title: LIBERTARIAN AND COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE OF JOHN RAWLS’S VIEWS AND THEIR EVOLUTION IN THE WORK “POLITICAL LIBERALISM”
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Shaveko, Nikolai A.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2020-03-04T11:57:10Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2020-03-04T11:57:10Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2018-06
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Shaveko N. A. 2018 LIBERTARIAN AND COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE OF JOHN RAWLS’S VIEWS AND THEIR EVOLUTION IN THE WORK “POLITICAL LIBERALISM”. Pravovedenie 62 (2): 382–399.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu25.2018.207
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/17137
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The article reviews critical remarks on the J. Rawls’s theory of justice proposed by the
  thinkers of the libertarian (Nozick) and communitarian (Sandel, Taylor, McIntire) directions,
  and makes an attempt to refute these criticisms. In particular, with help of neokantian
  and contemporary liberal philosophy of law it defends the Kantian approach to
  the problem of justice (a priori), the admissibility of the very formulation of the issue of
  distributive justice (the limited state intervention in the economy and private life is argued),
  and grounds the Kantian concept of personality applied by J. Rawls and its compatibility
  with providing of morality, ideals of brotherhood and love. Among other things,
  the “argument of Wilt Chamberlain” used by libertarians is rejected, and the possibility of
  meaningful judgments about justice in the Rawls’ situation of “initial position” is proved.
  The author argues that the universal liberal theory of justice can be compatible with its
  complementary moral ideals, but for this the latter must also withstand the test of universality.
  The author analyzes the main ideas proposed by J. Rawls in his work “Political
  Liberalism” (overlapping consensus, public reason) as a response to the objections of
  communitarists, and argues the author’s position on these ideas. In particular, it is demonstrated
  on the example of the worldview contradictions of believers, agnostics and
  atheists, that political liberalism is not philosophically neutral, and the idea of overlapping
  consensus has a limited scope. The conclusion is that the concept of justice cannot be
  philosophically neutral, and the Kantian approach to the problem of justice, also used by
  Rawls himself in the Theory of Justice, can be a philosophical basis, reflecting in the best
  way the generally accepted principles of freedom and equality.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Pravovedenie;Volume 62; Issue 2 (337)
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Rawls
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: libertarianism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: communitarianism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: a theory of justice
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: political liberalism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: overlapping consensus
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: public reason
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: LIBERTARIAN AND COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE OF JOHN RAWLS’S VIEWS AND THEIR EVOLUTION IN THE WORK “POLITICAL LIBERALISM”
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 382-399.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/17137/1/382-399.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 643,29 kB