

**“DISRUPTING” OR “COMPLEMENTING”: DIASPORA’S
IDENTITY AGENDA IN THE CONTEXT OF CHANGING
ARMENIAN FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES**

Introduction

Studying the structure and revealing the power of the Armenian Diaspora³⁸—which is the most well organized community of Armenians around the world³⁹—is complicated. The Armenian Diaspora is not a monolithic body and it is mainly focused on cultural, political and socio-economic issues. It’s impossible to coordinate Diaspora activity and govern it from one center⁴⁰. We can argue that a Diaspora’s diverse culture and

³⁸ In this article we’ll classify the Armenian Diaspora into four “communities”. The Armenians of Turkey, the majority of whom suffered from the Genocide and do not consider themselves as a Diaspora. The Georgian Armenians – especially Armenians in Samtskhe-Javakheti – and Iranian Armenians are in a similar situation: most of them are the descendents of Armenians deported from Eastern Armenia by Shah Abbas in the beginning of 17th century. We called the second category the Diaspora formed after the Genocide “Primary” or “Post-Genocide Diaspora”. The third community is made up of Soviet Armenian citizens, who are dissidents from the USSR and who found shelter in Europe and the USA. The final group is the Post-Independence (1991-on) Diaspora communities, which were formed in CIS countries, especially in the Russian Federation.

³⁹ There are more than 10 million Armenians living around the world. More than 7 million Armenians live in the Diaspora, and 3.5 million Armenians live in Armenia.

⁴⁰For the purpose of this paper, we define Diaspora as presented in Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth’s *“Diasporas and International Relations Theory:”* “People with a common origin who reside more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland—whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under foreign control. Diaspora members identify themselves, or are identified by others—inside and out—side their homeland—as part of the homeland’s national community, and as such are often called upon to participate, or are entangled, in homeland-related affairs,” *International Organization, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Summer, 2003), pp. 449-479.*

ideology make the expatriate community a viable and effective part of the nation, especially if the Diaspora exists in a liberal and open society.

A survey of experts, analysts, Armenian and Diaspora political elite, supported these theses⁴¹.

We'll not discuss here the genesis of the Armenian Diaspora or its problems. But we will explore the political inclinations of Armenian officials, the unrecognized republic of Nagorno Karabakh, and the Diaspora – referred to in this paper as the “united triplet” – examining their political convictions and attitudes toward issues like inter-national dialogue; political and economic aid to the two Armenian states; culture; and history. We will also consider the united triplet's views on the Diaspora's role in Armenian foreign policy and Diaspora agendas regarding Yerevan's international relationships.

Phrases of Transformation in the Diaspora Agenda

The main problem facing Diaspora Armenians is the preservation of national identity. Over the span of one century, they have established schools, churches, cultural homes and pan-Armenian organizations in host countries. After the independence of their native land, they undertook significant, but cautious, steps to reach a new level of cooperation with their ancestral land. This new concept inspired many politicians, both in Armenia and abroad, to declare that the Diaspora was the nation's “black gold,” a reference to Azerbaijan's oil and gas pipelines to the Black Sea.

The independence of Soviet Armenia, the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide and the question of financial, moral and territorial compensation for victims of the Genocide were

⁴¹The survey was conducted as a case study to measure the role and factor of national identity on supposed the role and factor of national identity on state foreign policy. The 50 respondents were representatives of internal and foreign decision making bodies from Armenia, Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR) and five Diaspora communities-France, Lebanon, Syria, USA and Russia. The survey questionnaire consisted of four parts: the components of identity, foreign policy orientation, Armenia-NKR-Diaspora relations and lobbying within networks.

the main goals of Armenian groups⁴² in the Diaspora before Armenia regained its sovereignty. International recognition of the Armenian Genocide has traditionally been one of the Diaspora's main causes. Two early victories by the Diaspora were the 1965 recognition by Uruguay and the Soviet Union's decision to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Genocide.⁴³

In the mid-1980s, Diaspora lobbying efforts grew: they initiated a major lobbying movement after the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the Armenian Genocide⁴⁴. Armenian ethnic lobbying groups became successful once they earned the confidence of their compatriots, proving they are able and ready to advocate the Genocide's international recognition and raise the problem of Western Armenian confiscated properties.

The Diaspora found additional reasons to support Armenia after the tragic 1988 earthquake and Azerbaijani pogrom⁴⁵ against Armenians in Kirovabad, Baku and Sumgait. While ideological differences and Soviet prohibitions prevented large-scale cooperation, the Diaspora was fully involved in the rehabilitation and

⁴² Armenian Diaspora is not a monolithic hierarchy but has a compact structure. For more than a century, it formed strong self-governing institutional systems in host countries. The chief "brain centers" are: the Church; the traditional political parties—"Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaktsutyun" (ARF-D), "Social-Democratic Hnchak Party" (Hnchak), "Armenian Liberal Party" (Ramkavar); as well as many cultural, sport, charitable unions and associations and lobbying groups. These groups and parties have different visions and expectations regarding Armenian claims, however.

