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RUSSIA AND TURKEY BETWEEN COOPERATION AND RIVALRY*

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This article discusses the dynamics of relations between Russia and Turkey and particularly the balance of power in the Black Sea and the South Caucasus. The article first aims briefly to describe the bilateral relations of Russia and Turkey after the Cold War and analyze their balance of power relations in the Black Sea and the South Caucasus.

For this purpose, the economic and energy cooperation is examined. Then, particularly regional foreign and military policies and their outcomes is analyzed.

The author examined qualitative methods (retrospective case study) to reveal the main tendencies of bilateral relations and comparative analysis of power balance relations. Both primary and secondary (academic and expert works) sources have been considered as basis of the research.

According to the results of the analysis the author concluded/inferred that two countries continue both cooperate in mutually beneficial realms and compete in order to expand their political influence. As economic and energy cooperation is mutually beneficial, the parties seek to avoid direct military confrontation, preferring absolute gains over relative ones. Regarding the balance of power in the Black Sea and in the South Caucasus the article proposes that currently Russia compared to Turkey has considerable dominance in these regions.

Keywords: *Russia, Turkey, rivalry, security, cooperation, conflict, Black Sea, South Caucasus, economics, energy.*

Russia and Turkey periodically continue to draw the attention of regional and world politics. Having left eleven Russia-Turkey wars behind in the past two countries, they still compete over several issues. Turkish military operations in Syria and Russian-Turkish negotiations over the Idlib de-escalation zone are recent examples of a possible confrontation between them. However, Russia-Turkey relations are complex and multidimensional. There are several factors that actually soften the risk of Russian-Turkish conflict and decrease the probability of direct military confrontation[285]. This article first briefly describes the bilateral relations of Russia and Turkey, then analyses the balance of power relations in the Black Sea and the South Caucasus regions to demonstrate the dynamics of cooperation and rivalry.

Russia-Turkey Relations after the Cold War

Throughout the Cold War, the USSR and Turkey were in different poles and had a limited share of relations. Since the 1980s, the relations began to intensify. The energy became one of the

* Հոդվածը ներկայացվել է 15.06.2020թ., գրախոսվել՝ 16.06.2020թ., տպագրության ընդունվել՝ 20.09.2020թ.:

[285] See, for example, **Ekinci D.**, Russia-Turkey Relations (1991–2016): Diverging Interests and Compelling Realities, In Turkish Foreign Policy edited by P. Gözen Ercan, *Palgrave Macmillan*, 2007; **Kelkitli F.A.**, Turkish–Russian Relations: Competition and Cooperation in Eurasia, *Routledge*, Abingdon, Oxon, 2017*;* **Буржо Р.**, Россия-Турция, Энергетика Как Основа Отношений, *Центр Россия/ННГ*, 2013

first reasons for this activation, and as the coming years showed, it laid a common ground for the development of bilateral relations after the Cold War. In 1997, the parties agreed upon the construction of a 1200 km Blue Stream gas pipeline, designed to deliver Russian gas across the Black Sea to Turkey. The first gas supplies started in 2003. It can provide annually 16 billion cubic meters of gas. The next bilateral achievement in energy cooperation is the Turk Stream gas pipeline, which started to operate in 2020. Turk Stream has an aggregate capacity of 31.5 billion cubic meters per year. As a result, Russia has become the major contributor to energy for Turkey. Currently, Turkey's 50% of gas demand is provided by Russia[286]. For Russia, Turkey is the second (after the EU) energetic export market[287]. Overall, Turkey is dependent on Russian energy, which is troublesome for Turks, and the search for alternative energy sources (especially from the Caspian basin) has been significant for Turkish energy policy.

Another sphere of bilateral activation was trading. Geographic proximity has led two countries to engage in mutually favorable trade. The trade turnout has risen from 1.5 billion dollars in 1992 to 14 billion in 2005. In 2010 the parties established a High-Level Cooperation Council to stimulate deeper political, economic and cultural cooperation. According to 2018 data, Russia is in first place in Turkey's import volume, and Turkey is the fifth export partner for Russia[288].

