title: Do the buyback contracts of undistributed stocks coordinate the supply chain?
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Berezinets, Irina V.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Zenkevich, Nikolay A.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Rucheva, Alina S.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Nikolchenko, Natalia K.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2021-03-11T11:05:27Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2021-03-11T11:05:27Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2020-12
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Berezinets I. V., Zenkevich N. A., Rucheva A. S., Nikolchenko N. K. 2020. Do the buyback contracts of undistributed stocks coordinate the supply chain? Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Management 19 (4): 461–492.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu08.2020.403
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/25360
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The concept of supply chain coordination implies that it is possible to obtain an optimal result for
  both independent chain participants and supply chain due to participants’ coordinated actions.
  This paper examines the question whether a buyback contract will be coordinating or not. The
  authors argue that a coordinating buyback contract should have the following substantive properties:
  practical feasibility, collective and individual rationality. The paper off ers a mathematical
  defi nition of a coordinating buyback contract which highlights these properties. Entering into
  buyback contract process is considered as a two-step game of two players (a supplier and retailer)
  on the assumption that the players are risk neutral and make decisions with full information
  available, the market price is fixed, and the product demand is a random variable. The authors
  demonstrate that the buyback contract does not coordinate the chain, however, there has been
  obtained a non-empty set of eff ective contracts depending on the buyback price. For such contracts,
  the defi nition of “conditional coordination” is given to introduce the property of a supplier’s
  partial rationality; its existence was proved. The findings reveal that the choice of buyback
  price affects the allocation of profits between chain participants so the decision on its choice must
  be cooperative. To substantiate the nature of cooperative choice of conditionally coordinating
  contracts, the asymmetric Nash solution is considered. All results were obtained both in general
  terms and under the assumption that the product demand has uniform distribution. For the latter
  case, the conditionally coordinating contract parameters were found and it was justified that
  the conclusion of such a contract is possible only when a supplier has greater bargain power than
  a retailer.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: The research has been conducted with financial support from St. Petersburg State University (project
  No. 48952577).
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Vestnik of St Petersburg University. Management;Volume 19; Issue 4
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: supply chain management
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: supply chain coordination
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: coordinating contracts
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: conditionally coordinating buyback contracts
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Do the buyback contracts of undistributed stocks coordinate the supply chain?
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 461-492.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/25360/1/461-492.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 396,16 kB