title: Understood in itself and through itself: On Spinoza’s theory of substance
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Schmidt, Andreas
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2023-10-06T11:46:48Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2023-10-06T11:46:48Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2022
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Schmidt A. Understood in itself and through itself: On Spinoza’s theory of substance. Philosophy of the History of Philosophy, 2022, vol. 3, рр. 163–182. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu34.2022.111 (In Russian)
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu34.2022.111
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/44119
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The paper argues that Spinoza considers the inherence relation of substance and
  mode as being in need of explanation, and that he attempts to analyze it as a relation
  of conceptual implication. In the first part, I sketch the argument that leads Spinoza
  to substance monism, explaining the relation of substance, attribute, and mode in
  more detail. In the second and third parts, I argue that Spinoza explains both the
  relation of cause and effect and the inherence relation of substance and mode as relations
  of conceptual implication. Here the problem arises that there are cases of causal
  relations which are not at the same time inherence relations, namely causal relations
  between modes. To solve this problem, I propose to clarify Spinoza’s definition of
  mode in such a way that x is a mode of y only if the concept of x is contained in the concept of y and y is a substance. It follows that there can be no modes of modes —
  a position that Spinoza can be shown to actually hold. In the final section, I take
  a brief look at Leibniz’s reception of the Spinozan theory of inherence and at how
  Leibniz must modify it to avoid Spinoza’s monistic consequences.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Philosophy of the History of Philosophy;Volume 3
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Spinoza
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Leibniz
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: substance
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: mode
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: causality
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: inherence
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: implication
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Understood in itself and through itself: On Spinoza’s theory of substance
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 163-182.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/44119/1/163-182.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 671,57 kB