Russia and Turkey cooperate in the sphere of nuclear energy as well. In 2003 Russian Rosatom signed an agreement with the Turkish government to build four nuclear reactors with 1200 megawatt power in Akkuyu until 2023. This initiative will establish the first nuclear power plant in Turkey.

Military relations between states lack deep cooperation reasonably caused by Turkey's membership in NATO. However, the most prominent event in the military sphere since the 1990s is the S-400 air and missile defense systems purchase. In 2017 Turkey announced that it signed a contract with Russian Rostec to supply two batteries of S-400s[289]. Turkey's risky act caused concerns of Western powers, and the threat of sanctions on Turkey gained high probability. The first shipment of S-400 systems arrived at Turkey in 2019[290]. Turkey's such act is mostly explained by the desire of Turkish leadership to underline its autonomy in security and foreign affairs[291].

Bilateral cooperation in energy and trade is a solid ground for the deepening of the relations of two countries and stimulates positive outcomes or, in other words, provides the parties with absolute gains. However, this is not true for international relations, where Russia and Turkey have considerable controversies. Nowadays, both countries have contesting geopolitical interests in the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, Syria, Libya, etc. The primary reason for this rivalry is the aspiration to expand its influence over those regions. For example, after the Crimea annexation, Turkey refused to recognize it and condemned Russia's actions. The reason was not only the factor of Crimean Tatars, who were against the unification (Crimean Tatars living in Turkey count from 500K-6 million people)[292] but mainly Turkey's decision not to go against the Western allies. The

[286] U.S. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief: Turkey, Washington, D.C., February 2, 2017

[287] U.S. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief: Russia, Washington, D.C., October 31, 2017

[288] World Bank, WITS TradeStat Database. https://wits.worldbank.org/ (last visited June 12, 2020)

[289] "Turkey, Russia Sign Deal on Supply of S-400 Missiles", *Reuters*, December 29, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-turkey-missiles/turkey-russia-sign-deal-on-supply-of-s-400-missiles-idUSKBN1EN0T5 (last visited June 12, 2020)

[290] "First Shipment of Russian S-400 Systems Delivered to Turkey", *Al Jazeera*, July 12, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/shipment-russian-400-systems-delivered-turkey-190712081713100.html (last visited June 12, 2020)

[291] **Flanagan et al.**, Turkey's Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the U.S. Army. Santa Monica, CA: *RAND Corporation*, 2020, p. xiii.

[292] **Jankowski H.**, Crimean Tatars and Noghais in Turkey, *Türk Dilleri Arastirmalari*, no. 10, 2000

Crimean case demonstrated a significant pattern of Russia-Turkey relations, according to which, despite political controversies, two countries tend to maintain cooperation in the economic and energy field, where, as the data confirms, Turkey's dependence on Russia is stronger. For instance, after Crimea events, new sanctions imposed on Russia. Yet, Turkey did not welcome it and refused to join them. Apparently, Turkey's authorities realized that these sanctions would harm the Russian economy, which is broadly interconnected with Turkey's economy.

Over recent years the major tensions in Russia-Turkey relations have emerged in the Syrian conflict. The most severe escalation since the end of the Cold War (if not much later) occurred in November 2015, when Turkey downed the Russian SU-24 aircraft near the Turkey-Syria border. Russia avoided from military response apparently not to escalate the situation and engage in a direct military confrontation with NATO member. Despite this fact, Russia's responded harshly by other means, including economic sanctions, restrictions on tourism, etc.[293] Then, the following months demonstrated that Turkey's economy had undergone sufferings particularly in agriculture and tourism[294]. The unprecedented escalations ended up with Recep Erdogan's letter to Vladimir Putin, where the Turkish President apologized for the incident. The letter paved the way for the revival of bilateral relations.

