title: Assessing the explanatory power of naturalism in addressing ultimate questions
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Darvish Aghajani, Javad
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2021-08-25T19:22:24Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2021-08-25T19:22:24Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2021-06
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Darvish Aghajani J. Assessing the explanatory power of naturalism in addressing ultimate questions. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies, 2021, vol. 37, issue 2, pp. 217–228.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2021.203
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/32977
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: A typical scientist has no responsibility other than to explain how a natural event occurred.
  However, when a philosopher asks about the conditions under which a scientist’s explanation
  is true, he is, in fact, raising an ultimate question, the concept which Karl Popper used for the
  first time. Answering this question requires that no elements are neglected in the explanation,
  and no significant factors in the explanation are overlooked. In other words, in explaining a
  phenomenon, at any level of its explanation, there should be no remainder. These requirements
  can be achieved through the full explanation. In the present article, by drawing on
  concepts such as theory-ladenness of observation, underdetermination of theory by evidence,
  and the role of models and metaphors in developing a scientific theory, it is illustrated that a
  complete explanation includes both a scientific explanation and personal explanation. A personal
  explanation comprises mental properties such as belief, desire, and intention, which are
  irreducible to physical properties. Therefore, we cannot provide a personal explanation while
  restricting ourselves to scientific methods. Consequently, it is argued in this article first, the
  personal explanation is irreducible to a scientific explanation. Second, the personal explanation
  is inevitable in order to provide a full explanation. Third, (methodological) naturalists
  claim that the ultimate judgment of what is natural and unnatural is possible only by scientific
  inquiry. Finally, accepting these three premises entails the inability of a naturalist to answer
  ultimate questions.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Vestnik of St Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies;Volume 37; Issue 2
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: ultimate question
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: complete explanation
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: naturalism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: personal explanation
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: reductionism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Assessing the explanatory power of naturalism in addressing ultimate questions
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 217-228.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/32977/1/217-228.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 634,81 kB