title: Networks of directors on Russian boards: The hidden part of the corporate governance iceberg
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Zavertiaeva, Marina A.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: López-Iturriaga, Felix J.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2020-06-29T10:26:31Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2020-06-29T10:26:31Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2020-03
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Zavertiaeva M. A., López-Iturriaga F. J. 2020. Networks of directors on Russian boards: The hidden part of the corporate governance iceberg. Russian Management Journal 18 (1): 29–50.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu18.2020.102
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/18386
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: In this paper we apply social network analysis to study the boards of directors of 107 large
  listed Russian firms between 2009 and 2014. Traditional corporate governance metrics, such
  as demographic characteristics, experience, or multiple directorships, confirm that the boards
  of Russian firms show greater independence and are more well-qualified than before. We also
  find a decrease in the centrality of directors, which corroborates the diminishing concentration
  of power of some directors. The most connected firms have a specific profile since they are
  larger, have lower market valuations, and stronger ties with government (both due to higher
  proportions of government owned shares and a greater number of directors who are former
  politicians). Our findings also demonstrate that the boards of financial institutions are less connected,
  whereas political and independent directors are more centralized.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: This study comprises research findings from the project No. 18-18-00270 supported by the Russian Science
  Foundation.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Russian Management Journal;Volume 18; Issue 1
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: boards of directors
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: corporate governance
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Russia
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: social networks
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Networks of directors on Russian boards: The hidden part of the corporate governance iceberg
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 29-50.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/18386/1/29-50.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 288,07 kB