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FROM MORAL POLITICS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

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Moral politics became a public issue in the European XIX century. Based on an evolutionary concept of human progress after the Vienna Congress, who besides the European balance of powers also cared about general moral values in politics by demanding the abolition of slave trade, the campaign for the abolition of slavery became the first strong civil society movement in modern history. The British Empire released the slaves in its colonies in 1833, France in 1848, the US during the Civil War of the 1860s, timely paralleled by the liberation of the Russian peasants. Mostly these campaigns were flavoured by the idea of a Christian *mission civilatrice*. In the late XIX century the secular language of human rights (which had already been part of the American and French declarations of the Rights of Men in the late XVIII century) dominated the French *Ligue pour la Défense des Droits de l'homme* in the case of Captain Alfred Dreyfus¹, who was accused of high treason for anti-Semitic reasons. Campaigns against colonial crimes used the same two languages. So did campaigns against the “bad government” in the Ottoman Empire, beginning with William Ewart Gladstones *Bulgarian Horrors* of 1876 and later in the case of the Ottoman Armenians. Moral politics in all these cases relied on the growing power of public opinion in European societies and its influence on the decisions of official politics.

The German pro-Armenian movement of the 1890's was mainly upheld by protestant Fellowship circles as well as educated liberal Protestants in the vicinity of Martin Rade's intellectual journal *Christliche Welt* (“Christian World”). It carried a strong Christian undertone, and in Rade's case encompassed a Neo-Kantian flavour. Its most prominent figure – closely related to Rade – was Johannes Lepsius, whose 1896 tome, *Armenien und Europa* (“Armenia and Europe”), was translated into several languages, exerting a tremendous international influence. The governments of Europe painted a picture of the massacres which was guided by imperial interests rather than following politico-moral standards, British liberal William Gladstone wrote in an 1897 letter to Lepsius, having read the book. He called this “one of the

¹ Hoffmann S.-L., Einführung. In: Stefan-Ludwig Hofmann (Ed.): *Moralpolitik. Geschichte der Menschenrechte im 20. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen, 2010, S. 14-18.

saddest, if not the saddest, truths of our time”¹. The former Prime Minister – whom Bismarck considered an insufferable moralist² – invoked Lepsius’ authority for his pro-Armenian campaigns of the 1890’s. He may be described as the era’s most efficacious proponent of an ethically motivated foreign policy and as an early visionary of a liberal, pan-European legislative system³. As Hans Lukas Kieser has pointed out, Lepsius, a protestant internationalist, very much influenced by Anglo-American sources⁴, was driven by similar concepts, albeit exhibiting a particularly German bent. His book he labelled an “Indictment” against the major European powers⁵. This meant cultivating a sentiment which would only two years later find its *locus classicus* in Émile Zola’s famous *J’accuse* during the Dreyfus campaign.

Like Gladstone, Lepsius was a liberal imperialist of ethical principles. His tract was published during an era when Bismarck’s calculated *Realpolitik* was increasingly being supplanted by visions of a geographically expansive German power state. The turnaround of public opinion toward an impatient brand of imperialism had been brought about in 1895 by Max Weber’s widely received Freiburg inaugural address⁶. This also affected a sought-after new sphere of influence in the Ottoman Empire. In the new climate, British calls for an intervention prompted by the Armenian massacres were – after a moment of hesitation – abruptly dismissed by Wilhelm II as a sinister ploy designed to increase London’s Eastern influence⁷.

For these very reasons, Lepsius and the moral politics of the German pro-Armenian movement were strongly opposed to the Reich’s official policies. In 1897, he wrote in Maximilian Harden’s journal *Zukunft* that national interest should never become the guiding principle of moral thought, judgment and action⁸. Adolf Stoecker’s *Deutsche Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* accused him of being overly dependant on English influence, politically as well as theologically⁹. The Prussian Ministry of the Interior intervened. Friedrich Naumann, subsequent *doyen* of German-minded liberalism, went as far as spin doctoring the victims of the Hamidian massacres to serve some higher purpose. This was supposed to lie in the German destiny for *Weltpolitik* (World Politics) in the Orient. Anyone who, like Lepsius,

¹ William Ewart Gladstone to Johannes Lepsius, 25 July 1897, Lepsius-Archiv Potsdam (LAP) 157-1710.

