title: Naturalistic ontology and epistemology of moral facts
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Frolov, Konstantin G.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2022-09-20T16:41:57Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2022-09-20T16:41:57Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2022-06
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Frolov K. G. Naturalistic ontology and epistemology of moral facts. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies, 2022, vol. 38, issue 2, pp. 204–217.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2022.205
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/37826
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The paper presents an original version of the moral naturalism — a theory that combines
  moral realism and naturalistic empiricism. In the first section, I give initial definitions of the
  basic concepts for our study (such as moral realism, epistemological and metaphysical naturalism,
  supervenience) and clarify their meaning. In the second section, I present the main
  motivation for this study and those grounds on which we should try to defend both moral
  realism and naturalism. In the third section, we take a series of steps aimed at the explication
  of the logical form of moral facts. The advantage of the proposed logical form is that it allows
  us to argue that knowledge of such facts can be a result of knowledge of the physical properties
  of objects. This implies that moral realism and epistemological naturalism are compatible.
  In the fourth section, I demonstrate another feature of the proposed logical form: it is similar
  to the logical form of some other, much less controversial modal facts (such as, for example,
  facts about physical possibilities). This similarity allows us to propose some kind of analogy of
  Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility for moral facts. Doing so I show how moral
  facts can supervene on the totality of all physical facts. In the fifth section, I analyze the most
  serious problem for moral naturalism: Hume’s guillotine. In the sixth final section, I present
  the main argument of this paper and make some remarks.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: The work was supported by the grant of the President of Russia for young researchers, project MK-
  703.2021.2.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Vestnik of St Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies;Volume 38; Issue 2
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: ethics
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: metaethics
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: ontology
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: moral realism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: moral argumentation
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: naturalism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: supervenience
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Hume’s guillotine
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Naturalistic ontology and epistemology of moral facts
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 14040-Текст статьи-46310-1-10-20220728.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/37826/1/14040-%d0%a2%d0%b5%d0%ba%d1%81%d1%82%20%d1%81%d1%82%d0%b0%d1%82%d1%8c%d0%b8-46310-1-10-20220728.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
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