title: Models of optimal control in Tullock rent-seeking game
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Fedyanin, Denis N.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2020-11-19T09:27:23Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2020-11-19T09:27:23Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2020-09-01
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/20694
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The paper constructs and investigates the models of the optimal control in the Tullock rent-seeking game. There are two types of control in the paper: an unlimited, but expensive resource, and a cheap, but an infinitely small resource. Before the game starts, players discuss parameters of the game, and then choose their strategies simultaneously and independently, competing for better rent. We consider two types of players and two types of communication and analyze combinations.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St. Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Contributions to Game Theory and Management, vol. XIII, 132–141;
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Models of optimal control in Tullock rent-seeking game
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: Fedyanin(132-141).pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/20694/1/Fedyanin%28132-141%29.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 280,76 kB