title: Implementation of Subgame-Perfect Cooperative Agreement in an Extensive-Form Game
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Kuzyutin, Denis
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Skorodumova, Yulia
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Smirnova, Nadezhda
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2021-11-29T20:25:21Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2021-11-29T20:25:21Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2021-10
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Kuzyutin D., Skorodumova Yu., Smirnova N. Implementation of Subgame-Perfect Cooperative Agreement in an Extensive-Form Game. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, XIV, 257-272.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.19
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/33701
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: A novel approach to sustainable cooperation called subgameperfect
  core (S-P Core) was introduced by P. Chander and M. Wooders in
  2020 for n-person extensive-form games with terminal payoffs. This solution
  concept incorporates both subgame perfection and cooperation incentives
  and implies certain distribution of the total players' payoff at the terminal
  node of the cooperative history. We use in the paper an extension of the S-P
  Core to the class of extensive games with payoffs defined at all nodes of the
  game tree that is based on designing an appropriate payoff distribution procedure
  β and its implementation when a game unfolds along the cooperative
  history. The difference is that in accordance with this so-called β-subgameperfect
  core the players can redistribute total current payoff at each node
  in the cooperative path. Moreover, a payoff distribution procedure from the
  β-S-P Core satisfies a number of good properties such as subgame efficiency,
  non-negativity and strict balance condition.
  In the paper, we examine different properties of the β-S-P Core, introduce
  several refinements of this cooperative solution and provide examples of its
  implementation in extensive-form games. Finally, we consider an application
  of the β-S-P Core to the symmetric discrete-time alternating-move model of
  fishery management.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: Funding: The reported study was funded by RFBR, project number 21-011-44058.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Contributions to Game Theory and Management;Volume 14
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: extensive game
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: sustainable cooperation
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: subgame-perfect equilibrium
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: core
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: payoff distribution procedure
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: renewable resource extraction
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Implementation of Subgame-Perfect Cooperative Agreement in an Extensive-Form Game
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 257-272.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/33701/1/257-272.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 493,41 kB