title: Extended Warranty: An Approach via Stackelberg Game
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Santos, Henrique
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Cristino, Claudio
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Bruno, Guedes
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2018-02-06T15:44:46Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2018-02-06T15:44:46Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2017-12
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: 10.21638/11701/spbu18.2017.402
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/9099
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: This paper aims at showing how the game theory can be applied to the quantitative study
  of extended warranty (EW). This kind of after-sales service represents an additional noncompulsory
  coverage, which the consumer can or not buy after the acquisition of some
  device, starting subsequently to the end of the base warranty (BW) period. Thus, a model,
  in which two players interact, is shown, i. e. the original equipment manufacturer (OEM),
  in charge of assigning prices to the equipment and to the extended warranty service; and
  the customer (owner of the device). The way, in which the parts interact, is modeled through
  the Stackelberg leadership game, which was originally applied in the analysis of the oligopolies
  competition market. In this particular model, the leader represents the OEM and
  the follower is the customer, where the OEM’s goal is to find a certain price structure to maximize
  his profit and consequently influence the buyer’s decision. Through this adaptation,
  the strategies and payoffs of players are defined. The robustness of the model is due to incorporating
  elements of the economic theory (consumer’s surplus, producer’s surplus, consumer’s
  reservation price, choice under uncertainty, maximum profit and contingent consumption
  plan) and elements of the reliability theory (probability of failure and non-repairable
  systems). Additionally, a numerical example and a sensitivity analysis of parameters are
  presented to highlight the model. Finally, this research systematizes the steps of Stackelberg
  game under the modeling of extended warranty (EW) as well.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Russian Management Journal;Volume 15; Issue 4
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: extended warranty
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: game theory
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Stackelberg game
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: consumer’s reservation price
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Extended Warranty: An Approach via Stackelberg Game
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 02-Santos.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/9099/1/02-Santos.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 279,65 kB