² **Mommsen W. J.**, *Großmachtstellung und Weltpolitik 1870-1914. Die Außenpolitik des Deutschen Reiches*. Frankfurt am Main/Berlin, 1993, S. 32.

³ **Ceadel M.**, *Gladstone and a Liberal Theory of International Relations* // **Gosh P.** and **Goldman L.** (Ed.), *Politics and Culture in Victorian Britain: Essays in Memory of Colin Matthew*, Oxford, 2006, p. 79 ff.

⁴ **Kieser H.-L.**, *Nahostmillenarismus, protestantische Internationale und Johannes Lepsius* // **Hosfeld R.** (Hg.): *Johannes Lepsius – Eine deutsche Ausnahme*, Göttingen, 2013, S. 62 ff.

⁵ **Lepsius J.**, *Armenien und Europa. Eine Anklageschrift wider die christlichen Großmächte und ein Aufruf an das christliche Deutschland*, Berlin, 1896.

⁶ Joas, Hans/ Wolfgang Kölbl: *Kriegsverdrängung. Ein Problem in der Geschichte der Sozialtheorie*, Frankfurt am Main, 2008, S. 161, 166.

⁷ **Mommsen W. J.**, op. cit., p. 129.

⁸ **Lepsius J.**, Antwort auf Hans Barth, *Zukunft* 18 (1897), S. 478.

⁹ **Feigel U.**, *Das evangelische Deutschland und Armenien. Die Armenierhilfe deutscher evangelischer Christen seit dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts im Kontext der deutsch-türkischen Beziehungen*. Göttingen 1989, S. 52.

thought international, i.e. “English”, as Naumann contended, might well take the Armenian side¹.

However, Lepsius was not fundamentally opposed to German *Weltpolitik*, although his take on the subject was only distantly related to the Wilhelmine boom of power politics. To Lepsius the theologian, *Weltpolitik* predominantly presented itself as a necessary condition for the final advent of the kingdom of Christ. He expected the latter to come about in the shape of a constitutionally ordered world on earth, based on human rights principles of the gospel. Basically, in Germany at this time, these were often also neo-Kantian influenced ideas. Yet Lepsius, like virtually every educated German protestant of his day, viewed Luther’s Germany as God’s predestined country. However, he had to witness how the atrocities committed in the Ottoman Empire during World War I stood in increasingly stark contrast to his vision of the coming kingdom of Christ on earth.

In the beginning of August 1915, Lepsius wrote from Istanbul to his wife Alice at Potsdam: “Unspeakable things have happened and are happening still. The goal is perfect extermination – executed under the veil of martial law. There is nothing else to be said”². Lepsius, 57 years old at the time, was received for an audience with War Minister Enver Pasha on 10 August 1915 after a recommendation by Auswärtiges Amt (the German State Department) and the German Embassy. This was precisely when the siege at Musa Dagh was unfolding, where some 5000 Armenians had sought refuge on the escape from their persecutors, the fateful days that are recounted in Franz Werfel’s novel, which also tells the story of this meeting. It was by no means a matter of course. Its background, too, remains unclear to this day and will in all likelihood never be fully uncovered. Certainly, the Reich’s government at that point took a strong interest in exercising a mitigating influence on its Turkish ally³. The German Embassy at Istanbul, however, doubted it could ever end successfully⁴. Enver, in turn, had a vested interest in a certain amount of German backing⁵. At least until the increasing success in defending the strategically important Dardanelles and the resulting growth in Turkish confidence would have completely dispelled any qualms.

Lepsius produced a protocol of this conversation at the War Ministry which is extensively quoted by Werfel. The most important exterminatory sentence in this conversation was the following. “We can handle our internal enemies”, Enver said: “You in Germany cannot. In this we are stronger than you”⁶. For the time being, thoughts like this were foreign to German politics, which were still (at least partly) anchored in values of traditional XIX century Wilhelminism. Yet, not much later, they were the very reason why Adolf Hitler admired Enver as an example to follow, whom – among others, particularly Mussolini – he referenced in his trial before the Munich People’s Court in 1924. According to Hitler, Enver managed to build up a whole new

¹ Naumann F., “Asia“, Berlin-Schöneberg 1900, S. 145, p. 141.

