title: WITTGENSTEIN’S DISAPPEARING IDEALISM
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: ROGONYAN, GARRIS
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2022-07-07T13:26:00Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2022-07-07T13:26:00Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2022-03
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: ROGONYAN G. WITTGENSTEIN’S DISAPPEARING IDEALISM. Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology, 2022, vol. 11 issue 1, pp. 229–247.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-229-247
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/37085
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The article examines some well-known attempts to consider Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations
  in the context of transcendental idealism. The main purpose of these attempts is to protect
  Wittgenstein’s later philosophy from the relativistic interpretation of such concepts a “language games”
  and “forms of life.” Thus, Bernard Williams, noting the ambiguity of the pronoun “we” in Philosophical
  Investigations, believes that such a “we” has a transcendental rather than empirical character. This
  approach allows Williams to argue that there is no meaningful alternative to the general perspective
  on the world that is embodied in this “we.” However, the main disadvantage of this approach is that
  Williams views such a “we” in much the same way as a conceptual schema. However, as many authors
  point out, this idea does not find its confirmation in the later works of Wittgenstein. Jonathan Lear, in
  turn, suggests that we should consider such a non-empirical “we” as a special kind of “mindedness.”
  Such a mindedness could be considered as analogous to a Kant’s analytical principle of apperception.
  Lear believes that it is this principle that gives meaningful unity to human behaviour and makes possible
  any communication with other people. Following Williams and trying to correct the shortcomings
  of his position, Lear proposes to consider the ambiguous status of “we” in Philosophical Investigations as
  an argument in favour of the “disappearance” of the transcendental “we,” and with it the disappearance
  of the threat of relativism. John McDowell, however, agreeing with the need to get rid Wittgenstein’s
  philosophy of relativistic interpretations, critically assesses the idea of using transcendental idealism
  for this purpose. Instead, McDowell proposes to return to Hegel’s thesis about the unboundedness of
  the conceptual, which makes it unnecessary to appeal to the transcendental justification of harmony
  between reason and the world. The article, therefore, also examines McDowell’s arguments against
  attributing to Wittgenstein any versions of transcendental idealism.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: The publication was prepared within the framework of the Academic Fund Program at the HSE
  University in 2020–2021 (grant No. 20-01-030).
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology;Volume 11; Issue 1
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Ludwig Wittgenstein
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Bernard Williams
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Jonathan Lear
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: John McDowell
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: transcendental idealism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: relativism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: language games
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: forms of life
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: WITTGENSTEIN’S DISAPPEARING IDEALISM
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 11_Rogonyan.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/37085/1/11_Rogonyan.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 742,83 kB