title: Probable opinions and solid outcomes: On the methodology of ethical expertise in the cultural sphere
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Brodsky, Alexander I.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2018-09-13T16:00:48Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2018-09-13T16:00:48Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2018-09
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Brodsky A. I. Probable opinions and solid outcomes: On the methodology of ethical expertise in the cultural sphere. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies, 2018, vol. 34, issue 3, pp. 324–332.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: 10.21638/11701/spbu17.2018.301
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/14811
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: When we attempt to apply the principles of ethical expertise — which originated, after all,
  in the field of biomedicine — to the sphere of culture, we face the fundamental problem of
  any expertise: the lack of a methodology that will enable at least the partial elimination of the
  influence of “subjective factors”, ranging from experts’ ideological and religious preferences
  to their personal moral qualities and emotional responses. This paper aims to develop such
  a methodology. To resolve this problem, the author proposes to revisit the forgotten art of
  casuistry, which was flourishing at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries. At
  that time, the golden rule of casuistry was to regard various ethical principles and norms as
  more or less plausible opinions (opinion probabilis). One could choose one of these opinions
  only after discussion and evaluation of each opinion and its outcomes in each specific case.
  Today, the use of casuistry in ethical expertise means that experts can proceed not from
  their own convictions and principles, but from an assessment of a specific situation, and a
  comparison between possible consequences resulting from the application of certain moral
  requirements to that situation. Only those conclusions which satisfy all the experts can be
  termed “justified”. However, such a consensus will be impossible if the experts base their
  conclusions not on an analysis of the consequences of a specific decision, but on their own
  favoured religious or ideological doctrines. Theoretically speaking, the author believes that
  casuistry as a method of ethical expertise implies not only an assessment of a particular case
  from the point of view of the general principles of morality but also the evaluation of these
  principles in light of their applicability to particular cases.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: This article was prepared for the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR), project Nr. 18-011-
  00673 «Methodology of ethical expertise in the field of culture».
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Vestnik of St Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies;Volume 34; Issue 3
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: ethics
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: expertise
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: culture
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: casuistry
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: opinions
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Probable opinions and solid outcomes: On the methodology of ethical expertise in the cultural sphere
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 01-Brodsky.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/14811/1/01-Brodsky.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 604,05 kB