- Concept of biological and
toxin weapons
- Main international documents
on prohibition of biological and toxin weapons
- Main international obligations
on prohibition of biological and toxin weapons
- International control over observance
of obligations on prohibition of biological and toxin weapons
- Implementation of the control
over observance of the Convention in Russia
- Reflection of principles and
standards, associated with fullfilment of international obligations
on prohibition of biological weapons in Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation
- Main laws and resolutions regulating
the implementation of the Convention
International Control over Observance of Obligations on Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons
Protocol of 1925 and Convention of 1972, which put
a ban on a whole kind of mass destruction weapon, are of great international
significance. The effectiveness restatement and strengthening of the
Convention, as recognized by the world community, remains as the actual
task in the light of new developments in biology and biotechnology,
that may have "double" assignment. The Convention contains no provisions,
providing for international control over their observance, therefore
the measures on its strengthening are being developed.
The 2nd (1986) and the 3rd (1991) Conferences on Review of the Convention actions to increase the openness of biological works made a decisions on representation by States Parties on the UN Security Council of information on biological activities and facilities within frameworks of confidence building measures. Such information is given annually and includes:
- data on research centres and laboratories, that satisfy the highest national and international safety standards (Measure A, part 1);
- the information on national programmes of research and developments in the field of biological protection, including declarations on facilities, at which these programmes are exercised. This measure also includes information, concerning contractors and available publications (Measure A, part 2);
- information on bursts of infectious diseases and similar phenomena, caused by toxins, which, as is given, depart from standard (Measure В);
- publications of biological research results, directly concerned with the Convention, and assistance in using knowledge (Measure C);
- information on promotion contacts between scientists, other experts and facilities, involved in biological research, which are directly related to the Convention, including exchanges and visits to carry out joint studies on mutually coordinated basis (Measure D);
- declarations on legislation, regulations and other measures, including those in respect of export and/or import of pathogenic microorganisms in accordance with the Convention (Measure E);
- declarations on past activities within frameworks of offensive and/or defense programmes of biological research and development since January 1, 1946 (Measure F) ;
- declarations on vaccines production facilities, allowed by the State Party to protect people (Measure G).
The 3rd Conference (1991) made a decision on establishment of Ad hoc Group of Governmental Experts (AGGE) to identify and learn of potential measures of examination of the Convention's implementation from scientific and technical points of views. The Group had studied 21 potential measures of examination and stated, that the measures alone did not allow to hold the distinction between inhibited and permissible activities do not permit, however the application of this measures in combination may be useful.
The Special Conference (1994) approved the AGGE report and instituted the Special Group of States Parties with a view to develop international juridical obligatory document (Protocol) on strengthening of the Convention. It provided for, that this document will be offered the Convention States Parties for signing and ratification (i. e. it will have status of the UN document).
Mandate of Special Group provides for, that the Group considers, among others: term definitions; objective criteria; inclusion of existing or strengthened measures of confidence and transparency; system of measures in order to foster the Convention adhering; actions, reckoned on support of efficient and full implementation of article X of the Convention. The measures must be formulated and carried out thus, to ensure the protection of sensitive business information and legal needs of national security, avoid the adverse effect on scientific research, international co-operation and industrial development.
The draft text of the Protocol is composed on the basis of States' proposals and now its editing, definition, search of consensus decisions on effectiveness of its provisions are being carryied out. In accordance with these proposals in a future Protocol to the Convention may be included following measures:
- obligatory declarations of: protection programmes against biological weapon; objects, involved in implementation of these programmes; former offensive and defensive biological programmes; vaccinal productions; facilities for production of plants inoculum; highly separated premises; objects, operating with agents and/or toxins specified in lists; industrial facilities, possessing by certain fermentation potential and producing pharmaceutical, medical, veterinary preparations, plant protection means and other preparations; facilities, disposing of aerosol test chambers and equipment for aerosols investigation in opened air; facilities, conducting works on genetic modification of microorganisms; data on export and import (transfer) of biological agents, toxins, and equipment; information on natural and unusual bursts of diseases;
- visits of declared (perhaps, and undeclared) facilities to check their activity and declarations represented by the Protocol States Parties;
- investigations of presumptive use of biological weapons and any other presumptive violation of obligations under the Convention, bursts of diseases, associated with emission or affect of microbial or other biological agents and toxins on human beings, animals and plants;
- confidence building measures;
- measures on scientific and technical exchange and cooperation;
- national measures on Protocol implementation.
The States Parties suggestions envisage the creation of specific international organization, as well as national bodies of States Parties on realization of mechanism under development for strengthening of the Convention. The mechanism, which is being developed for strengthening (but in essence - for control) of the Convention, by its wide coverage may come close to such on the Convention on Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. However the terms of implementation of the Protocol to the Convention would be essentially differ.
According to the resolution of the 4th Conference (1996) the work on juridical obligatory document is to be terminated by the 5th Conference (2001).