Currently two countries are mainly engaged in the negotiation processes over Idlib province, where clashes between Russian backed Syrian army and opposition forces (pro-Turkish) is the item of agenda in Russia- Turkey relations. Russia is actively supporting Asad's regime to restore territorial integrity of Syria. In its turn, Turkey seeks to establish buffer zone across Turkey-Syria border to prevent Kurdish militias to enter Turkey

Thus, Russian-Turkish relations are complex and multidimensional. After the general introduction of bilateral relations, the next step is the anal size in particular cases. Therefore Russia-Turkey relations in the Black Sea and the South Caucasus will be discussed below.

The Black Sea Region: Irreversible Shift

The Black Sea has its unique place for Russia and Turkey due to its geography. First of all, it is vital in terms of economy and energy transportation. Besides, three of six countries of the Black Sea are NATO members, two are seeking membership, and only Russia is on the opposite side. Arguably the Black Sea region is another chessboard for Russia-NATO competence where Turkey is driven not only by its interests but also as an alliance member.

From the beginning of the 1990s, the Black Sea has served for bilateral trade and transport purposes. In 1992 Turkey initiated Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), where Russia involved as well. The organization aimed to foster economic cooperation among the Black Sea countries. In later years the organizations extended its membership beyond the Black Sea countries, including non-Black Sea countries. However, the bilateral relations were much more intensive, and this organization has not succeeded as such.

As already mentioned, the energy transportation from Russia to Turkey stretches across the sea. It allows two countries to overcome the third parties, which is beneficial for two countries in terms of both economic and political.

Until 2014 the power balance in the Black Sea was favorable neither for Russia nor Turkey. First, before the annexations of Crimea, Russia's military strength was mainly concentrated in Sevastopol Naval Base. However, the capabilities of the base did not impose a considerable threat to neighboring countries. Second, Turkey sought not to generate a confrontation in this region. The

[293] **Torosyan T., Arshakyan G**., Geopolitical Aspect of Russian-Turkish Relations: Rivalry or Cooperation?, *Armenian Journal of Political Science*. no. 1(6), 2017

[294] **Özertem H. S.**, Turkey and Russia: Fragile Friendship, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 15, no 4, 2017.

confrontation with Russians was not in the interests of Turks, and they tried to maintain positive relations with them. Moreover, Turkey opposed the spread of NATO influence in the Black Sea, apparently either not to trigger tensions with Russia or to protect Turkey's role from the USA ambitions[295]. Hence, Russia and Turkey had consensus over the Black Sea status-quo of the balance of power and had mutual benefits from trade and energy transportation.

This matter of affairs altered after the Crimean unification with Russia. This event caused new changes in the Black Sea security system and ended up with the shift in the balance of power, and a new phase of rivalry not only between Russia and Turkey but also with NATO began[296]. After 2014 Russia has already started intensive militarization of Crimea and modernization of Russian Black Sea Fleet. Russia increased its military strength locating new anti-missile and anti-naval systems, equipped the navy with modern cruise missiles and submarines[297].

Russia's active military build-up of Crimea brought about Turkeys' (as well as other neighbors) concern over security issues. The balance of power has been shifted. Turkey started to appeal for help to its NATO allies. In 2016 while expressing his concern about these processes, Recep Erdogan called upon NATO members to expand its presence in the Black Sea, because as Turkish President famously put, "the Black Sea has become Russia's own lake"[298].

In 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit member countries decided to increase NATO presence in the Black Sea. In the following years, NATO activated military exercises and various events in the region. NATO Navy's presence in the Sea accounted for much more days that previously. Furthermore, NATO strengthens its capabilities in neighboring member states both in the air and on the ground[299].

Nevertheless, NATO activation has not seriously affected the balance of power. In this sense, there is a specific fact worth mentioning. According to 1937 the Montreux Convention non-Black Sea countries' naval forces have particular restrictions in the Black Sea regarding their size, tonnage, and weight. This implies that NATO naval forces have limited access to the Sea. Even though the convention has not always been abided by countries (e.g., in 2008)[300], Turkey has deep interests in maintaining it as the convention provides Turks with exclusive rights over the Bosporus and Dardanelle straits, which is a significant instrument for Turkey's foreign policy in the Black Sea and beyond it.