² Lepsius to Alice Lepsius, beginning of August 1915, Lepsius-Archiv Potsdam (LAP) 118-1320.

³ Wangenheim to Scheubner-Richter, 21 June 1915. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA-AA) /BoKon/169.

⁴ Wangenheim to AA, 9 June 1915. PA-AA R 14086.

⁵ Wangenheim to AA, 31 May 1915. PA-AA R 14086.

⁶ Lepsius J., Mein Besuch in Konstantinopel // Der Orient, vol. 1/3 (1919), S. 8.

nation, successfully detoxifying the multicultural Gomorrha that was Constantinople¹. This unveiled a deep congruency of fundamental imaginations of purification. Hitler's "awaking" Germany welcomed the radically nationalist Young Turks (and their Kemalist followers) as a congenial example².

Henry Morgenthau relates that Lepsius was determined to try to persuade his own government to put a halt to this crime against humanity perpetrated by a wartime ally – as we know, he failed. "His feelings were aroused chiefly against his own government", Morgenthau records in his memoirs in view of those hours spent together at the American Embassy. "He expressed to me the humiliation which he felt as a German, that the Turks should set about to exterminate their Christian subjects, while Germany, which called itself a Christian country, was making no endeavours to prevent it"³.

Lepsius decided not to remain silent after his return to Germany. This was in stark contrast to the considerable amount of people in the Reich who knew exactly what was going on in Turkey, yet did not speak up in order to preserve the *raison d'état*. Even the majority of the German clergy adhered to this practice almost unconditionally. "Nationalized Christianity's conscience" he wrote in March 1916, "is easily swayed in such conflicts of interest to subordinate that which is imperative on grounds of humanity to that which is politically opportune"⁴. Johannes Lepsius did not succumb. He wanted to take a stand by again publicly promoting moral politics as far as he could under wartime circumstances.

It was at a Berlin press conference on 5 October 1915, short after his return from Istanbul, when Lepsius made himself very clear for the first time. There, he actually accused the German government of having become a slave to the Ottoman leadership instead of duly ruling as its master. In the beginning of the war, Lepsius had subscribed to the unrealistic illusion that the German-Turkish alliance would by necessity bring about a certain hegemonial Europeanization of Turkey at the hands of Germany as well as establish order in its judicial system. These Lepsius had considered positive effects⁵, even in the Armenian case. But such pipe-dreams of a "German Egypt" were soon shattered, as it became more and more apparent that Turkey was following its own agenda in this war. Johannes Lepsius, although a German patriot, adopted the stance of denouncing his own government in the face of the great crime against humanity that was the Genocide. The Reich's Oriental opportunism in the case of the Armenian Genocide was steeped in a German spirit of cultural relativism Lepsius had never shared. The "belief that in warfare, might is the only decisive factor and that right and humanity can be disregarded until victory is achieved"⁶, as he put it later, was leading to a moral catastrophe.

¹ **Gordon H. J.** (Ed.), *The Hitler Trial before the People's Court in Munich*. Vol. 1. Arlington 1976, p. 180.

² See also **Ihrig S.**, *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination*. Cambridge, Mass./ London, UK, 2014; *idem*: *Justifying Genocide: Germany and the Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler*. Cambridge, Mass./ London, UK, 2016.

³ **Morgenthau H.**, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, New York, 1918, p. 344.

⁴ Lepsius to August Winkler, 26 March 1916. LAP 7183.

⁵ "Memel and Basra are the endpoints of the European Limes towards Asia". Johannes Lepsius: *Unsere Waffenbrüderschaft mit der Türkei // Der Christliche Orient*, vol. 16 (1915), S. 17.

⁶ Lepsius: *Was hat man den Armenien angetan? Die Zeit zu reden ist gekommen*. *Mitteilungen aus der Arbeit von Dr. Johannes Lepsius*, September/Dezember, 1918, S. 113.