⁴³ For 70 years, relations between Diaspora communities and the Motherland were restricted to cultural exchanges. The largest Armenian political party-ARF-D – which had a significant number of supporters and followers abroad –was outlawed in Armenia due to its anti-Soviet policy.

⁴⁴ See the full text at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/euro/pcc/aag-/pcc_meeting/resolutions/1987_07_20.pdf.

⁴⁵ Pogroms took place in Baku, Sumgait, Kirovabad and other Azerbaijani cities in response to Nagorno Karabakh Armenians' request on "unifying with Motherland Armenia."

reconstruction recovery process⁴⁶. The Diaspora's agenda grew further following Armenia's independence in 1991. While Genocide recognition was the “chief goal” of Diaspora organizations for more than eight decades, post-independence priorities focused on two main problems: Armenia's economic recovery and the international realization of Nagorno Karabakh Armenians' right to self-determination.

The Diaspora also made considerable contributions to the Karabakh war effort⁴⁷, which overwhelmed Armenia's nascent economy.⁴⁸ The Diaspora exerted influence on the governments in their adopted countries, lobbying for financial aid for the Armenian economy. For instance, the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) leadership argued that foreign assistance would help Armenia become economically viable – allowing it to become a catalyst for development throughout the Caucasus and all of the Newly Independent States⁴⁹.

⁴⁶ M. Aghababian, M. Melkumyan, (1996): “*After Earthquake Reconstruction in Armenia*”, Elsevier Science Ltd, paper No. 2173, p 6.

⁴⁷Diaspora contribution in the Karabakh war was not symbolic ... According to various estimations, more than 500 Diaspora Armenians participated in the war. See Ashot Petrosyan, “*Diaspora Armenians in Karabakh war,*” (2001) Yerevan, p16. The Diaspora lobby in the US played a big role in getting the House of Representatives to pass Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act (*Public Law 102-511, Washington DC, 24 October 1992, see at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ115/html/PLAW-107publ115.htm>*), which banned all the US government assistance to the Azerbaijani government.

⁴⁸ Armenian Diaspora communities around the world have contributed to Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) to Armenia. Furthermore, the number of businesses established by/connected with Diaspora investors has been significant since independence. About 69% of all foreign investors that invested directly in the Armenian economy in 1994-2004 were connected to the Diaspora. The latter are estimated to have invested around \$275 million from 1998 to 2004, which was an estimated 25% of total FDI in Armenia in that period. See more at: <http://ev.am/brainwork/foreign-investments-and-diaspora/current%20situation-of-the-diaspora-connected-fdis-in-Armenia>

⁴⁹ The ANCA helped secure \$50 million for Armenia in the 2000-2014 Fiscal Years foreign aid bill. According to Aram Hamparian, the ANCA Executive Director, this helped to offset the devastating effects of the

Yerevan's Changing Priorities and Attitude toward Diaspora

1990-1998. “Strangers’ Meeting” or the Period of State Building

The level of Diaspora engagement with Armenia has varied, depending on the political regime in power in the country⁵⁰. During the first term of President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the first president of the new independent state, relations with the Diaspora were problematic and complicated. While he sought help from Diaspora groups to bolster the post-war economy⁵¹ and state building processes, he took steps to limit their involvement in Armenia's domestic and foreign politics. He tried to neutralize the ideological and organizational presence of the Diaspora in the motherland – a step that was not supported by the majority of Armenian political parties and international human rights activists in Armenia⁵². The

Turkish and Azerbaijani blockades and to continue Armenia's political and economic transition. “Specifically, these funds will be used to develop the economy and infrastructure, further strengthen democratic institutions, and meet the country's current development and humanitarian needs”,-stated Hamparian in an interview with us on 06.07.2013.

⁵⁰ We'll explore Armenia-Diaspora relations during the three Presidents' ruling terms: Levon Ter-Petrosyan (1991-1998), Robert Kocharyan (1998-2008) and Serzh Sargsyan (2008-till now).

⁵¹ For instance, during the blockade, Diaspora lobbyists assisted Armenia with the delivery of basic goods and fuel using airplanes. During the winter of 1992-93, the United Armenian Fund (UAF) managed to raise \$7 million all over the world via the Diaspora. They helped provide electricity and distributed 500 tons of flour in the regions of Armenia, in addition to providing bread-baking plants with flour and power. See at: http://ev.am/sites/default/files/DIASPORA-ARMENIA%20CASE_Revised-Mar2010-130312.pdf.

⁵² The “Freedom in the World”: Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties-1995-1996”-*Report of Amnesty International*, “*Freedom House Assesses Human Rights Violations in Armenia*,” September 30, 1996- found that in 1995 the country was becoming more authoritarian. See more at: <http://www.arfd.info/1996/09/30/amnesty-international-freedom-house-assess-human-rights-violations-in-armenia/>.

president moved to ban the ARF-D political party, which was known for its strong ties to the Diaspora⁵³.