As a result, today, Russia has a relative advantage over Turkey in the Black Sea. Turkey's attempts to counter Russian growing capabilities have not recorded tangible success. NATO officials continue to emphasize the strategic importance of the Black Sea for the Alliance and the necessity of broader involvement in the region.

Meanwhile, the change in the balance of power has not ceased or damaged bilateral economic and energy relations. Turkey and Russia continue to cooperate in mutually beneficial realms using the Sea for trade and transportation.

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[295] **Flanagan** et al., p. 124.

[296] "Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea and the South Caucasus", *International Crisis Group*, Special report N°250, Brussels, 2018

[297] **Petersen M.,** "The Naval Power Shift In The Black Sea*", War On The Rocks*, January 9, 2019. (last visited June 12, 2020); Kucera J., "Russia Claims "Mastery" Over Turkey in Black Sea", *Eurasianet*, September 16, 2016. https://eurasianet.org/russia-claims-mastery-over-turkey-black-sea (last visited June 12, 2020)

[298] "Almost a Russian lake': Erdogan Calls for Greater NATO Presence in Black Sea", *Russia Today*, May 16, 2016. https://www.rt.com/news/342670-nato-black-sea-russia/(last visited June 12, 2020)

[299] "Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Defense Ministers", Brussels, February 16, 2017

[300] **Kramer E. A.,** "NATO Ships in Black Sea Raise Alarms in Russia", *The New York Times*, August 28, 2008. https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/28/world/europe/28russia.html(last visited June 12, 2020)

The South Caucasus

After the collapse of the USSR, the South Caucasus as a separate region found itself in a power vacuum. Three newly independent countries faced new challenges: state-building armed conflicts and etc. In the early 1990s, the temporary withdrawal of Russian dominance caused the political elites to formulate their own foreign policy strategies. Then, Russia was undergoing the same processes of state-building and the outbreak of armed conflicts inside the Federation. Moreover, the new Russian elite considered the integration with the West as a foreign policy priority, and post-Soviet countries were not paid much attention. Therefore, the importance of the South Caucasus greatly decreased for Russia in the first years after the end of the Cold War.

Similarly, Turkey, who had a historical presence in the region and has been sidelined from the region after the 1920s, wanted to establish new relations with whose countries. However, in the first years of the 1990s, Turkey did not possess appropriate resources to restore its historical positions in the region, and hardly they tried[301].

Nevertheless, this state of affairs did not last long. The outburst of armed conflicts and the interests over Caspian energy started to involve non- regional powers. Russia and Turkey were on that list.

Actually, Russia has a real advantage at the onset. First, armed conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh caused Russia to restore its positions. In the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia had direct involvement and, in result, located Russian peacekeeping forces (formally within CIS contingent) on Abkhazian-Georgian and South Ossetian- Georgian borders. Furthermore, in 1995, Russia located military bases in Armenia and Georgia. Second, after the Soviet Union, three South Caucasian countries continued to have security, economic and cultural ties with Russia, which hard to say regarding Turkey, who was on the other side of the Iron Curtain (except ethnic-cultural connections with Azerbaijan). These ties were one of the reasons Russia promoted the Commonwealth of Independent States, which involved Armenia, Georgia (left in 2009) and Azerbaijan as well.

However, in the 1990s, Turkey succeeded in establishing a deep partnership with Azerbaijan, which was primarily a result of mutual ethnic and cultural ties[302]. In this period, the parties along with the West reached a significant agreement on the building of pipelines to transport gas and oil from the Caspian Sea[303]. It was the first attempt to bring Caspian energy across the South Caucasus to Turkey and then to Europe.

