title: Instrumental support for designing mechanisms of institutional intervention
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Kristinevich, Sergey A.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2021-03-03T19:43:01Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2021-03-03T19:43:01Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2020-09
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Kristinevich S. A. (2020) Instrumental support for designing mechanisms of institutional intervention. St Petersburg University Journal of Economic Studies, vol. 36, iss. 3, pp. 354–370.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu05.2020.301
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/25126
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The interaction of participants in the political-economic process cannot always be successfully
  described in terms of mechanisms of market coordination and is not always based on
  principles of a voluntary and mutually beneficial exchange that increases well-being. The fact
  is that economic actors are not uniform in the possession of power. Accordingly, activity for
  the rational use of limited resources is not based on competition between homogeneous economic
  entities in a spontaneous economic order, but on conflict between subjects with different
  power potentials in a hierarchical structure. Thus, power acts as a competitive advantage,
  which rational subjects tend to use for the purpose of force redistribution. One of its forms
  is institutional intervention — a behavioral model based on a coercive strategy through the
  establishment (change) of rules. The article describes the potential use of optimization and
  equilibrium models to describe the behavioral interventionist strategies. Optimization models
  characterize the interventionist behavior at the initial stage of institutional design, and
  equilibrium models determine possible variation in interactions between interventionists and
  victims during the redistribution of power. Methods for quantifying effects of institutional
  change are systematized. The proposition that violent equilibrium is not a specific distribution
  of mutual gains from cooperation, both with voluntary exchange and coordination level of
  tolerance (the maximum value of costs that the victim is willing to sacrifice) and a threshold
  (the lowest possible) values interventionist legitimacy, is substantiated. As guidelines for the
  evaluation of deviations from the equilibrium levels, we offer levels stability, efficiency, and
  legitimacy of institutional design.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: St Petersburg University Journal of Economic Studies;Volume 36; Issue 3
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: institutional interventions
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: forced exchange
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: legitimacy
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: power redistribution
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: violent equilibrium
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Instrumental support for designing mechanisms of institutional intervention
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 354-370.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/25126/1/354-370.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 713,86 kB