Ter-Petrosyan sought to undermine the Diaspora's right to participate in Armenian politics on the grounds of "national ideology," which he described as a "false political category"⁵⁴ in an address to the Supreme Council. The president stressed that rule of law and civil society were crucial to state building – implying that Diaspora communities were not welcome⁵⁵. Ter-Petrosyan suspended efforts to bring state foreign policy in line with Diaspora views.

In particular, the Diaspora prioritized the recognition of the Genocide, while under Ter-Petrosyan, Armenia reached out to Turkey and announced it was ready to normalize relations. Under Ter Perosyan's administration, the government declared that Yerevan had no territorial demands on Turkey, saying that the Diaspora should draft its own Genocide Agenda, and recognition should not be a cornerstone of Armenia's foreign policy⁵⁶. The president's policy

⁵³The court banned ARF-D activity in the country and confiscated its property, grounding the ruling in the "Law on Political Organizations." On December 28, 1994, President Team spokesman in one of his famous television speeches banned the ARF-D, which was the leading opposition party, along with "Yerkir" ("Homeland") daily, the country's largest daily newspaper. See at: <http://web.archive.org/web/20061206144311/http://www.arf.am/English/history/004history.htm>.

⁵⁴President's speech from the floor of the Supreme council "Referendum is the best way of adopting Constitution," published in the official newspaper "*Hayastani Hanrapetutyun*" (*Republic of Armenia*), April 26, 1994.

⁵⁵"*Hayastani Hanrapetutyun*", *ibid*, p2.

⁵⁶ During various meetings and negotiations with international figures and Turkish political and diplomatic elite representatives, Ter-Petrosyan and his team spokesman said Yerevan was interested in new relations with Ankara without any preconditions, even the issue of Genocide recognition. Gerard Libaridian, the former supervisor to the Ter-Petrosyan, argues that the politicization of the genocide by the Diaspora "had served, wittingly or unwittingly, to create the mentality and psychology that Turkey, through its no recognition of the Genocide, is likely to repeat it, that Turkey is the eternal enemy. If Turkey is the eternal enemy, then Russia is the eternally necessary friend. And this then creates pressures on your policy of independence". See at

coincided with the draft plan he presented at the 1989 Founding Congress for the Armenian National Congress party. The plan stressed that the Armenian people had to rely on their own strength, not on the strength of someone else or any sponsors. *“It’s a political delusion that a nation has permanent enemies or permanent friends, but not permanent national interests.”*⁵⁷

This policy put Ter-Pertosyan directly at odds with the Diaspora communities. Tension between the Armenian government and the Diaspora increased after Ter-Pertosyan backed a "compromise" version of conflict resolution over Karabakh⁵⁸.

1998-2007. “Mutual Recognition” or Period of Associated Integration

Relations with the Diaspora improved under the government of Robert Kocharyan, Ter-Pertosyan's successor. Contrary to the country's first president, Kocharyan sought to balance Diaspora investments in the Armenian economy with the Diaspora's "ideological entrance" into the country. In frequent speeches to Diaspora communities, Kocharyan urged investment in the “sustainable development of its [the Armenian] economy by developing human capital and forming a knowledge-based

http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=322&debate_ID=2&slide_ID=6#_ftnref7.

⁵⁷ The author of this idea is Pan-Armenian National Movement senior leader, philologist, Academic Rafayel Ishkhanyan, who was the supporter of building relations with Turkey. See R. Ishkhanyan, *“Երրորդ ուժի բացառական օրենք”* (*“The Rule of Exclusion of Third Force”*), “Azat Khosq”, Yerevan, 1991, p 18.

⁵⁸ Robert Kocharyan stated this in his speech at the Bertelsmann Foundation in Berlin on November 16, 2006. See more at: <http://2rd.am/hy/16-11-2006-Nakhagah-Robert-Kocharyani-elujty-Bertelsman-Himnadramum-Berlin>.

⁴ See the official release of President’s visit to Latin American countries on 2-9 May, 2002: <http://2rd.am/hy/Jamanakacic-ashkharhum-heravorutyuny-khochyndot-che>.

economy.”⁵⁹ He also initiated the first Armenia-Diaspora conference and Pan-Armenian games, which helped mend relations between the authorities and the expatriate communities. Speaking in Brazil, the president called the Diaspora an invaluable asset for Armenia.² According to him, the Diaspora had proven to be an indispensable bridge between Armenia and its host countries. “I am proud that most of them have acquired a reputation of loyal citizens, hardworking people and successful businessmen. There is no doubt that if Armenians can do it elsewhere, they can do it in their own home,” stated Kocharyan.

Under the Kocharyan government, Yerevan created several Diaspora business and economic forums. The conferences proved to be a vital format for Armenian businesses, officials and the Diaspora to meet and discuss crucial issues and investments. In his opening speech at the 2003 economic forum in Yerevan, Kocharyan underscored the importance of the Diaspora for Armenia. About 150 Diaspora involved in business participated in the forum⁶¹.

