title: Social Welfare under Oligopoly: Does the Strengthening of Competition in Production Increase Consumers’ Well-Being?
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Parenti, Mathieu
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Sidorov, Alexander V.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Thisse, Jacques-Francois
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2018-07-19T11:10:44Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2018-07-19T11:10:44Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2017
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Parenti, M., Sidorov, A. P., & Thisse, J. F. (2017). Social welfare under oligopoly: does the strengthening of competition in production increase consumers well-being?. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 10(0), 233-244.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/10463
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description
metadata.value: In Contributions to game theory and management, vol. X. Collected papers presented on the Tenth International Conference Game Theory and Management / Editors Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich. – SPb.: Saint Petersburg State University, 2017. – 404 p.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The paper studies the detailed comparison of the Social welfare (indirect utility) under three types of imperfect competition in a general equilibrium model: quantity oligopoly (Cournot), price oligopoly (Bertrand) and monopolistic competition (Chamberlin). The folk wisdom implies that an increasing toughness of competition in sequence Cournot-Bertrand-Chamberlin results in increasing of consumers’ welfare (indirect utility). We show
  that this is not true in general. This is accomplished in a simple general equilibrium model where consumers are endowed with separable preferences. We find the sufficient condition in terms of the representative consumer preference providing the “intuitive” behavior of the indirect utility and show that this condition satisfy the classes of utility functions, which are commonly used in examples (e.g., CES, CARA and HARA). Moreover, we provide a series of numerical examples (and analytically verifiable conditions as well),
  which illustrate that violation of this condition may results in “counterintuitive” behavior of indirect utility, when the weakest level of competition (Cournot) provides the highest amount of the consumer’s welfare.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Fundamental Researches under grant No.15-06-05666.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: Saint Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Cournot competition
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Bertrand competition
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: free entry
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Lerner index
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: indirect utility
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Social Welfare under Oligopoly: Does the Strengthening of Competition in Production Increase Consumers’ Well-Being?
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Other
metadata.lang: en_GB