title: Fichte’s “empty form of knowledge”
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: de Carvalho, Mário Jorge
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2019-11-14T10:23:29Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2019-11-14T10:23:29Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2019-09
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: de Carvalho M. J. Fichte’s “empty form of knowledge”. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies, 2019, vol. 35, issue 3, pp. 417–429.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2019.303
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/16579
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: This paper deals with Fichte’s Grundzüge, and in particular with his discussion of the “empty
  form of knowledge” he claims stands at the centre of the third — i.e., the present — age. Fichte
  speaks of a fundamental principle that forms the “common denominator” between the third
  and fourth main epochs. This fundamental principle — the “maxim of comprehensibility”
  (Maxime der Begreiflichkeit) — makes knowledge and comprehension the measure of all that
  “counts as being valid and as really existing”. But the question arises: How can one and the
  same principle act as the “unifying concept” for two different “main epochs of human life”?
  Does this not go directly against Fichte’s claim that two main epochs differ from each other in
  every respect, precisely because they produce two entirely different “unifying principles”, and
  because everything in them must reflect the difference between their “unifying principles”?
  Fichte’s answer to this question is as follows: a) the fundamental maxim in question allows for
  two diametrically opposed interpretations, so that each of them provides the principle or the
  “unifying concept” from which the third and fourth main epochs arise, and b) the third main
  epoch only gives rise to the empty form of science, as opposed to “truly real science”: it stands
  for a careless and easy-going, shallow, conventional, trivializing and incorrect conception of
  the “fundamental maxim of comprehensibility” — so that it misses what is essential, does not
  do justice to the fundamental maxim, overlooks its implications, and indeed goes against its
  innermost meaning.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Vestnik of St Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies;Volume 35; Issue 3
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Fichte
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Wissenschaftslehre
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: philosophy of history
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: form of knowledge
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: principle
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Fichte’s “empty form of knowledge”
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 417-429.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/16579/1/417-429.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 644,58 kB