The Diaspora agreed with many of Kocharyan’s positions, especially concerning the Genocide and the resolution of the Karabakh conflict⁶². Under Kocharyan's government many European Parliaments adopted resolutions condemning Ottoman Turkey’s Genocide against Armenians. The Diaspora still found the government's policy toward Genocide recognition weak, however, especially the Armenian-Turkish TARC⁶³ commission. While not all

⁵⁹ See more at: http://ev.am/sites/default/files/DIASPORA-ARMENIA%20CASE_Revised-Mar2010-130312.pdf.

² See more at: http://ev.am/sites/default/files/DIASPORA-ARMENIA%20CASE_Revised-Mar2010-130312.pdf.

⁶² Diaspora parties backed Kocharyan’s presidency also because of his “strategy” toward Karabakh conflict resolution. Contrary to Ter-Petrosyan’s solution of “Phase version,” Kocharyan promoted the “Package version” solution, which was supported by Diaspora. See Khachik Galstyan, (2005), *“The Perspectives of Karabakh Conflict Resolution,”* 21th Dar, Vol. 4(10), pp. 63-82.

⁶³ “Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission” (TARC) was set up in Geneva on 9 July 2001 and had six Turkish and four Armenian members, who

Diaspora groups were against the TARC⁶⁴, the influential ANCA stated that decisions by the commission could endanger 40 years of lobbying for the US House of Representatives to recognize the Genocide⁶⁵.

One issue that the Diaspora and Armenian political parties were in total agreement on was the question of dual citizenship. The constitution foresaw Armenian citizenship for anyone of Armenian origin, based on provisions defined by law. Dual citizens were guaranteed all the rights given to Armenian citizens, as well as all duties and responsibilities⁶⁶. The constitution also laid out provisions to create a Ministry of the Diaspora. The Diaspora figured prominently in Armenia's National Security strategy, a marked departure from the policy of earlier administrations.

Analysis shows that the National Security Strategy focuses on two major issues that could threaten the identity of Armenians living abroad: the destruction of culture (language, religion, etc...) and Diaspora Armenians' apathy toward their ancestral home, which could be a result of their exclusion from the homeland's domestic affairs. This indicates that the Armenian government was concerned about a possible conflict between the two actors - Armenians living in Homeland and those who live abroad, which could threaten the essence and existence of the state. The National Security strategy

were well-known people, former diplomats, ministers, scholars and others who had occupied positions. See <http://www1.american.edu/cgp/TARC/tor.htm>.

⁶⁴Diaspora communities, mainly political parties and Lobbying groups, had different attitude toward this issue. ANCA condemned the passive attitude of Yerevan statesmen over the US State Department's initiative (2000-2004) for TARC, which, in its point of view, includes fears about the dialogue between Turkish and Armenian historians on issues like the proof and reality of Armenian Genocide. The AAA, which is one of the biggest Armenian organizations in the US, supported the TARC. Hrair Hovnanian, the biggest sponsor of AAA, stated: *"This is the first multi-disciplinary, comprehensive attempt to reconcile differences between two neighbours, separated by bitterness and mistrust, and as such, it is a major advance."* See at: <http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Page=Dergilcerik&IcerikNo=166&Lisan=en>.

²⁹ After the State Department's "intervention," the resolution didn't pass.

⁶⁶Dual citizenship was authorised after the Constitutional amendment of the Armenian Citizenship Law No. 75-N on February 26, 2007.

attempts to cement relations between the country and the Diaspora by tying it to the Karabakh conflict: “Armenia embraces all systemic demonstrations of Diaspora involvement in the solution of vital problems facing Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh.”⁶⁷

The strategy states that the decline of national and cultural identity in the Diaspora was an external threat for the state and any weakening of Armenia-Diaspora ties and the absence of mutually enriching contacts might threaten the fundamental values of Armenian National Security. “The Republic of Armenia attaches great importance to the preservation of national identity in the Armenian Diaspora. Well-organized and efficiently integrated Diaspora communities are important contributors to the overall increase in Armenia’s international involvement.”⁶⁸ The strategy’s focus on supporting the Diaspora illustrates the changing relationship between Yerevan and the Diaspora. The document stresses the need to help the Diaspora maintain its Armenian roots – an indication that relations between the state and Diaspora communities evolved following the war, from a country that “begs for charity from the rich Diaspora” to the state as an “equal” which can improve, promote, maintain and enrich the Diaspora identity agenda⁶⁹.

With this document, Armenia tried to consolidate relations with the Diaspora, underscored by a special chapter (*the Third Chapter*) on those relations. For instance, the section on “fundamental values” includes references to the Diaspora: “RA [The Republic of Armenia] strives to preserve and develop the identity of the Armenian nation, within both Armenia and throughout its Diaspora; developing and implementing a comprehensive concept of

⁶⁷Ibid, p, 7.

