title: WHY PHENOMENOLOGY COULD NOT COMMIT THE LINGUISTIC TURN?
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: MEDOVA, ANASTASIA
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2023-01-27T13:00:38Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2023-01-27T13:00:38Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2022-09
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: MEDOVA A. WHY PHENOMENOLOGY COULD NOT COMMIT THE LINGUISTIC TURN?. Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology, 2022, vol. 11 issue 2, pp. 558–583.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-2-558-583
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/38910
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: Frege and Husserl are traditionally regarded as the precursors of the linguistic turn; however, the
  importance of their ideas for this event still is not fully comprehended. This article contributes to
  such comprehension: the principles of the linguistic turn in its analytical interpretation provided by
  Rorty are applied as an indicator revealing the commonality and difference of Frege’s and Husserl’s
  positions regarding key issues of their concepts. The connection of the philosophers’ ideas with the
  linguistic turn is viewed in the context of their interpretation of predicativity, propositionality, contextuality
  of meaning, and ways of categorization. The analysis conducted gives rise to distinguishing
  between Frege’s and Husserl’s referential schemes. It is based on the differences in the characteristics
  of the connection between perception and predication. In conclusion, the arguments against
  Frege’s and Husserl’s involvement in the linguistic turn are emphasized. These arguments stem from
  the idea of the primacy of sense over language fundamental for both philosophers who proceed
  from the fact that certain a priori logical relations underlie utterances or other acts. There is a more
  solid argument which does not allow considering Frege’s and Husserl’s legacies as its source. This
  argument consists in the fact that they regard sense as an objective, communicable, and universal
  phenomenon independent of its carriers, not inherently linguistic, and pre-logical which is due to
  its intentional nature according to Husserl and logical “indecomposability” of concepts according
  to Frege.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology;Volume 11; Issue 2
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: meaning
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: sense
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: reference
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: contextuality
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: propositionality
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: meaning-conferring act
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: WHY PHENOMENOLOGY COULD NOT COMMIT THE LINGUISTIC TURN?
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 04_Medova.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/38910/1/04_Medova.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 662,04 kB