title: Cooperative Game Theory Methods in the Analysis of Economic and Political Interaction at the International Level
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Konyukhovskiy, Pavel V.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Holodkova, Victoria V.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2021-11-26T19:30:04Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2021-11-26T19:30:04Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2021-10
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Konyukhovskiy P. V., Holodkova V. V. Cooperative Game Theory Methods in the Analysis of Economic and Political Interaction at the International Level. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, XIV, 192-215.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.15
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/33697
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The main attention is focused on the application of the methods
  of the theory of cooperative games to the analysis of the relationship between
  the leading actors in international politics, or, as they say, the centers
  of power. One of the speci c features of the modern world is the "triple
  type" of conflicts. Namely, at different levels of relationships, con ict situations
  with three participants (players) are often observed. Such situations
  are objectively characterized by the formation of possible paired coalitions,
  rejecting the third. The main idea of the proposed approach is the transition
  from cooperative games with deterministic values of characteristic functions
  to their counterparts with stochastic values. One of the possible concepts of
  solutions for stochastic cooperative games is associated with the extension
  of the ideas of the bargaining set to them. Problems of development and
  interpretation of this concept in the case of a triple conflict of international
  centers of power. An essential advantage of this approach is the possibility of
  meaningful interpretations of the significance level, at which the conditions
  for the rationality of the shares of the players should be ensured, taking into
  account the non-determinism of their utilities given by the characteristic
  function.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Contributions to Game Theory and Management;Volume 14
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: game theory
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: cooperative games
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: stochastic cooperative games
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: bargaining set
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: intercountry interaction
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: centers of power
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Cooperative Game Theory Methods in the Analysis of Economic and Political Interaction at the International Level
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 192-215.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/33697/1/192-215.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 990,6 kB