title: On the Value of the Preexisting Knowledge in an Optimal Control of Pollution Emissions
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Chebotareva, Angelina
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Su, Shimai
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Tretyakova, Sophia
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Gromova, Ekaterina
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2021-11-25T20:51:47Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2021-11-25T20:51:47Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2021-10
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Chebotareva A., Su Shimai, Tretyakova S., Gromova E. On the Value of the Preexisting Knowledge in an Optimal Control of Pollution Emissions. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, XIV, 49-58.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.04
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/33672
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: For a classical differential game of pollution control, we consider
  how the possession of specific information would impact the payoff of some
  players compared to cases in which the knowledge of information is incomplete.
  To measure the resulting discrepancy, we use the notion of value of
  information (VoI). Specifically, we study two scenarios, one in which the role
  of knowledge about the terminal cost is studied, and the other one, in which
  we analyze the influence of knowledge about the exact value of the upper
  bound on control. For each case, we obtain explicit analytical expressions for
  the payoff functions. These functions are used to quantify the exact value of
  information.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: The reported study was funded by RFBR and DFG, project number 21-51-12007.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Contributions to Game Theory and Management;Volume 14
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: differential game
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: pollution problems
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: value of information
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: optimal control and trajectory
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: On the Value of the Preexisting Knowledge in an Optimal Control of Pollution Emissions
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 49-58.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/33672/1/49-58.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 495,42 kB