Military intelligence had him under surveillance. In his devastation he went as far as publicly demanding German military control of the northern Ottoman Empire to establish a rule of law there. He even suggested surrendering the Ottoman Arabic territories to the British for the same reason¹. Not unlikely Lepsius was informed about Boghos Nubar's negotiations with the British military command in Egypt concerning an invasion in the gulf of Iskenderun. This was an unrealized plan that had the support of the Armenian Dashnaksuyun party at Sofia with whom Lepsius had close ties. The German government reacted in a fairly moderate manner considering the scope of this provocation. A course of deliberate disinformation was taken, complemented by a warning against inadvertently being used as a battering ram for the Armenian question². On 11 January 1916 however, a query from Social Democratic MP Karl Liebkecht confronted the Reichstag (the German parliament) with "Professor Lepsius's" assessment of "an outright extinction of the Turkish Armenians"³. Documents, originating from Lepsius's material gathered during his Turkish journey, have doubtless found their way into James Bryce's and Arnold Toynbee's 1916 British Bluebook. How this was possible is still unclear. Probably the channels were Swiss. In turn Lepsius learned certain details from British sources, for instance concerning the developments at the Musa Dagh. These he published in 1916, taking some literary liberties, in his Potsdam based journal *Der Christliche Orient*⁴. International contacts and attempts to exert influence on policies were, despite the war, still intact.

In summer of 1916, Lepsius published his report *Die Lage des armenischen Volkes in der Türkei* ("The Situation of the Armenian People in Turkey") spanning over three hundred pages. It contained precise chronological representations as well as meticulous statistics, as well as a thorough analysis of causes. Despite the looming military censorship, he personally managed to have 20.500 copies printed secretly and distributed all over the Reich. The pamphlet was banned by military censorship on 7 August 1916. The German Turkophile Ernst Jäckh working at the State Department issued him a warning pertaining to his "propaganda lectures and leaflets"⁵ and prompted the Ministerial passport office to bar Lepsius from entering Switzerland for further talks⁶. However, he had already left Germany by mid-July to take residence in the neutral Netherlands where it was possible for an anonymous Dutch translation of his *Bericht* to be published. A French translation had already been undertaken in Potsdam⁷ and was published in Paris after the war in late 1918.

The *Bericht* is an astonishing opus. First and foremost, it is a testimony of extraordinary personal courage. During this time, as the so-called national "home peace" of the World War was kept, censorship turned any public utterance about war

¹ Jackh Papers, No 22, OHL (Zensurbüro) to Ernst Jäckh, 1 November 1915, No. 2,610 O.Z. see **Trumpener U.**, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918*, Princeton, 1968, p. 223.

² **Trumpener U.**, op. cit., p. 224.

³ Anfrage des Reichstagsabgeordneten Karl Liebkecht in der 26. Sitzung des Reichstags, 11 January 1916. PA-AA R 14089.

⁴ **Lepsius**, *Das rettende Kreuz // Der Christliche Orient*, vol. 17 (1916). H. I/III, S. 12-19.

⁵ Jäckh to Lepsius, 11 September 1916. LAP 13321(2).

⁶ Jäckh to Zimmermann, 31 Juli 1916. PA-AA R 14092.

⁷ **Meißner A.**, *Martin Rades "Christliche Welt" und Armenien*, Berlin, 2010, S. 231 ff.

crimes into a potentially dangerous affair, be they of German origin or committed by Her allies. His book was, as the *New York Tribune* noted in July 1919, the most “powerful indictment of Turkey’s crimes in Armenia” that appeared during the war in all countries¹. By the same token, the *Bericht* marks the beginning of a serious historiography of the Armenian Genocide. Lepsius was not only a Theologian whose upbringing, environment and wealth of experience had equipped him with a diverse historico-educational backdrop and a charismatic public persona. He was an academically trained Mathematician, held a doctorate in Philosophy, and commanded the ability to think systematically and conceptually.

The main thesis of the book – which, according to Ulrich Trupener, has been “the best work of synthesis on this subject”² for decades – is that, beginning in the spring of 1915, government-planned ethnic cleansing was being executed by the organs of a “deep state”, immediately turning into genocidal measures. More recently, detailed studies have accentuated how ideological hardliners of the Young Turk Committee – one might call them ethno-nationalist political commissars – tried to enforce extreme exterminatory measures everywhere, even against the resistance of some military officials and provincial governors. The purpose of these was, as Lepsius highlighted, to essentially annihilate everything not purely Turkish in an ethnic or cultural sense³ – or at least anything proven to be incapable of assimilation. In his view, the genocide was an exclusively Turkish project of a domestic and ethno-political nature and deadly mass-robbery on a great scale. The *Bericht* also poses the *quaestio juris*, quoting the Allied declaration of 24 May 1915 where these events were literally characterized as “crimes against humanity and civilization”⁴. Of course, in wartime Germany, this had to be considered “enemy propaganda”.