⁶⁸Ibid, p, 4.

⁶⁹The “Law on Education Developing State Program 2001-2005” outlines the cooperation borders between State officials and the Diaspora to improve the linguistic abilities of Diasporan pedagogues, to retrain them for a short time in the homeland and provide Diaspora schools and colleges with Armenian language teaching programs, history books and syllabuses. From 2008 to date Armenian Ministries of Education and Diaspora provided Diaspora schools with more than 60 thousand pieces of such kind books. See the Law on Armenian Parliament website: <http://www.parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&ID=1422&lang=arm>.

Armenia-Diaspora relations, with a broader mobilization of the potential of the Armenian Diaspora.”⁷⁰

The strategy goes on to stress the role of the Diaspora in creating a "unique bridge between Armenia and the international community, as Armenian community organizations worldwide support the development of bilateral ties with different countries, and foster Armenia's global integration and consolidation of democracy.”⁷¹

2008-2015. “Anxious Engagement” or Steps of Integration

On February 19, 2008, Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan, who was backed by incumbent President Robert Kocharyan, won Armenia's presidential election in the first round according to official results⁷². Although some Diaspora circles expressed concerns about the election results, they sent congratulatory messages to the new elected president⁷³. Homeland-Diaspora relations during Kocharyan's rule evolved to the level of “security status,” but ties between the government and the Diaspora were far from stable when Sargsyan came to power. The new president had promised to "cement" ties with the Diaspora and restore balance in the relationship between the state and Armenians living abroad. The government's policy of reengagement with Turkey, however,

⁷⁰Ibid, p, 1.

⁷¹Ibid, p, 8.

⁷²Sargsyan was declared the winner with 52.8 percent of the vote. Team spokesman, Armenia's first President and the main opposition candidate came in second with 21.5 percent of the vote.

⁷³Diaspora communities demonstrated a rather lenient approach toward the events in Armenia, as evident from a joint statement made by five leading U.S. Diaspora groups on March 18. (Signatories included the AAA, AGBU, ANCA, Diocese of the Armenian Church of America (Eastern/Western) and Prelacy of the Armenian Apostolic Church of America (Eastern/Western). *Statement is available at <http://www.pf-armenia.org>, News and Reports section*). Interestingly enough, for the AAA this was a departure from its traditionally stronger focus on human rights and democracy in Armenia, including criticism of past elections.

disrupted those plans.⁷⁴

The new talks with Turkey eventually led to the Armenian-Turkish Protocols⁷⁵, which were not welcomed by the Diaspora because it could danger its campaign for international recognition of the Genocide, as well as the status of Karabakh⁷⁶. The Diaspora responded by creating the “Stop the Protocols” campaign, in Yerevan and abroad. They highlighted the fact that the protocols had created serious concern and frustration among the Diaspora communities. They highlighted their objections toward the idea of negotiating over historical matters, and stressed that the recognition of the Armenian Genocide was a precondition to any negotiation. They also noted that recognizing borders and territorial integrity meant “renouncing our struggle for justice.”⁷⁷

⁷⁴ After TARC’s “Final Conclusion” report, for three years secret negotiations between Armenian and Turkish envoys were held in European capitals, especially in Genève, on the normalization of relations. The Armenian MFA often preferred not to speak about the meetings, but Turkish media periodically spoke of such meetings.

⁷⁵ In April 22, 2009, Zurich, Switzerland, Armenian and Turkish ministers of Foreign Affairs, with the participation and mediation of EU, the USA and Russia, signed two protocols; “Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey” and “Protocol on Development of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey.” See the full texts of the Protocols: http://www.armeniapedia.org/images/2/21/Armenia-turkey_protocol.pdf.

⁷⁶ ANCA published a special press release highlighting some words and phrases in the full text of the Protocols and mentioned dangers behind 20 of the key provisions in those two documents. See the ANCA text version at: http://www.anca.org/assets/pdf/misc/protocols_explained.pdf.

⁷⁷ “For instance, the Coordination Council of Armenian Organizations in France (CCAF) has issued a statement opposing the protocols between Armenia and Turkey,” -reported “Nouvelles d’Arménie”, the newspaper published by the Armenian community in France. The statement says in part: “The Armenian Genocide is not negotiable and it cannot be examined by a sub-intergovernmental commission. History is already written, no one can deny this fact acknowledged as genocide by historians, lawyers, international institutions, and over 20 states, including France”. The CCAF therefore requested clarification on the 5th paragraph of the Protocol on establishing diplomatic relations that the two countries, “affirm their mutual

Religious leaders urged the government to clarify its position for the Diaspora. “The wave of concern over the possible Armenia-Turkish diplomatic relations has swept over the Armenian Diaspora throughout the world. Most of all, we are concerned over the recognition of the Armenian Genocide committed by Ottoman Turkey, and the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process,” noted Aram I, Catholicos of the Great House of Cilicia, in a letter addressed to the Armenian authorities⁷⁸. Aram I submitted a 7-point proposal to the Armenian authorities, stressing the necessity for a cautious approach to establishing diplomatic relations with Turkey. “President Serzh Sargsyan must dispel all the doubts of the million-strong Armenian Diaspora,” stated Aram I⁷⁹.

