title: Games with Incomplete Information on the Both Sides and with Public Signal on the State of the Game
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Gavrilovich, Misha
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Kreps, Victoria
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2018-07-18T13:26:19Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2018-07-18T13:26:19Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2017
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Gavrilovich, M. R., & Kreps, V. L. (2017). Games with incomplete information on the both sides and with public signal on the state of the game. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 10(0), 68-78.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/10452
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description
metadata.value: Collected papers presented on the Tenth International Conference Game Theory and Management / Editors Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich. – SPb.: Saint Petersburg State University, 2017. – 404 p.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: Supposing that Player 1’s computational power is higher than that of Player 2, we give three examples of different kinds of public signal about the state of a two-person zero-sum game with symmetric incomplete
  information on both sides (both players do not know the state of the game) where Player 1 due to his computational power learns the state of the game meanwhile it is impossible for Player 2. That is, the game with incomplete information on both sides becomes a game with incomplete information on the side of Player 2. Thus we demonstrate that information about the state of a game may appear not only due to a private signal but as a result of a public signal and asymmetric computational resources of players.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: Support from Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher School of Economics is gratefully acknowledged. This study was partially supported by the grant 16-01-00124-a of Russian Foundation for Basic Research.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: Saint Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: zero-sum game
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: incomplete information
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: asymmetry
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: finite automata
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Games with Incomplete Information on the Both Sides and with Public Signal on the State of the Game
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Other
metadata.lang: en_GB