title: Organizational change: From community to firm
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Skarzhinskaya, E. M.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Tsurikov, V. I.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2022-08-30T09:54:54Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2022-08-30T09:54:54Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2021-09
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Skarzhinskaya E. M., Tsurikov V. I. 2021. Organizational change: From community to firm. Russian Management Journal 19 (3): 315–335.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu18.2021.303
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/37512
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: In the framework of mathematical modelling, we examine a self-governed collective whose members
  create aggregate income through individual effort, which income is then distributed between
  members per pre-negotiated relative shares. Each agent’s seeking maximum individual gain leads
  the collective into a non-efficient Nash equilibrium. To achieve equilibrium in a Pareto-preferable
  outcome, coordination of efforts is required. In our article, certain members of the collective united
  by a coalition based on mutual trust coordinate their efforts. We show that under a coalitional
  strategy aimed at maximizing coalitional gain, individual gains are increased across the collective.
  However, for each non-cooperated agent the set share in the income still acts as a limiting factor
  in their choice of invested effort. To increase its efforts further, the coalition offers each noncooperated
  agent a contract whereby the agent foregoes their share in the income for the benefit
  of the coalition, in exchange for a reward per their invested effort. As the contract takes effect,
  the organization undergoes fundamental change consisting in the transformation of a collective of
  individuals with equal rights into a hierarchical economic organization. We offer a set of models
  describing such organizational change at the stage of forming the contract and at the subsequent
  stage of implementation. For the contract formation stage, we identify the conditions under which
  each agent gains more by entering into the contract than by rejecting it. At the contract implementation
  stage, we identify the conditions wherein equilibrium values of each agent’s efforts assume their
  communally-optimal value.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Russian Management Journal;Volume 19; Issue 3
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: collective action
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Nash equilibrium
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Pareto-improvement
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: stimulus contract
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: coalition
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Organizational change: From community to firm
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 03.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/37512/1/03.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 761,34 kB