title: Tax Authority and Taxpayers: How Does Mutual Collecting of Information Affect the Effectiveness of Tax Control
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Kumacheva, Suriya Sh.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Tomilina, Galina A.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2023-05-05T13:29:56Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2023-05-05T13:29:56Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2022
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Kumacheva, S. S., & Tomilina, G. A. (2022). Tax Authority and Taxpayers: How Does Mutual Collecting of Information Affect the Effectiveness of Tax Control. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 15, 155-177.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.12
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/41429
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: Lots of works have been devoted to the modelling of tax control. In the classic game-theoretic formulation, the subject of study is the interaction between tax authority and taxpayers. However, along with such attitude to the problem, some works allow us to study auxiliary problems related to tax collection and tax control. Two of these issues are worth mentioning. The first is the dissemination of information about future tax audits among the taxable population. The second is the gathering and analysis of information on the tendency of taxpayers to evasion. It was shown that both processes can be used to adjust the tax authority's strategy and optimize audits in order to improve tax collection. However, the mutual collecting of information on tax audits by the taxpayers and the tax authority decreases the total tax revenue. The study of formulated problem is accompanied by the modelling of both processes, their simulation, and comparative analysis of the results.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Contributions to Game Theory and Management;Volume 15
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: tax control
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: tax evasions
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: risk propensity
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: structured network
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Bayesian approach
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: mutual collecting of information
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Tax Authority and Taxpayers: How Does Mutual Collecting of Information Affect the Effectiveness of Tax Control
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 12.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/41429/1/12.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 3,44 MB