The Diaspora's protests worked: Sargsyan took steps to ease their fears and build stronger relations between the Diaspora communities and the government. In the spring of 2008, he initiated reforms to coordinate a productive state policy on Armenia-Diaspora relations. One of the reforms included finally creating the Diaspora Ministry, which started functioning as part of the government on October 1, 2008. The Ministry was put in charge of drafting and implementing the government's policies to strengthen ties between Armenia and the Diaspora; developing cooperation with non-governmental organizations; preserving Armenian national identity; and realizing the potential of relations with the Diaspora, draft of the repatriation programs, in addition to other responsibilities⁸⁰.

recognition of their existing border as defined by relevant treaties in international law”. The organization also stated that the right to self-determination, the right to participate in the political settlement of the conflict, ensured security, live peacefully on their land directly should be clearly recognized to the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh. See the full text at CCAF official website; <http://www.ccaf.info/item.php?r=3&id=416>.

⁷⁸ <http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/showthread.php?187639-Aram-I-Appeals-To-Sargsyan-On-Armenia-Turkish-Protocols>

⁷⁹ Similar appeals have been made by major effective political parties and lobbying groups both in Armenia and host countries.

⁸⁰ As mentioned in its duties, the Ministry will draft and implement prospective pan-Armenian programs aimed at developing ties between Armenia and the Diaspora and the rise of the reputation of Armenia and the Armenian people. The Ministry will also contribute to the implementation of pan-Armenian educational programs and development of public

Conclusion

In summary, after the creation of the dual citizenship institute, Diaspora engagement became more evident during the administration of the country's third president. As a result, the Diaspora has started to speak openly about problems in Armenia, including corruption, human rights violence, fraud and problems of democratization. The Diaspora also implied that, besides financial presence, it wants lawful status in its historic homeland. Although the Diaspora has had some concerns about domestic policy, its attitude toward Armenia's security priorities is now more in line with the current government's agenda, especially concerning relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan, supporting the self-determination right of Nagorno Karabakh population, and maintaining national identity abroad⁸¹. This new stage in relations with the Diaspora has become more evident as the expatriate communities started to influence on the government's agenda. The major testimony to the Diaspora's influence was the adoption of the Pan-Armenian Declaration on the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide⁸².

Armenian schools in the Diaspora; it will support activities aimed at preservation, protection, development and broadening of national identity, culture and heritage, establish and radicalize Armenian national identity among Armenians speaking a different language or those who belong to a different religion, as well as support the repatriation of Armenians of the Diaspora and the pilgrimage of Armenian youth to the Homeland. The Ministry will support the participation of businessmen of the Diaspora in economic programs of the Republic of Armenia; form a political, economic, cultural, juridical and spiritual environment for the productive participation of the Armenian Diaspora in the solution of national issues and strengthening of Armenian statehood. For further information on Ministry's priorities see the official website of the Ministry of Diaspora of RA at: <http://www.mindiaspora.am/en/index>.

⁸¹ One of the main demands of the Diaspora powerful organizations was the cancellation of Armenian-Turkish protocols. They even initiated a campaign called "Stop the Protocols" and organized a collection of signatures against the signature and ratification of the Protocols.

⁸² Following the session of the State Commission on Coordination of the events for the commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the Armenian

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aghababian M., Melkumyan M., *“After Earthquake Reconstruction in Armenia”*, Elsevier Science Ltd, paper No. 2173, 1996.

Astourian S., *“From Ter-Petrosian to Kocharian: Leadership Change in Armenia”*, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies, US Berkeley, 2000. See at: http://iseees.berkeley.edu/bps/publications/2000_04-asto.pdf

Balayev B., *“The Right to Self-Determination in the South Caucasus: Nagorno Karabakh in Context”*, Lexington Books, 2013.

Brubaker R., *“The “diaspora” diaspora”*, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 28, No.1,2005.

Chorbajian L., Donabedian P., Mutafian C., *“The Caucasian Knot: The History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh”*. London: Zed Books, 1994.

Cornell S., *“Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethno-political Conflict in the Caucasus”*, London: Routledge, 2001.

Dufoix S., *“Diaspora”*. Berkeley& Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2008.

Galstyan Kh., *“The Perspectives of Karabakh Conflict Resolution”*, 21th Dar, Vol. 4(10), Yerevan, 2005.