Lepsius focused on the right-wing nationalist modernity and systematicity of this genocide, and in 1916 he was the first one to clearly see the fundamental difference to former atrocities. Unaltered were his post-war comments. He drew an express comparison between the Young Turks and the Pan-German movement⁵ whose radically anti-Semitic wing was just garnering attention in the early 1920’s through political assassinations. In this respect, he saw the genocide of 1915/16 as an immensely dangerous model⁶. Moreover, he accused Germany of “complicity” by “indulgence and coward failure to act” as early as at the end of 1918⁷.

After the World War, the question was raised for the first time whether it be necessary to institute an international legislation, especially to handle gross violations of human rights at the hand of governments. On 15 March 1921, former Ottoman Grand Vizier Mehmet Talaat was shot dead in Berlin’s Hardenbergstraße. This assassination made history, and notably, legal history. The June 1921 court case of

¹ Another Chapter in Germany’s Confession of Turkish Guilt // *New York Tribune*, July 27, 1919. PA-AA R 14106.

² **Trupener U.**, op. cit., p. 204.

³ **Wegner A. T.** (Ed.), *Der Prozess Talaat Pascha. Stenographischer Bericht*, Berlin, 1921, S. 56, 60 f.

⁴ **Lepsius**, *Bericht*, p. 200.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁶ Lepsius to Weckeser, 2 December 1922, LAP 141-1555 (1).

⁷ **Lepsius**, Was hat man den Armeniern getan? Die Zeit zu reden ist gekommen // *Mitteilungen aus der Arbeit von Dr. Johannes Lepsius*, vol. 11/12, September/December, 1918, S. 116.

Tehrirjan and its public reception had, albeit inadvertently, all the markings of an early Genocide tribunal. Specifically, the formal structure of a criminal trial necessitated a substantial assessment of the accused's motives. The latter, by the way, was ultimately acquitted on grounds of temporary insanity. In essence, the perpetrator's motives, and *ipso facto* the deeds of the victim, took precedence over the actual crime. Johannes Lepsius' expert opinion at the court played an integral part in this development, as the *New York Times* observed¹.

In fact, the trial unearthed several new aspects. One of Tehrirjan's three defenders, attorney Werthauer, scrutinized the perversions of nationalist militarism. He thereby raised the question of boundaries to legitimate violence in war against the backdrop of an existing discourse that had arisen from the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. His colleague Niemeyer, on the other hand, went one step further, calling for "jurisdiction (...) in the sense of a universal and enlightened insight into the nature of the law as well as the duties of humanity"². Thus, a component of natural law theory was introduced into a criminal trial, by this augmenting along a moral-political line. That was unusual and amounted to an implicit demand for substantial legislative consequences in the future. Apparently after this major crime against humanity during the First World War - the genocide of the Armenians - time was mentally ripe for this major step. As regards the matter of the verdict, the court had previously been informed by its expert witness Johannes Lepsius that the murder victim had actually been sentenced to death. A ruling to this effect had been handed down *in absentia* by a Turkish court-martial on 5 July 1919, in fact, on grounds of – literally – "crimes against humanity"³.

The Berlin trial brought about some unexpected, far-reaching consequences, one of which relates to Raphael Lemkin. "Will not passion sway such a form of justice and make a travesty of it?" Lemkin asked in his autobiographical sketches, after having read about the case in 1921 newspapers: "I felt that a law against this type of racial or religious murder must be adopted by the world. (...) Sovereignty, I argued, cannot be conceived as the right to kill millions of innocent people"⁴.

The consequences of that train of thought are well-known. Lemkin was the first to attempt a legally sound definition of the concept of "genocide" in 1944. He succeeded by introducing the result into the UN genocide convention of 1948. Even after World War II and the Shoah, he revisited his initial experience again and again: that memorable Berlin trial of 1921, the Armenian genocide, and the fundamental defects of international law which it had revealed.

