title: A game-theoretic model of pollution control with asymmetric time horizons
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Gromova, Ekaterina V.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Tur, Anna V.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Balandina, Lidiya I.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2018-07-26T07:49:45Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2018-07-26T07:49:45Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2016
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Gromova, E.V., Tur, A.V. and Balandina, L.I., 2016. A game-theoretic model of pollution control with asymmetric time horizons. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 9(0), pp.170-179.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/11933
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description
metadata.value: Contributions to game theory and management, vol. X. Collected papers presented on the Tenth International Conference Game Theory and Management / Editors Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich. – SPb.: Saint Petersburg State University, 2017. – 404 p.
  The collection contains papers accepted for the Tenth International Conference Game Theory and Management (July 7-9, 2016, St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia).
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: In the contribution a problem of pollution control is studied within the game-theoretic framework (Kostyunin et al., 2013; Gromova and Plekhanova, 2015; Shevkoplyas and Kostyunin, 2011). Each player is assumed to have certain equipment whose functioning is related to pollution control. The i -th player's equipment may undergo an abrupt failure at time T i. The game lasts until any of the players' equipment breaks down. Thus, the game duration is defined as T=min(T 1 ,…,T n ), where T i is the time instant at which the i-th player stops the game.  We assume that the time instant of the i-th equipment failure is described by the Weibull distribution. According to Weibull distribution form parameter, we consider different scenarios of equipment exploitation, where each of player can be in “an infant”, “an adult” or “an aged” stage. The cooperative 2-player game with different scenarios is studied.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: This work was supported by the grant 9.38.245.2014 from St. Petersburg State University.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: Saint Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: differential game
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: cooperative game
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: pollution control
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: random duration
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Weibull distribution
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: A game-theoretic model of pollution control with asymmetric time horizons
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Other
metadata.lang: en_GB