Gültekin-Punsmann B., Simão L., Tavitian N., *“The Closed Armenia-Turkey Border: Economic and Social Effects, Including Those on the People; and Implications for the Overall Situation in the Region”*, Study on Policy De-

Genocide, which had regional committees in Diaspora communities and included Major Pan-Armenian political, religious, cultural, charitable organizations from Homeland and Diaspora, President Sargsyan read the Declaration at the Tsitsernakaberd Memorial Complex. The document delineated statehood and Diaspora demands from Turkey and international community. See the full text of the Declaration at Armenian Genocide museum-institute official website; <http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/29.01.2015-hrchakagir.php>.

partment External Policies, Brussels: European Parliament, 2007, See at; [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2007/385526/EXPO-AFET_ET\(2007\)385526_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2007/385526/EXPO-AFET_ET(2007)385526_EN.pdf).

Hall S., *“Cultural Identity and Diaspora., Identity: Community, Culture, Difference”*, Ed. J. Rutherford. London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd, 1990.

Hill F., Kirişci K., Moffatt A., *“Armenia and Turkey: From normalization to reconciliation”* Turkish Policy Quarterly, (Winter 2015), See at: http://turkishpolicy.com/pdf/Armenia-and-Turkey-From-Normalization-to-Reconciliation-Winter-2015_82b3.pdf

Ishkhanyan R., *“Երբ նրա ղ ն լ ժ ի բ ա գ ա ն լ ա լ ո թ է ն բ բ ”* (*“The Rule of Exclusion of Third Force”*), *“Azat Khosq”*, Yerevan, 1991.

Kharazian A., *“Armenia’s Democratic Development is a Priority”*, *“Zhamanak”* daily, May 3, 2008, available at: <http://en.zhamanak.com/article/720/>

Libaridian G., *“The New Thinking Revisited”*, Libaridian speaks at Princeton University, May 9, 1998. See at http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=322&debate_ID=2&slide_ID=6#_ftnref7

Mouradian C., *“The Mountainous Karabakh Question; Inter-Ethnic Conflict or Decolonization Crisis?”*, *Armenian Review*, Vol. 43 no. 2, 1990.

Petrosyan A., *“Diaspora Armenians in Karabakh war”*, Yerevan, 2002.
Sheffer G., *“Diaspora Politics At Home Abroad”*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Safran W., *“Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return”*, *Diaspora: a Journal of Transnational Studies*, Vol. 1(1), NY, University of Toronto Press, 1991.

Tölölyan Kh., *“The Nation-State and Its Others: In Lieu of a Preface”*, *Diaspora: a Journal of Transnational Studies*, Vol. 1(1), NY, 1991.

Vertovec S., *“Three Meanings of Diaspora, Exemplified Among South Asian Religions”*. *Diaspora: A journal of Transnational Studies*, 7, no. 2, 1999.

Resolution of European Parliament on a Political Solution to the Armenian Question, Official Journal of the European Communities, Doc. A2-33/87, adopted on 18 July 1987, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/euro/pcc/aag/pcc_meeting/resolutions/1987_07_20.pdf

USA 107th Congress Public Law 115, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs, Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act (*Public Law 102-511, Washington DC, 24 October 1992*), See at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ115/html/PLAW-107publ115.htm>

Amnesty International, “*Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1995-1996*”, Report on Human Rights violations in Armenia, See at: <http://www.arfd.info/1996/09/30/amnesty-international-freedom-house-assess-human-rights-violations-in-armenia/> [Last access 15.06.2015].

Archive of “*Hayastani Hanrapetutyun*” (*Republic of Armenia*) Newspaper, April 1994.

EV Consulting, “*Armenia: Diaspora Assisted Growth*”, Yerevan, 2005, See at: http://ev.am/sites/default/files/DIASPORA-ARMENIA%20CASE_Revised-Mar2010-130312.pdf

“The Declaration on the Independence of Armenia”, See at: <http://www.gov.am/en/independence/>

National Security Strategy of RA, See at: http://www.mfa.am/u_files/file/-doctrine/Doctrineeng.pdf

The “Law on Education Developing State Program 2001–2005”, See at: <http://www.parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&ID=1422&lang=arm>

Policy Forum Armenia, “*Armenia’s 2008 Presidential Election: Select Issues and Analysis*”, July, 2008, See at: http://www.pf-armenia.org/sites/default/files/documents/files/PFA_Election_Report--FINAL.pdf

“*Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey*”, See at: http://www.armeniapedia.org/images/2/21/Armenia-turkey_protocol.pdf

Speeches of the First President of RA available at: [/hy.wikisource.org/wik](http://hy.wikisource.org/wik)

The nonofficial website of Second President of RA, <http://2rd.am/eng>.

The Official Website of Armenian National Committee of America,
<http://www.anca.org>

The Official Website of the President of RA, <http://www.president.am/en>
The Official Website of Armenian Organizations of France,
<http://www.ccaf.info>

The Official Website of Ministry of Diaspora of RA,
<http://www.mindiaspora.am>

The Official Website of Armenian Genocide Museum-Institution,
<http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/>

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr. Narek S. Galstyan Associate Professor Narek S. Galstyan received his PhD in 2007. Since 2006, he has taught at the Faculty of International Relations and since 2008, at the Center of European Studies, Yerevan State University, Armenia. N. Galstyan has written over 20 articles and book chapters. He has co-authored 3 manuals and 1 monograph. His professional interests include Area Studies, International Security Studies and Small State Studies in general and EU Studies, Regional Integration and Armenia's Foreign and Security Policy in particular.