In upcoming years, the bilateral relations provided a favorable ground for transforming it into trilateral cooperation, encompassing Georgia as well. The trilateral partnership remains the sole successful initiative apart from the bilateral framework to engage Turkey into regional processes, that is why it requires more attention to be paid.

Mainly the trilateral cooperation touched upon the energy sphere. In 2006 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) gas pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) oil pipeline started to operate. For Turkey, this is an alternative source for Russian energy and aimed to reduce Turkey's dependence on Russia. In addition to this, Turkey's interest matched with the West's in terms of overcoming Russia's energy domination. Thus, the Western countries backed the constructions and have their contribution to financing the initiatives[304]. Likewise, in 2018 the Trans-Anatolian pipeline came

[301] **Balci B.**, Strengths and Constraints of Turkish Policy in the South Caucasus, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 16, no. 2, Spring 2014

[302] **Маркедонов *С***. Российско-турецкие отношения и проблемы безопасности Кавказского региона, *Валдайские записки № 45*. Апрель, 2016. https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/valdai-papers/valdayskaya-zapiska-45/ (дата обращения: 12.06.2020)

[303] **Yesevi Ç.G.**, **Tiftikçigil Y. B.**, Turkey-Azerbaijan Energy Relations: A Political and Economic Analysis, *International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy*, Vol. 5, no. 1, Spring 2015

[304] **Zaur S.**, Institutionalizing Trilateral Strategic Partnership: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung*, Regional Program South Caucasus, 2016, p. 4

into force, which transports Caspian gas from Turkey to Europe.

Furthermore, the trilateral framework institutionalized in 2012. Three countries signed a declaration in Trabzon, Turkey. Expressing their commitment to continue trilateral cooperation, the parties agreed to activate their efforts in foreign and domestic realms[305]. Such meetings have been held in forthcoming years. For example, in 2019, three countries have signed the 2020-2022 sectoral cooperation agreement, which primarily encompasses energy transportation issues[306].

Trilateral cooperation touched military affairs as well. It involves military staff trainings and cooperation over ensuring the security of pipelines. Since 2006 three countries annually hold "Eternity" joint staff exercises and from 2014 "Caucasian Eagle" joint military exercises. Notably, the military cooperation largely revolves around energy interests, and the security of pipelines is at the heart of the military exercises.

Actually, the trilateral cooperation has not transformed into a deeper political partnership or alliance, and there is no evidence for such tendencies. There are several reasons for that. The most significant is the cautiousness of Turkey regarding the strong Russian positions in the South Caucasus. For Russians, Turkey's increasing role in the region would surely not be tolerable. Another reason is the diverse foreign policy strategies of the three countries. Turkey turned its vector from the EU to the Middle East and do not have previous expectations for European integration despite being NATO member country. Although Georgia's future in NATO and the EU is not clear, Georgians preserve their commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration. Azerbaijan, in turn, pursues a policy of "distancing". Azerbaijanis tend not to adhere to any geopolitical poles and equally cooperate with Russia and the West.

Due to the above-mentioned factors, the trilateral partnership of Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan lacks joint strategic goals and perspectives. In these contexts, Turkey has limited influence in the region, and ongoing tendencies do not promise a transformation of the status quo.

In the meantime, Russia holds its firm domination in the region. Russia-Georgia war in 2008 reasserted the determination of Russian leadership to consider the region as a as a zone of Russian "privileged interests"[307]. Even though after the war Russia-Georgian relations hugely suffered and Russia lost its grips on Georgia, following years proved the acceptance of Russian domination over the region by other great powers. Unlike Georgia, Russia's relations with Armenia are at the highest level. Russia is a major security, economic, and energy partner for Armenia. Russia located here its 102nd Military Base and alongside joint Armenian forces guards on Armenia-Turkey and Armenia-Iran borders. Moreover, Armenia is a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

In 2009 an attempt of rapprochement of Armenia and Turkey was initiated by Armenians. Russia was one of the mediators alongside the USA, France, and the EU. Though the opening of Armenia-Turkey borders could probably allow larger Turkish involvement in the region, Russia welcomed the initiative. One of the central reasons was as then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev claimed the independence of regional countries in dealing with regional issues meaning exclusions of the USA and the EU[308].

