers,
  Gabriel is inclined to refer to non-philosophical explanations of their origins.
  This manner of presentation has nothing to do with the methods of analytic philosophy.
  Analytic philosophers evaluate philosophical concepts and arguments based on
  themselves. In addition to clarifying this issue, the paper examines the main ideas
  of Gabriel’s book and evaluates some of the ideas proposed by him related to the
  concepts of consciousness, the human spirit and the problem of free will. In particular,
  the paper discusses a concept that receives the name “neo-existentialism”
  from Gabriel. His solution to the problem of free will is also considered, which is
  one of the varieties of compatibilism, the position according to which free will can
  coexist with causal determinism, which means a state of affairs in which at any given
  time the world has only one really possible future. The connection of this decision
  with Gabriel’s more general metaphysical ideas, expressed in his book about the nonexistence
  of the world, is shown. Special attention is paid to the features of Gabriel’s criticism of alternative approaches to the interpretation of consciousness and free
  will. The analysis of Gabriel’s particular concepts confirms the general conclusion of
  this paper that his book is not related to the analytical philosophical tradition.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Philosophy of the History of Philosophy;Volume 2
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Markus Gabriel
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: consciousness
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: mind
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: free will problem
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: neo-existentialism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: compatibilism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: analytic philosophy
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: continental philosophy
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: What and how Markus Gabriel proves in his book “I am Not a Brain”
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 271-281.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/44099/1/271-281.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 616,63 kB