Dr. Abraham Gasparyan received his PhD from Institute for National Strategic Studies, RA. He has taught at Yerevan State University from 2010, French University in Armenia from 2014, and Mass Media Center from 2014. Associated Professor Gasparyan has more than 10 scientific articles in various international and local journals. He implemented many scientific researches for Oxford, Gutenberg and other leading universities. The main concentration of his scientific career is in; Democratization, Civil-Military problematique, Domestic and Foreign Politics of Turkey, Army Role in Middle Eastern Countries, National Security Discourse, Political Islam. He published "The Realities of Internal Political Processes in the Middle East" (VLV Press) in 2016. Dr. Gasparyan is an analyst and senior TV anchor in Public TV of Armenia.

Dr. Grigor Hayrapetyan received his PhD from the Yerevan State University. The spheres of his scientific interests are international trade and regional economic integration. He has taught at the Yerevan State University and the Center for European Studies (Yerevan). Grigor Hayrapetyan has written over 35 articles and chapters mostly on Armenian foreign trade and economic relations, several his works are dedicated to the different aspects of educational services' provision at the local and international markets. He published two working papers: The Determinants of the Attractiveness of National Higher Education Systems (2009), and Regional and International Trade of Armenia: Perspectives and Potentials (2011). In his recent works he considered the issues of

economic cooperation of Armenia with the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union, and Armenia-Diaspora's perspectives for development.

Dr. Kornely Kakachia is Professor of Political Science at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Georgia, and Director of Tbilisi based think tank Georgian Institute of Politics. His current research focuses on Georgian domestic and foreign policy, security issues of the wider Black Sea area and comparative party politics. He was a recipient of IREX and OSI fellowships and was a visiting fellow at Harvard University's Black Sea Security program, (2009–2010) Harriman Institute, Columbia University (2011) and The Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. He is the co-editor of *Georgian Foreign Policy: The Quest for Sustainable Security* (2014).

Levan Kakhishvili is an Administrator of Graduate Programmes in International Relations at the International Black Sea University (IBSU) and a Researcher at the Georgian Institute of Politics. Mr Kakhishvili's field of expertise includes politics and international relations of the former Soviet Union, Georgia's foreign policy with a focus on Georgian-Russian relations, and issues related to national identity, ethnic minorities and nationalism. He has obtained two Master's degrees: MSc in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Oxford, St Antony's College and MSocSc in Transformation in South Caucasus from Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (TSU). As an Invited Lecturer he teaches courses on Political Science, Research Methods and Academic Writing at IBSU and Research Design at TSU.

Dr. Alexander Markarov was awarded Doctor of Sciences Degree (Dr. Habil.) in Political Science in 2010 and currently he is Professor of Political Science at Yerevan State University, he also holds positions of the Deputy Vice Rector and Head of International Cooperation Office at the same university, Professional experience includes more than a decade of research, writing, and teaching on state and society developments in the Newly Independent States and Central and Eastern Europe with specialization in comparative study

of political transformations and institutional developments. He had published widely on these topics (about 40 articles and book chapters) and taught graduate courses on post-Soviet politics in Armenia, Czech Republic, Belarus and the US. He has published numerous books including *Semi-presidentialism Within the Post-Soviet Transformation Context* (YSU Press. in Russian) in 2008 as well as edited publications such as *State, Politics, and, Society: Issues and Problems within Post-Soviet Development* (Iowa City: Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies, the University of Iowa, 2002).

Salome Minesashvili is a doctoral student at Berlin Graduate School for Transnational Studies, Free University Berlin. She received Master's degrees in International Political Theory from the University of Edinburgh and in Transformation in the South Caucasus from Iv. Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University. For her dissertation, Salome is working on the topic of national identity change contextualized in the similar foreign policies of Georgia and Ukraine.

Mariam Naskidashvili is a researcher at Georgian Institute of Politics. She holds MA degree in political science from the Leiden University and MSc in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Oxford. Currently living in Tokyo, Ms. Naskidashvili has more than five years of working experience with local and international media (mainly BBC and France 24). Furthermore she has worked for an international development organization CARE International in the Caucasus. Her research interests include foreign policy formation, transitional countries and impediments to democratisation.

Dr. Tamara Pataraiia currently works at the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development. Topics of interests are: democratic transition, Euro-Atlantic integration, foreign and security policy, democratic control over the security. She is an author of a number of research and articles and policy reports, member of the following professional bodies; Editorial Board Member of the Quarterly Journal CONNECTIONS, one of the founders of Civil