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[305] Trabzon Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia And the Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, June 08, 2012. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/trabzon--declaration-of-the-ministers-of-foreign- affairs-of-the-republic-of-azerbaijan_-georgia-and-the-republic-of-turkey_-08-june-2012_- trabzon.en.mfa (last visited June 12, 2020)

[306] "Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia Sign Cooperation Action Plan", *Daily Sabah*, December 24, 2019. https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2019/12/24/turkey-azerbaijan-georgia-sign-cooperation-action-plan (last visited June 12, 2020)

[307] Interview given by Dmitry Medvedev to Television Channels Channel One, Russia, NTV, Sochi, August 31, 2008. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/48301(last visited June 12, 2020)

[308] "Press Statements Following the Russian-Turkish Talks", Moscow, February 13, 2009. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/3172 (last visited June 12, 2020)

Russia-Azerbaijan relations also have a high degree of cooperation. However, as previously mentioned, Azerbaijan averts from joining Russia's economic and security unions and have distanced relations with Russians. Nevertheless, this does not bound the parties to build mutually beneficial bilateral relations. In 2013 Azerbaijan obtained from Russia armaments counting almost 3 billion dollar[309]. In the economic sphere, according to 2018 data, Russia's share of overall Azerbaijani import is in the largest (17%).

In the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan and for the South Caucasus generally, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts are a significant security challenge. For Russia, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is one of the possible leverages in both countries. Even though there is a lack of evidence that Russia directly exercised this trump card to impose its will on the sides, the impact of the conflict both for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the regional security is decisive. Furthermore, Russia is involved in the peace negotiation process as an OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair.

If we try to depict the arrangement of the South Caucasian countries by their perused foreign and security policies, a crossing axis will emerge: Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan and Russia-Armenia. Admitting every reservation that can be made regarding this arrangement, however, the positions of Russia and Turkey in this axis is not symmetric. The fact that Russia has a much heavier role than Turkey is an uncontested reality.

In conclusion, the relations between Russia and Turkey, as typical for regional and great powers' bilateral relations, have many dimensions. Currently, the two countries either cooperate and compete. Since the 1990s, the cooperation primarily deepened in economic and energy fields. Trade and Russian gas supplies serve as a common ground for mutually beneficial relations. Even though the rivalry exists between them concerning the various political issues, the parties previously demonstrated restraint to the escalation of controversies. Even in the case of the 2015 crisis following the downing of a Russian airplane, which greatly worsened bilateral relations, the forbearance of Russia not to escalate the conflict by military means proved that two sides prefer to negotiate over war.

In reality, Turkey has tangible dependence on the Russian economy and energy. Despite the increasing tensions between the West and Russia and the fact that Turkey is a member of NATO, the relations of these two countries have not suffered, which confirms that geopolitical tensions have not reached them, and they have their agenda.

[309] "Russia starts delivering $1 billion arms package to Azerbaijan", *Reuters*, June 18, 2013. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-azerbaijan-arms/russia-starts-delivering-1-billion- arms-package-to-azerbaijan-idUSBRE95H0KM20130618 (last visited June 12, 2020)

ՌՈՒՍԱՍՏԱՆ ԵՎ ԹՈՒՐՔԻԱ. ՀԱՄԱԳՈՐԾԱԿՑՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԵՎ ՄՐՑԱԿՑՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՄԻՋԵՎ

ՀՈՎՍԵՓ ԲԱԲԱՅԱՆ
Հայաստանի Հանրապետության
Պետական կառավարման ակադեմիայի ասպիրանտ,
ք. Երևան, Հայաստանի Հանրապետություն

