title: Does competition enforcement prevent competitive strategies of digital platforms: Evidence from BRICS
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Avdasheva, Svetlana B.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Korneeva, Dina V.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2020-02-20T12:56:00Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2020-02-20T12:56:00Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2019-12
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Avdasheva S.B., Korneeva V.D. 2019. Does competition enforcement prevent competitive strategies of digital platforms: Evidence from BRICS. Russian Management Journal 17 (4): 547–568.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu18.2019.408
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/17112
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: Competitive strategies of platforms often involve contractual arrangements that might be considered
  as anticompetitive. Since recent decisions of European Commission after investigations
  against Google in 2017 and 2018, and Bundeskartellamt against Facebook in 2019, the standards
  of liability for abuses applied by competition authorities will influence business models of digital
  platforms. This paper summarizes theories of harm applied by BRICS competition authorities
  applied towards multi-sided platforms under investigations. One may expect that BRICS approach
  to be harsher compared to mature competition jurisdictions. However, a comparison
  shows that discrimination and tying with exclusionary effects have been the focus of investigations
  and decisions in BRICS. Remedies in the infringement decisions are intended to protect
  rivalry through “no restriction of multihoming” conditions. There is no evidence that BRICS
  authorities apply a specific economic theory of multi-sided platforms. At the same time, BRICS
  competition enforcement could be applied as one of the legal instruments when one platform
  tries to crowd out another from global markets.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: This article is an output of a research project implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at the
  National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE).
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Russian Management Journal;Volume 17; Issue 4
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: multi-sided platform
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: competition policy
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: enforcement
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: theory of harm
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: BRICS
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Does competition enforcement prevent competitive strategies of digital platforms: Evidence from BRICS
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 547-568.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/17112/1/547-568.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 207,46 kB