title: Hartmann’s Question of “Being as Being” and M. Heidegger’s Question of “The Meaning of Being”: Two Views over Ontology
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Gusev, Maxim
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2019-07-05T10:25:31Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2019-07-05T10:25:31Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2019-03
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Gusev M. N. Hartmann’s Question of “Being as Being” and M. Heidegger’s Question of “The Meaning of Being”: Two Views over Ontology. Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology, 2019, vol. 8, issue 1, pp. 67–86.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-1-67-86
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/15886
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The article addresses two versions of returning to ontology and two views on the nature of ontology. The aim of the article is to reveal the way two 20th century philosophers—Nicolai Hartmann and Martin Heidegger—saw the meaning and purpose of ontology, as well as the answer to the question as to why each of them thought that the other’s ontological approach was fundamentally flawed. My investigation is based on Hartmann’s book Ontology: Laying the Foundations and Heidegger’s book Being and Time. Hartmann’s option of returning to ontology implies the question about being as being. It is impossible to reduce being as being (being as such) to being in some definite, limited sense. Thus, being as being possesses absolute universality and cannot be defined, albeit one can distinguish some structure in it. Not only being is always both being-there (Dasein) and being-so (Sosein), but being is also always either real or ideal. Hartmann is certain that the restriction of being as being to being in some definite sense and the miscomprehension of that four-component system leads up to various errors. According to Hartmann, Heidegger misses the ontological question because he puts the question on being as it is given instead of that on being as it is in itself. According to Heidegger, Hartmann misses the ontological question because he stays on the grounds of the unrestricted speculations instead of understanding being and its meaning by means of being itself. The question arises as to who of them is right. As a matter of fact, there are no arguments that both philosophers would deem acceptable. Each of them is deaf to the opponent’s opinion. In addition, we are not obligated to accept neither Heidegger nor Hartman’s opinion because there are certainly more than just two views on ontology.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology;Volume 8; Issue 1
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: ontology
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: being
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: meaning of being
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: being as being
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: phenomenology
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: world
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Dasein
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Hartmann’s Question of “Being as Being” and M. Heidegger’s Question of “The Meaning of Being”: Two Views over Ontology
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 67-86.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/15886/1/67-86.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 628,24 kB