Հոդվածում քննարկվում են Ռուսաստանի և Թուրքիայի միջպետական հարաբերությունների ընդհանուր բնույթը և միտումները: Աշխատանքի նպատակն է բացահայտել Ռուսաստանի և Թուրքիայի միջպետական հարաբերությունների դինամիկան Սառը պատերազմի ավարտից հետո, այնուհետև վերլուծել երկկողմ հարաբերությունների ուժային հավասարակշռությունը Սև ծովում ու Հարավային Կովկասում:

Այդ նպատակով խնդիր է դրվել ուսումնասիրել ռուս-թուրքական հարաբերություն–ների առանցքում ընկած տնտեսական ու էներգետիկ հարաբերությունները և վերլուծել երկու տարածաշրջաններում այս երկրների քաղաքականությունը և դրա արդյունքները՝ շեշտը դնելով առաջին հերթին ռազմաքաղաքական հարաբերությունների վրա:

Աշխատանքում օգտագործվել են երկկողմ հարաբերությունների բնույթը բացա–հայտող որակական վերլուծության (հետադարձ իրավիճակային վերլուծություն) և ուժային փոխհարաբերությունները վեր հանող համեմատական վերլուծության մեթոդները: Վերլուծության համար փաստական հիմք են հանդիսացել ինչպես առաջնային աղբյուրները, այնպես էլ թեմայի վերաբերյալ ակադեմիական ու փորձագիտական աշխատանքները:

Ըստ ուսումնասիրության արդյունքում ձեռք բերված եզրակացությունների՝ երկու երկրները շարունակում են և՛ համագործակցել փոխշահավետ ոլորտներում, և՛ մրցակցել միմյանց հետ ազդեցության տարածման համար: Միևնույն ժամանակ Ռուսաստանը և Թուրքիան խուսափում են անմիջական ռազմական բախումներից, քանի որ տնտեսական ու էներեգետիկ հարաբերությունները շահավետ են երկու կողմի համար: Սև Ծովում և Հարավային Կովկասում կողմերի ուժային հարաբերությունների ուսումնասիրությունը թույլ է տալիս եզրակացնելու, որ ներկայումս երկու տարածաշրջաններում Ռուսաստանը ունի զգալի գերակայություն Թուրքիայի նկատմամբ:

Հիմնաբառեր՝ *Ռուսաստան, Թուրքիա, մրցակցություն, ուժային բալանս, համագործակցություն, հակամարտություն, Սև ծով, Հարավային Կովկաս, տնտեսություն, Էներեգետիկա:*

РОССИЯ И ТУРЦИЯ: МЕЖДУ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВОМ И СОПЕРНИЧЕСТВОМ

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В статье обсуждаются общие черты двухсторонних отношений России и Турции. В частности, целью работы является выявление основных тенденций двухсторонних отношений после Холодной войны и анализ силового баланса в регионах Черного моря и Южного Кавказа.

Для этого поставлена задача исследовать экономические и энергетические взаимоотношения двух стран, проанализировать их внешнюю и военную политику и ее результаты в регионах.

Для выявления основных тенденций двусторонних отношений и баланса сил использованы качественные методы (ретроспективное тематическое исследование) и сравнительный анализ силового баланса. В исследовании использованы первичные и вторичные (академические и экспертные работы) источники данных, касающиеся русско-турецких отношений.

По результатам анализа автор пришел к выводу, что две стороны не только склонны сотрудничать во взаимовыгодных сферах, но и конкурировать в целях расширения своего политического влияния. Поскольку экономическое и энергетическое сотрудничество взаимовыгодно, стороны стремятся избежать прямой военной конфронтации, предпочитая абсолютные выгоды относительным. Что касается баланса сил в Черном море и на Южном Кавказе, то в статье утверждается, что в настоящее время Россия по сравнению с Турцией значительно доминирует в этих регионах.

Ключевые слова: *Россия, Турция, соперничество, силовой баланс, сотрудничество, конфликт, Черное море, Южный Кавказ, экономика, энергетика.*