title: Corruption in Public Procurement: efficient and quasi-efficient
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Ivanov, Andrei E.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2015-04-22T16:52:42Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2015-04-22T16:52:42Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2013
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/1447
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: In the public procurement legislation of the Russian Federation auctions are considered to be the primary procurement method. Having originally introduced live outcry auctions, the Russian authorities were forced to replace them with e-auctions due to many cases of collusion. However first results of applying of e-auctions unexpectedly revealed a significant reduction in the competition in the auctions.
  The paper argues that this reduction cannot be explained only by corruptive behavior of the mala fide contracting authority trying to limit the competition in the favor of the selected supplier for kickbacks. The paper treats the hypothesis of buyer's quasi-corruptive behavior: the bona fide contracting authority is trying to limit the competition in the favor of the selected supplier too but for avoiding the risks which items from the applying English auction for purchasing of the differentiated goods.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: OBEGEF – Observatório de Economia e Gestão de Fraude
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Working Paper;26
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: public procurement
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: corruption in auction
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: principal-agent model
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: efficient corruption
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: quasi-efficient corruption
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Corruption in Public Procurement: efficient and quasi-efficient
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Working Paper
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: Ivanov_Working Paper #26.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/1447/1/Ivanov_Working%20Paper%20%2326.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 553,97 kB