title: Types of Equilibrium Points in Antagonistic Games with Ordered Outcomes
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Rozen, Victor V.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2018-07-19T11:23:11Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2018-07-19T11:23:11Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2017
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Rozen, V. V. (2017). Types of equilibrium points in antagonistic games with ordered outcomes. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 10(0), 287-298.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/10465
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description
metadata.value: in Contributions to game theory and management, vol. X. Collected papers presented on the Tenth International Conference Game Theory and Management / Editors Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich. – SPb.: Saint Petersburg State University, 2017. – 404 p.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: Saddle point concept is a basic one for antagonistic games with payoff functions. For more large class consisting of games with ordered outcomes, there are different generalizations of the saddle point concept. In
  this article we consider three types of equilibrium for games with ordered outcomes, namely, saddle points (or Nash equilibrium points), general equilibrium points and transitive equilibrium points. The main definitions concerning games with ordered outcomes are introduced in section 1. In section 2, necessary and sufficient conditions for saddle points in games with ordered outcomes are found. These conditions are formulated by using the so-called characteristic sets of players. Transitive equilibrium points are considered in section 3. Theorem 3 characterizes transitive equilibrium points in antagonistic games with ordered outcomes as preimages of saddle points in antagonistic games with payoff functions under strict homomorphisms. The
  main result of this article is theorem 4 in which analogy result for mixed extension of game with ordered outcomes is proved. In constructing of mixed extension of game with ordered outcomes, we use the so-called canonical extension of an order on the set of probabilistic measures.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: Saint Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: game with ordered outcomes
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: saddle point
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: general equilibrium point
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: transitive equilibrium point
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Types of Equilibrium Points in Antagonistic Games with Ordered Outcomes
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Other
metadata.lang: en_GB