title: Phenomenology and Being-in-itself in Hartmann’s Ontology: Laying the Foundations
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Peterson, Keith R.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2019-07-05T09:57:24Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2019-07-05T09:57:24Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2019-03
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Peterson K. R. Phenomenology and Being-in-itself in Hartmann’s Ontology: Laying the Foundations. Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology, 2019, vol. 8, issue 1, pp. 33–51.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu02.2018.101
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/15884
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: Was Nicolai Hartmann a phenomenologist? Answering this question has become more important in the context of debates over new realisms in Continental philosophy. To answer it, the paper highlights five important points. First, Hartmann’s own distinction between the phenomenological school of thought and phenomenological method must be preserved. He does not accept the sweeping humanistic opposition between the sciences and phenomenology, and yet (like the phenomenologists) he employs a method that aims to provide a description of phenomena following on a suspension of metaphysical commitments that is directed at their essential structures, with some important qualifications. Secondly, he rejects the phenomenological reduction because it identifies the natural attitude with a metaphysical standpoint and it advocates instead a ‘naïve consciousness’ free of metaphysical assumptions. Thirdly, his assessment of phenomenology is conditioned by his conception of cognition as a transcendent act. He finds that phenomenology fails to adequately account for the whole phenomenon of cognition, especially its characteristic grasp of something independent of the act. Fourthly, Hartmann grants the irreducibility of phenomena, but holds that they are characteristically unstable, referring to something beyond themselves and forcing us to decide whether what they show is genuine or not. There is thus no infallible intuition of phenomena. Finally, from an epistemological perspective, the concept being-in-itself is merely a counterpart to the concept of the phenomenon, which we do not need for the purposes of ontology. Based on this reassessment, it is concluded that Hartmann employs some form of the phenomenological method but cannot be identified as a phenomenologist.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology;Volume 8; Issue 1
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Nicolai Hartmann
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: phenomenology
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: being-in-itself
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: cognition
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: phenomenological method
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: transcendent act
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: phenomenal transcendence
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: natural attitude
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: natural realism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: metaphysics
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Phenomenology and Being-in-itself in Hartmann’s Ontology: Laying the Foundations
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 33-51.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/15884/1/33-51.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 637,83 kB