title: Revenue Sharing Contracts for Value Chain Coordination: The Case of Motion Picture Industry in the USA
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Zenkevich, Nikolai A.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Gladkova, Margarita A.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2018-04-25T10:39:30Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2018-04-25T10:39:30Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2018-03
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Zenkevich N. A., Gladkova M. A. Revenue Sharing Contracts for Value Chain Coordination: The Case of Motion Picture Industry in the USA. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Management, 2018, vol. 17, issue 1, pp. 26–45.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: 10.21638/11701/spbu08.2018.102
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/9457
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: Value chain includes many participants whose main objectives are to maximize their own profit. However, the maximum of the whole value chain is not always achieved. Moreover, members may distort true earnings in order to increase their revenue part. There appears a need in contract revision to diminish the risk of opportunistic behavior. The paper aims to improve and test the incentive income imputation procedure based on specific revenue-sharing contracts which coordinate film value chain. The coordination concept of supply chain has been modified and applied to the motion picture industry. The suggested approach introduces transfer prices to the members of the chain and allows the transformation of counteragents’ participation contracts to sharing contracts. This innovation proves chain members’ motivation to maximize the total gain of the chain since the transfer price is constructed on the basis of the costs of the members and their shares in the final allocation of revenues. The developed approach can support decision-making in efficiency improvement at the stage of film value chain establishment. It gives the mathematically justified solutions which can serve as a starting point during contract negotiations between members of the film value chain. The approach has been tested on the case studies from the USA motion picture industry and the applicability of coordinating contracts is demonstrated.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: This study was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, projects No 16–01–00805А and No 17–07–00371.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Vestnik of St Petersburg University. Management;Volume 17; Issue 1
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: sharing contract
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: coordinating contract
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: value chain
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: value chain coordination
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: motion picture
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: motion picture industry stakeholders
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: box-office revenue
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: transfer prices
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Revenue Sharing Contracts for Value Chain Coordination: The Case of Motion Picture Industry in the USA
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 02-Zenkevich.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/9457/1/02-Zenkevich.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 314,42 kB