title: “I” and collective responsibility
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Bakeeva, Elena V.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Biricheva, Ekaterina V.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2021-09-03T17:19:25Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2021-09-03T17:19:25Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2021-03
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Bakeeva E. V., Biricheva E. V. “I” and collective responsibility. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies, 2021, vol. 37, issue 1, pp. 41–52.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2021.104
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/33034
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The article discusses the link of collective moral responsibility with “I” as an act of the realization
  of subjectness. The authors provide and verify the thesis about the primacy of “I” to
  any forms and cases of collective responsibility. The notion of “I” is reexamined taking into
  account the critique of the subject undertaken in the so-called “post-metaphysical” (J. Habermas)
  philosophy. The key point of this critique is the rejection of the understanding of “I” and
  of the subject as unchanging metaphysical entities. In this situation, it is of paramount importance
  to distinguish the dynamic core of “I”, which is free from any metaphysical connotation.
  In addressing this issue, the authors build on the concept of “I” as a responsible act (deed) as
  presented in works of Mikhail Bakhtin. According to this concept, “I” does not precede the
  act but is born in the actual responsible act in the face of an Other. This action turns out to be
  devoid of content here and is interpreted as an act of accepting responsibility in the face of the
  Absolute instance. Such an interpretation of “I” makes it possible to retain the possibility of a
  responsible act within the growing anonymity of a contemporary social being and to substantiate
  manifestations of collective responsibility in collective actions. The final part of the article
  lists the basic features that characterize the link of “I” as an act and collective responsibility.
  Of these features, the main one is associated with the impossibility of “external” vesting of
  responsibility to anyone due to his/her belonging to a certain community. Collective responsibility
  may be recognized only in the “inner” dimension of a personal act. Hence follows a
  fundamental asymmetry that characterizes the phenomenon of responsibility in general and
  collective responsibility in particular.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Vestnik of St Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies;Volume 37; Issue 1
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: “I”
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: collective responsibility
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: act
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: deed
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Immanuel Kant
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Mikhail Bakhtin
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: “I” and collective responsibility
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 41-52.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/33034/1/41-52.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 649,99 kB