title: Dynamic Cournot Oligopoly Models of the State Promotion of Innovative Electronic Courses in Universities
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Kalachev, Vassily Yu.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Ougolnitsky, Guennady A.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Usov, Anatoly B.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2024-02-26T17:33:42Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2024-02-26T17:33:42Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2023
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2023.05
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/44947
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: We built and investigated a two-level dynamic game theoretic
  model of control of the state promotion of innovative electronic courses in
  universities based on Cournot oligopoly. A federal state is the Principal, and
  universities competing a la Cournot are agents. The agents invest in the
  development of new electronic educative courses that is considered as their
  innovative investments. The Principal gives subsidies to the agents for the
  promotion of innovations. The agents play a dynamic game in normal form
  that results in a Nash equilibrium, and the Principal solves an inverse Stackelberg
  game (a Germeier game of the type Γ2t). We investigated different
  types of strategies: (1) uniform strategies for all agents; (2) type-dependent
  (agent efficiency-dependent) strategies; (3) action-dependent strategies. For
  a specific form of the model functions we found a solution in explicit form,
  and in the general case we used a method of qualitatively representative
  scenarios in simulation modeling. We analyzed the results by means of the
  individual and collective relative efficiency indices.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: en
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Contributions to Game Theory and Management;Volume 16
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: Cournot oligopoly
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: inverse dynamic Stackelberg games
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: simulation modeling
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: university management
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: Dynamic Cournot Oligopoly Models of the State Promotion of Innovative Electronic Courses in Universities
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 74-86.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/44947/1/74-86.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 576,07 kB