title: JUSTIFICATION OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE: REPRESENTATIONALISM AND DIRECT REALISM
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: GUSEV, ALEXANDER
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2024-06-27T18:23:10Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2024-06-27T18:23:10Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2024-03
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: GUSEV A. JUSTIFICATION OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE: REPRESENTATIONALISM AND DIRECT REALISM. Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology, 2024, vol. 13 issue 1, pp. 129–149.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2024-13-1-129-149
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/45629
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: The paper examines two of the most influential approaches to the problem of the justification of perceptual
  knowledge: representationalism and direct realism, taken in a version of epistemological disjunctivism.
  The problem itself can be represented as the need to demonstrate that there is a logical
  connection between a statement about the perception of a certain fact, p, and a statement about the
  knowledge of p. The article notes that both approaches face the problem of “the silence of the senses.”
  This problem was pointed out by Ch. Travis, who tried to show that the content of sensory experience
  is not propositional; senses themselves do not tell us what fact we are dealing with when perceptually
  interacting with the world. The first part of the article reconstructs the argument from looks that
  Travis proposed to criticize representationalism. This part demonstrates that we cannot accept representationalism
  as an approach in the philosophy of perception that successfully overcomes the shortcomings
  of sense data theory. The main drawback of this theory was its adherence to the myth of the
  given—the idea that in perceptual experience we are dealing with non-propositional, non-conceptual
  “raw” data. The second part of the paper notes that Travis’s argument can also be directed against
  such a version of direct realism as epistemological disjunctivism, since according to representatives of this theory, the content of veridical perceptual experience, being identical with the perceived state
  of affairs, is propositional. This part also analyzes the response to Travis from such a representative of
  this theory as J. McDowell. While McDowell rejects propositionalism, he nevertheless insists that the
  content of perceptual experience must be regarded as conceptual. It allows us to avoid the myth of the
  given. In conclusion, criticism of McDowell’s approach from the phenomenological position taken by
  H. Dreyfus is discussed, and it is noted that McDowell’s conceptualism is quite compatible with both
  phenomenology and enactivism. The enactivist understanding of perception that we find in McDowell
  leads us to accept the enactivist account of perceptual knowledge, where the foundation of knowledge
  is action, i.e. something epistemically groundless.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.description.sponsorship
metadata.value: The study was supported by a grant from the Russian Science Foundation No. 23-28-00862,
  https://rscf.ru/en/project/23-28-00862/.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology;Volume 13; Issue 1
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: epistemology
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: perception
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: perceptual knowledge
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: justification
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: representationalism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: epistemological disjunctivism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: enactivism
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: phenomenology
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: JUSTIFICATION OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE: REPRESENTATIONALISM AND DIRECT REALISM
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 07_Гусев-129-149.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/45629/1/07_%d0%93%d1%83%d1%81%d0%b5%d0%b2-129-149.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
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