¹ **Montgomery G. R.**, Why Talaat's Assassin was Acquitted // *New York Times Current History*, July 1921.

² *Der Prozess Talaat Pascha*, S. 120 f.

³ **Hosfeld R.**, *Tod in der Wüste. Der Völkermord an den Armeniern*, München, 2015, S. 226.

⁴ **Donna-Lee F.** (Ed.), *Totally Unofficial. The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin*, New Haven & London, 2013, p. 20.

Ռոլֆ Հոսֆելդ – Բարոյական քաղաքականությունից դեպի միջազգային արդարություն

Եվրոպայի համար XIX դարը Ֆրանսիական հեղափոխության և նապոլեոնյան պատերազմների փորձառություններից հետո բնութագրվում էր տերությունների միջև հավասարակշռության գերակայության գաղափարով: Չնայած շահերի վրա հիմնված քաղաքականության որոշակի գերակշռությանը՝ ժամանակն իր հետ բերում էր նաև բարոյական քաղաքականության կողմնորոշում: Հետհեղափոխական քառսի համայնապատկերում նրան բնորոշ էր նաև մարդկային առաջադիմության զարգացման հայեցակարգը: Ստրկացման և զաղութային հանցագործությունների դեմ ի հայտ եկան կարևոր բարոյաքաղաքական քարոզարշավներ: XIX դարի վերջի հայամետ քարոզարշավները պետք է դիտարկվեն այդ համատեքստում: Վիլյամ Գլադստոնը գործում էր եվրոպական ժողովուրդների ժողովրդավարական միության՝ մարդու իրավունքների և ազատականության հայեցակարգի հիման վրա, որը «լիբերալ» իմպերիալիզմի դիրքորոշումը չէր բացառում: Նույնը վերաբերում էր Գերմանիայում Ֆոհաննես Լեփսիուսին: Նրանք երկուսն էլ, հակառակ իրենց կառավարությունների՝ սուկ շահերի վրա հիմնված քաղաքականությանը, ձգտում էին ամրապնդել հասարակական կարծիքի իշխանությունը: Ընդ որում՝ արտակարգ էին համաշխարհային պատերազմի ժամանակ հետապնդվող հայերի փրկության նպատակով Լեփսիուսի գործադրած ջանքերը, որը ամեննին հաշվի չէր առնում բեռլինյան պաշտոնական քաղաքականությունը: Հանուն մարդու իրավունքների տեղի ունեցող հասարակական բարոյաքաղաքական քարոզարշավները պետք է, այնուհանդերձ, ունենային ինստիտուցիոնալ և քաղաքական հետևանքներ: Դա առաջին անգամ պարզորոշ դարձրեց 1921 թ. Բեռլինում Սողոմոն Թեխիրյանի դատավարությունը, որն ուղղակիորեն նպաստեց ՄԱԿ-ի՝ Ցեղասպանության վերաբերյալ կոնվենցիայի ի հայտ գալուն:

Рольф Хосфельд – От нравственной политики до международной справедливости

XIX век для Европы после испытания Французской революцией и наполеоновскими войнами характеризуется идеей баланса сил между государствами. Несмотря на некоторый перевес политики, основанной исключительно на интересах, время с собой принесло также и ориентацию моральной политики. В постреволюционном хаосе ему был характерен также концепт развития человеческого прогресса. Появились важные морально-политические кампании против рабства и колониальных преступлений. Проармянские пропагандистские кампании конца XIX века также должны рассматриваться в этом контексте. Вильям Гладстон действовал на основе демократического союза европейских народов – концепта прав человека и либерализма, который не исключал позицию «либерального» империализма. То же касалось и Йоханнеса Лепсиуса в Германии. Они оба стремились укрепить власть общественного мнения против воли своих правительств – политики, основанной исключительно на интересах. При этом, чрезвычайными были усилия Лепсиуса, направленные на спасение армян, преследуемых во время мировой войны, который никак не принимал во внимание официальную берлинскую политику. Общественные морально-политические кампании за права человека должны были иметь институционные и политические последствия. Это впервые было определено во время судебного процесса над Согомоном Тейлиряном в 1921 г. в Берлине, который непосредственно способствовал появлению конвенции ООН о геноциде.