title: THE MAXIM “LAW DOES NOT ARISE FROM THE VIOLATION OF LAW” AND THE MODIFICATION OF PEREMPTORY NORMS
metadata.name: dc.contributor.author
metadata.value: Chernichenko, Stanislav V.
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.accessioned
metadata.value: 2020-03-04T09:38:26Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.available
metadata.value: 2020-03-04T09:38:26Z
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.date.issued
metadata.value: 2018-03
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.citation
metadata.value: Chernichenko S. V. 2018. THE MAXIM “LAW DOES NOT ARISE FROM THE VIOLATION OF LAW” AND THE MODIFICATION OF PEREMPTORY NORMS. Pravovedenie 62 (1): 6–19.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.identifier.other
metadata.value: https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu25.2018.101
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.identifier.uri
metadata.value: http://hdl.handle.net/11701/17118
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.description.abstract
metadata.value: Maxim “ex injuria jus non oritur” is not only a general legal, but also an international legal
  principle, which states that law doesn’t arise from the violation of law. However, peremptory
  norms of international law (jus cogens) are not something frozen. They develop, like
  international law in general, so the latter expressly provides for the possibility of their
  modification by subsequent norms of the same nature. This inevitably means that, in the
  period of changing such norms, the behavior of some states will contradict the previous
  peremptory norm until the emergence of a new peremptory norm is recognized by the
  international community of states. Does the change of imperative norms result in an exception
  to the above-mentioned maxim? And how do you know whether the actions of the
  state or group of states have created a new peremptory norm of international law, or they
  are merely a violation of the already existing peremptory norm? Can moral considerations
  justify the state’s withdrawal from the maxim of “ex injuria jus non oritur” in the name of
  creating a new peremptory norm of international law? Or is such a deviation justified by
  the conformity of the state’s actions to any other norms? Having examined these issues,
  the author comes to the conclusion that, unlike the positive law, natural law does not know
  exceptions to the maxim. The author proves that the ground for the emergence of new
  peremptory norms of international law creates changes in natural law.
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.language.iso
metadata.value: ru
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.publisher
metadata.value: St Petersburg State University
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.relation.ispartofseries
metadata.value: Pravovedenie;Volume 62; Issue 1 (336)
metadata.lang: -
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: peremptory norms of international law
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: the Vienna convention on the law of treaties 1969
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: the UN International Law Commission
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.subject
metadata.value: modification of peremptory norms
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.title
metadata.value: THE MAXIM “LAW DOES NOT ARISE FROM THE VIOLATION OF LAW” AND THE MODIFICATION OF PEREMPTORY NORMS
metadata.lang: en_GB
metadata.name: dc.type
metadata.value: Article
metadata.lang: en_GB
resources.filename: 6-19.pdf
resources.url: https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/17118/1/6-19.pdf
resources.format: Adobe PDF
resources.size: 681,41 kB