The Russian delegation in talks on Protocol elaboration spoke in favour of the development of a mechanism for strengthening of the Convention. The mechanism should be efficient, economical, equal in rights, not discriminatory, not rendering negative impact on the national interests of the States Parties of the Convention. In the closing stage of those negotiations substantive disputes were defined between delegacies, participating in the work of the Special Group on Principle Control Measures of Biological and Biotechnological Activity.
At the last 24th session of the Special Group (July - August of 2001), due to unacceptability of articles of the draft Protocol for USA, the work on text was held up. It is supposed, that the further fate of the draft Protocol will be defined on the 5th Conference on Review of the Convention actions.
The 2nd (1986) and the 3rd (1991) Conferences on Review of the Convention actions to increase the openness of biological works made a decisions on representation by States Parties on the UN Security Council of information on biological activities and facilities within frameworks of confidence building measures. Such information is given annually and includes:
- data on research centres and laboratories, that satisfy the highest national and international safety standards (Measure A, part 1);
- the information on national programmes of research and developments in the field of biological protection, including declarations on facilities, at which these programmes are exercised. This measure also includes information, concerning contractors and available publications (Measure A, part 2);
- information on bursts of infectious diseases and similar phenomena, caused by toxins, which, as is given, depart from standard (Measure В);
- publications of biological research results, directly concerned with the Convention, and assistance in using knowledge (Measure C);
- information on promotion contacts between scientists, other experts and facilities, involved in biological research, which are directly related to the Convention, including exchanges and visits to carry out joint studies on mutually coordinated basis (Measure D);
- declarations on legislation, regulations and other measures, including those in respect of export and/or import of pathogenic microorganisms in accordance with the Convention (Measure E);
- declarations on past activities within frameworks of offensive and/or defense programmes of biological research and development since January 1, 1946 (Measure F) ;
- declarations on vaccines production facilities, allowed by the State Party to protect people (Measure G).
The 3rd Conference (1991) made a decision on establishment of Ad hoc Group of Governmental Experts (AGGE) to identify and learn of potential measures of examination of the Convention's implementation from scientific and technical points of views. The Group had studied 21 potential measures of examination and stated, that the measures alone did not allow to hold the distinction between inhibited and permissible activities do not permit, however the application of this measures in combination may be useful.
The Special Conference (1994) approved the AGGE report and instituted the Special Group of States Parties with a view to develop international juridical obligatory document (Protocol) on strengthening of the Convention. It provided for, that this document will be offered the Convention States Parties for signing and ratification (i. e. it will have status of the UN document).
Mandate of Special Group provides for, that the Group considers, among others: term definitions; objective criteria; inclusion of existing or strengthened measures of confidence and transparency; system of measures in order to foster the Convention adhering; actions, reckoned on support of efficient and full implementation of article X of the Convention. The measures must be formulated and carried out thus, to ensure the protection of sensitive business information and legal needs of national security, avoid the adverse effect on scientific research, international co-operation and industrial development.
The draft text of the Protocol is composed on the basis of States' proposals and now its editing, definition, search of consensus decisions on effectiveness of its provisions are being carryied out. In accordance with these proposals in a future Protocol to the Convention may be included following measures:
- obligatory declarations of: protection programmes against biological weapon; objects, involved in implementation of these programmes; former offensive and defensive biological programmes; vaccinal productions; facilities for production of plants inoculum; highly separated premises; objects, operating with agents and/or toxins specified in lists; industrial facilities, possessing by certain fermentation potential and producing pharmaceutical, medical, veterinary preparations, plant protection means and other preparations; facilities, disposing of aerosol test chambers and equipment for aerosols investigation in opened air; facilities, conducting works on genetic modification of microorganisms; data on export and import (transfer) of biological agents, toxins, and equipment; information on natural and unusual bursts of diseases;
- visits of declared (perhaps, and undeclared) facilities to check their activity and declarations represented by the Protocol States Parties;
- investigations of presumptive use of biological weapons and any other presumptive violation of obligations under the Convention, bursts of diseases, associated with emission or affect of microbial or other biological agents and toxins on human beings, animals and plants;
- confidence building measures;
- measures on scientific and technical exchange and cooperation;
- national measures on Protocol implementation.
The States Parties suggestions envisage the creation of specific international organization, as well as national bodies of States Parties on realization of mechanism under development for strengthening of the Convention. The mechanism, which is being developed for strengthening (but in essence - for control) of the Convention, by its wide coverage may come close to such on the Convention on Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. However the terms of implementation of the Protocol to the Convention would be essentially differ.
According to the resolution of the 4th Conference (1996) the work on juridical obligatory document is to be terminated by the 5th Conference (2001).
The Russian delegation in talks on Protocol elaboration spoke in favour of the development of a mechanism for strengthening of the Convention. The mechanism should be efficient, economical, equal in rights, not discriminatory, not rendering negative impact on the national interests of the States Parties of the Convention. In the closing stage of those negotiations substantive disputes were defined between delegacies, participating in the work of the Special Group on Principle Control Measures of Biological and Biotechnological Activity.
At the last 24th session of the Special Group (July - August of 2001), due to unacceptability of articles of the draft Protocol for USA, the work on text was held up. It is supposed, that the further fate of the draft Protocol will be defined on the 5th Conference on Review of the Convention actions.