title: THE PARADOXES OF ANALOGICAL REPRESENTATION: THE ORIGINAL AND A COPY IN PHENOMENOLOGICAL IMAGINATION THEORY
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: DROZHETSKAYA, ELENA
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2022-07-07T13:22:13Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2022-07-07T13:22:13Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2022-03
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: DROZHETSKAYA E. THE PARADOXES OF ANALOGICAL REPRESENTATION: THE ORIGINAL AND A COPY IN PHENOMENOLOGICAL IMAGINATION THEORY. Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology, 2022, vol. 11 issue 1, pp. 208–228.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-208-228
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/37084
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: This article deals with a phenomenological standpoint on paradoxicality of image-consciousness
  (imagination), i.e., an analogical representation in which an image possesses material support. Contrary
  to tradition, E. Husserl thought of imagination as being both an intuitive and a mediate act.
  Husserl’s opinion results from paradoxical nature of an image itself: an image (Bildobjekt) appears but
  it doesn’t exist, while the exhibited thing (Bildsujet) does exist but doesn’t appear in proper sense. The
  paradoxicality of an image results in its double conflict — with actual present and with Bildsujet. Initially,
  Husserl considered that the more analogous features an image possesses the less conflict exists
  between it and Bildsujet, but then his own experience made him change his mind. Examining a wax
  figure example, he came to the conclusion that this perfectly human-like object is rather a fiction (an
  illusion) than an image for it is constituted in a position-taking intention, not in a neutralized one.
  However, despite we’ve got knowledge of illusory nature of such an object our consciousness keeps
  on fluctuating between an imaging intention and a perceptual one. Unlike Husserl neither J.-P. Sartre
  nor M. Richir draws a distinction between an image and an illusion. Sartre considers the imaginary
  in its radical form to be a world of schizophrenic. As for Richir, he supposes the imaginary to be a
  mass-consumption product being used for ideological manipulations. He follows Plato’s intellectual
  strategy and characterizes an image as εἴδωλον (simulacre) which represents the reality instead of
  reaching it. Being saturated by visible an image lacks any gap that would give an impulse to a work
  of imagination. At the same time, Richir admits that simulacre does relate to art, whereas an artefact
  doesn’t. An artefact is made by technical device which imitates not reality but consciousness. Thus,
  an artefact in its turn is not a reality illusion but an illusion of a reality illusion. Its hallucinatory effect
  makes us believe that we look into a mirror of reality as if a technical agent had better access to it than
  a human eye does.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology;Volume 11; Issue 1
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: image consciousness
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: imagination
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: imaginary
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: analogical representation
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Bildobjekt
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Bildsujet
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: simulacre
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: artefact
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: illusion
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: THE PARADOXES OF ANALOGICAL REPRESENTATION: THE ORIGINAL AND A COPY IN PHENOMENOLOGICAL IMAGINATION THEORY
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 10_Dvorzhetskaya.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/37084/1/10_Dvorzhetskaya.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 657,16 kB