title: Constructive and Blocking Power in Marine Logistics
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Elnova, Maria
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Smirnova, Nadezhda
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2018-07-24T10:35:51Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2018-07-24T10:35:51Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2018
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/10474
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description
metadata.value: In Contributions to game theory and management, vol. XI. Collected papers presented on the Eleventh International Conference Game Theory and Management / Editors Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich. - SPb.: Saint Petersburg State University, 2018. - 330 p.
  The collection contains papers accepted for the Eleventh International Game Theory and Management (June 28-30, 2017, St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia).
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: Transport industry in economy had been studied for many years, however, only recently researchers have begun to widely apply concepts of cooperative game theory to optimize costs and profits which are incurred in
  hauling. Today a wide range of cost/profi allocation methods have become a trend in transport segment, particularly in logistics operations. The most of these methods based on cooperative game theory consider the effect of collaboration (cooperation) which means the integration of companies as a key way to share transportation costs or profits. This study aims to contribute to this area of research by exploring different allocation methods such as the Shapley value, the nucleolus and some other excess based solution concepts
  of transferable utility game (TU game). In this work we overview existing studies on the subject and consider methodology of cooperative game theory. Further, we calculate numerical example of three shipping companies based on real data. In order to compare profit sharing results we compute the set of allocations and examine the constructive and blocking power of coalitions. The importance and originality of the work are that it explorescthe new field of application of game theory in logistics which can provide additional insights in this research area.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: cooperative game theory
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: logistics
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: horizontal cooperation
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: cost allocation
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Shapley value
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: nucleolus
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: SM-nucleolus
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: anti-prenucleolus
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: blocking power
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Constructive and Blocking Power in Marine Logistics
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Other
metadata.lang: en_GB