title: CRISIS OF SCIENCES AND PHENOMENOLOGY: OVERCOMING OR RADICALIZATION?
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: BELOUSOV, MIKHAIL
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2022-07-07T12:38:29Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2022-07-07T12:38:29Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2022-03
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: BELOUSOV M. CRISIS OF SCIENCES AND PHENOMENOLOGY: OVERCOMING OR RADICALIZATION?. Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology, 2022, vol. 11 issue 1, pp. 40–72.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-40-72
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/37077
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: In his late works Husserl interprets the crisis of European sciences as the loss of their meaning for
  life. The diagnosis seems to suggest therapeutic strategy: to overcome the crisis, phenomenology must
  return to the evidences of the life-world. The article argues that the husserlian strategy of overcoming
  the crisis consists not in the elimination of the break with the prescientific evidences of the natural
  attitude, but, on the contrary, in the radicalization of the breach. Thus, I want to show that Husserl
  seeks to overcome the crisis of sciences by means of more radical crisis of phenomenology. In Husserl’s
  view, phenomenology must become the only science, which does not presuppose the life-world, since
  it problematizes it. I am going to argue also, that the counterintuitive strategy is not just of the historico-
  philosophical interest, but is meaningful for the actual philosophical understanding of the lifeworld.
  To justify those claims, I will proceed in three stages. In the first section of the article, I analyze
  the difference between the objective world and the life-world, which is the point of departure of husserlian
  interpretation of the crisis of sciences in Crisis. Bringing into correlation the difference between
  the objective world and the life-world in Crisis with the distinction of the ideal world and the real one in Ideas I, I disclose the ambiguity of husserlian interpretation of the crisis of European sciences. According
  to Husserl, the crisis arises, when science transcends the life-world through the idealizations,
  and, at the same time, presupposes the immediate prescientific evidences as something that is taken for
  granted. In the second section, I argue that the strategy of overcoming the crisis in Crisis is based on
  the phenomenological epoche, which allows for the porblematization of the life-world without presupposing
  it, Within this context I demonstrate the motivational unity of two reductions, performed by
  Husserl in Crisis–the reduction to the life-world, stripping the reality of the garb of ideas mistakingly
  taken to be the reality itself, and the reduction of the life-world, turning it into horizon and depriving
  phenomenologist of a right of relying on the life-worldly evidences, which is taken for granted in the
  natural science and renders it possible. The unity of the reductions indicates that phenomenological
  descent back down to the life-world is treated by Husserl as the radical break with the evidences of the
  natural life. The third section discusses the question, whether the problematical character of the lifeworld
  can be revealed only from the point of view of disinterested spectator, or it can be discovered, in
  a way, from within, in pretheoretical experience, which capacitates the life to problematizing itself and
  motivates phenomenological epoche. I argue that, although the question is not answered in a suitable
  way within husserlian analyses of the motivation for the epoche, the key to the solution of the problem
  is provided by the genetic phenomenology, since it thematizes the historicity of the life-world. I interpret
  the historicity as the ambivalent pretheoretical experience, constituting both the self-evidence and
  the problematical character of the life-world.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, project No. 20-011-00842
  “Formation and Transformation of Сoncepts in Phenomenological Philosophy. History of Terms
  and Discussions.”
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology;Volume 11; Issue 1
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: crisis of European sciences
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: epoche
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: life-world
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: objective world
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Husserl
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: idealization
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: historicity
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: CRISIS OF SCIENCES AND PHENOMENOLOGY: OVERCOMING OR RADICALIZATION?
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 03_Belousov.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/37077/1/03_Belousov.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
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