title: Comparing the Manipulability of Approval Voting and Borda
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Teplova, Daria
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Ianovski, Egor
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2023-05-05T16:14:00Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2023-05-05T16:14:00Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2022
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Teplova , D., & Ianovski , E. (2023). Comparing the Manipulability of Approval Voting and Borda. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 15, 236-249.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.18
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/41435
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem established that no nontrivial
  voting rule is strategy-proof, but that does not mean that all voting
  rules are equally susceptible to strategic manipulation. Over the past
  fifty years numerous approaches have been proposed to compare the manipulability
  of voting rules in terms of the probability of manipulation,
  the domains on which manipulation is possible, the complexity of finding
  such a manipulation, and others. In the closely related field of matching,
  Pathak and S¨onmez (2013) pioneered a notion of manipulability based on
  case-by-case comparison of manipulable profiles. The advantage of this approach
  is that it is independent of the underlying statistical culture or the
  computational power of the agents, and it has proven fruitful in the matching
  literature. In this paper, we extend the notion of Pathak and S¨onmez
  to voting, studying the families of k-approval and truncated Borda scoring
  rules. We find that, with one exception, the notion does not allow for a
  meaningful ordering of the manipulability of these rules.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: Support from the Basic Research Program of HSE University is gratefully acknowledged.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Contributions to Game Theory and Management;Volume 15
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: social choice
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: strategic voting
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Borda
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: scoring rules
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Comparing the Manipulability of Approval Voting and Borda
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 18.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/41435/1/18.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 531,9 kB