title: Modelling of Information Spreading in the Population of Taxpayers: Evolutionary Approach
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Kumacheva, Suriya Sh.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Gubar, Elena A.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Zhitkova, Ekaterina M.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Kurnosykh, Zlata
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Skovorodina, Tatiana
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2018-07-18T13:44:39Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2018-07-18T13:44:39Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2017
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Kumacheva, S. S., Gubar, E. A., Zhitkova, E. M., Kurnosykh, Z. A., & Skovorodina, T. Y. V. E. (2017). Modelling of information spreading in the population of taxpayers: evolutionary approach. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 10(0), 100-128.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/10455
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description
metadata.value: Collected papers presented on the Tenth International Conference Game Theory and Management /
  Editors Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich. – SPb.: Saint Petersburg State
  University, 2017. – 404 p.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: Information technologies such as social networks and Internet allow to spread ideas, rumors, advertisements and information effectively and widely. Here we use this fact to describe two different approach of evaluation
  the impact of information on the members of tax system. We consider an impact of spreading information about future audits of the tax authorities in a population of taxpayers. It is assumed that all agents pay taxes, if they know that the probability of a tax audit is high. However some agents can hide their true income and then such behavior provokes the tax audit. Each agent adopts her behavior to the received information of future audits, which depends on the behavior of other agents.                                                                               Firstly, we model a process of propagation information as an epidemic process and combine it with game between tax authority and taxpayers. Secondly, we consider evolutionary game on network which define structured population of taxpayers and evaluate the impact of the spreading of information on the changes of population states over the time.                               We formulate mathematical models, analyze the behavior of agents and corroborate all results with numerical simulations.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: This research was supported by the research grant ”Optimal Behavior in Conflict-Controlled Systems” (17-11-01079) of Russian Science Foundation.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: Saint Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: tax audit
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: tax evasion
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: total tax revenue
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: information spreading
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: evolutionary game on networks
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Modelling of Information Spreading in the Population of Taxpayers: Evolutionary Approach
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Other
metadata.lang: en_GB