title: Contextualism and closure
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Smith, Nicholas D.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2020-09-04T11:15:15Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2020-09-04T11:15:15Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2020-06
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Smith N. D. Contextualism and closure. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies, 2020, vol. 36, issue 2, pp. 291–299.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2020.207
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/19200
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: Skepticism confronts us with a paradox (sometimes known as “the skeptical trilemma”), a version of which follows: (1) I know that I am working on a computer right now; (2) I know that knowing that I am working on a computer right now logically implies that I am not being deceived or manipulated in the way that skeptical hypotheses imagine. (This implication is called “closure under known logical implication”); (3) I do not or cannot know that I am not being deceived or manipulated in the way skeptical hypotheses imagine. The paradox of skepticism is that these three statements are logically incompatible. A relatively new movement in epistemology called contextualism proposes that we can accept all three of the claims in the trilemma, by recognizing that they are not all true within the same epistemic context. Briefly, contextualists claim that we can know in ordinary contexts, but cannot know that we are not being deceived or manipulated in a skeptical scenario, but the latter fact is true in a different epistemic context than the ordinary knowledge that we might have. Closure under known logical implication will remain true, but only insofar as the implications involved are alternatives that belong to the same epistemic context as the original knowledge claim. In this paper, I claim that contextualism’s account of how epistemological contexts change, together with its acceptance of closure, is implausible.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Vestnik of St Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies;Volume 36; Issue 2
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: epistemology
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: knowledge
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: closure
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: contextualism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: fallibilism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: logical implication
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: skepticism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Contextualism and closure
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 291-299.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/19200/1/291-299.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 610,85 kB