title: Analysis of Management Collusive Decisions on the World Oil Market
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Nastych, Maria A.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2018-10-23T16:35:41Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2018-10-23T16:35:41Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2018-09
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Nastych M. A. 2018. Analysis of management collusive decisions on the world oil market. Russian Management Journal 16 (3): 371–392.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: 10.21638/spbu18.2018.303
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/14999
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The article examines the issue of the advantage and key conditions of collusion between the major
  oil exporting countries on the world oil market. This issue is explored in the paper within the
  framework of the concepts of stochastic cooperative game theory and the theory of industrial organisation.
  Namely, the concepts of game theory correspond to the conflicting interests of collusion
  participants. Next, the possibility of collusion between market players is considered and resolved
  using the theory of cooperative games. Stochastic methods of constructing and investigating the
  characteristic function of a cooperative game help to take into account the high volatility of the
  oil market. Further, the Cournot model of the theory of industrial organisation describes the strategic
  management of production volumes to maximize profits. The Stackelberg model takes into
  account the incentives to collude through the emergence of an industry leader, who first announces
  his management strategies. Based on these methodologies, the paper concludes that the collusion
  for its participants is beneficial, and the equilibrium levels of quotas for oil extraction are found.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Russian Management Journal;Volume 16; Issue 3
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: world oil market
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: OPEC
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: collusion
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: stochastic cooperative game
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Cα-core
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: VaR
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Analysis of Management Collusive Decisions on the World Oil Market
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 03-Nastych.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/14999/1/03-Nastych.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 377,01 kB