title: DUTY AND MORAL WORLD-VIEW IN “THE PHENMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT” AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF DING AN SICH
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: BELOUSOV, MIKHAIL
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2024-02-02T14:55:25Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2024-02-02T14:55:25Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2023-09
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: BELOUSOV M. DUTY AND MORAL WORLD-VIEW IN “THE PHENMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT” AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF DING AN SICH. Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology, 2023, vol. 12 issue 2, pp. 502–530.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2023-12-2-502-530
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/44791
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The question of the world in itself — the world beyond its correlation with experience in the broadest
  sense — is one of the sore points of phenomenology and becomes especially acute in the light of
  modern discussions around correlationism. These discussions, in one way or another, make phenomenology
  come around to the classical distinction between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself,
  with the help of which Kant outlines the field of ethics as a special world lying on the other side of the
  correlation of knowledge and object constitutive for nature. Philosophy deals with the thing-in-itself
  in the proper, positive sense of the word, not as phenomenology (transcendental philosophy, which
  reveals the correlation of knowledge and reality in the world of phenomena and the futility of attempts
  by theoretical reason to know anything beyond phenomena), but as a critique of practical reason. The
  article attempts to consider the opposition of the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon in the context
  of the criticism that Kant’s practical philosophy is subjected to in Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit and to explicate the arguments that this criticism makes available to phenomenology for rethinking
  the problem of Ding an sich and the ethical dimension of the epoche. The first part of the article examines
  the Hegelian analysis of the main contradiction contained in the Kantian opposition of duty
  as something that is in itself, and nature as a phenomenon (this opposition forms what Hegel calls the
  moral worldview): duty does not depend on nature and therefore does not need natural (phenomenal)
  realization in actions, but at the same time, duty is nothing but the necessity of actions and, consequently,
  the necessity of a phenomenon. This contradiction, as Hegel shows, leads to the disintegration
  of the moral worldview and, thus, turns into the sublation of the absolute separation of duty (thing in
  itself) and nature (phenomenon). The restitution of the difference between the moral an sich and the
  phenomenon within conscience — a phenomenon that arises as a result of the destruction of the moral
  worldview — turns into a new paradox, which demonstrates that the thing-in-itself (ethical good),
  since it is freed from the phenomenon, is not only unreal, but also turns into its own opposite. The paradox
  consists in the fact that the consciousness of duty, taken in its independence from the phenomenal
  realization in actions, becomes evil itself, turning to hypocrisy in the moral judgment about other people’s
  actions. In the second part of the article, the significance of the Hegelian critique of Kant’s practical
  philosophy for the phenomenological destruction of the difference between the thing-in-itself and the
  phenomenon and the problematization of the ethical dimension of the phenomenological method is
  explicated. Tracing the naive origins of this difference in the natural attitude and their transformation
  in Kantian philosophy, the author tries to consider the sublation of the opposition of the thing-in-itself
  and the phenomenon in the field of ethics as one of the possible paths to phenomenology. It is shown
  how the necessary relation of the supra-worldly an sich with the situational nature of its phenomenal
  realization in actions calls into question the possibility of a phenomenological epoche. The author also
  seeks to demonstrate that the problematization of the difference between the thing-in-itself and the
  phenomenon does not turn phenomenology into a system in the Hegelian sense.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: The research was prepared with the funding from Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, grant
  project “Critical thinking as an object of critics in the history of Russian and European thought”.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology;Volume 12; Issue 2
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: duty
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: moral world-view
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: thing in itself
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: appearance
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: phenomenology
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Hegel
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Kant
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: DUTY AND MORAL WORLD-VIEW IN “THE PHENMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT” AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF DING AN SICH
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 13_Белоусов.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/44791/1/13_%d0%91%d0%b5%d0%bb%d0%be%d1%83%d1%81%d0%be%d0%b2.pdf
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