

# TURKEY'S STATE POLICY ON CYPRUS AFTER THE OCCUPATION OF THE NORTH OF THE ISLAND (1974-1983)\*

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***This article aims at revealing the foundations of Turkish policy on the island after the Occupation of the North of Cyprus, the consequences of which are extremely important for the future of Cyprus.***

***The aim of the research is to study the policy of the Turkish authorities to change the population ratio on the island as well as to strengthen the Turkish element in the occupied territories, which has a solid basis for continuity in that part of Cyprus.***

***The work was written by a combined study of facts using the principles of historical analysis.***

***The study confirms that after the Occupation of North of Cyprus, the steps taken by Turkey to change the demographic picture of the island at the state level, which began in Turkey in relation to Cyprus in the 1960s, were a continuation of this aggressive policy. The goal was to divide Cyprus, to establish a Turkish presence in the north of the island, and on the way to this, Turkey was ready even to ignore the interests and wishes of the Turkish Cypriots on the island.***

***Keywords:* Cyprus, Turkey, UN Resolutions, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Denktash, Turkish occupation, inter-communal negotiations, immigration, The issue of settlers.**

## Foreword

Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and events following it have had a huge impact on the Cyprus issue and further destiny of Cyprus on the whole, dividing its history into two parts – before the 1974 invasion and after. Turkey's invasion significantly changed the Turkish-Greek force correlation in the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus. Turkey, getting military priority over the Greek side, launched steps to achieve priority on the diplomatic front as well.

Despite the improvement of Turkey's regional position on the international arena, the country's position became rather vulnerable, which was especially reflected in the UN Resolution 3212 (UN Resolution 3212), adopted on November 1, 1974 and UN Security Council Resolution 361 (UN Resolution 361) supporting it. For instance, Resolution 3212 urged all states to respect the sovereignty, freedom, territorial integrity and neutrality policy of the Republic of Cyprus, and to refrain from any actions and intrusions against it.

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The document comprised an insistent call to withdraw all foreign troops urgently, to terminate any foreign military presence in Cyprus, as well as to stop any interference in the affairs of Cyprus. It also stated that all refugees should return to their homes with due safety provided. In addition, the Resolution called for the continuation of the UN-sponsored talks on the settlement of the issue, emphasizing that the constitutional system of the Republic of Cyprus is the common cause of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. It is noteworthy that this UN Resolution was approved by UN Security Council Resolution 361, which actually made its implementation mandatory. In the following years, the UN adopted a number of resolutions on the Cyprus issue (3395 (UN Resolution 3395), 31/12 (UN Resolution 31/12), 32/15 (UN Resolution 32/15), etc.), which repeated the main points of Resolution 3212 with only minor differences.

The position of the USSR was absolutely vital in the success of the Greek party in the UN. During the discussions on the Cyprus issue, the USSR advocated the cessation of foreign interference in the affairs of Cyprus, the sovereignty, freedom and territorial integrity of Cyprus, and stressed the need for a settlement under the auspices of the United Nations (Armenia's National Archive, *f. 326, l. 5, a. 10, p. 60*).

Even though these UN resolutions did not comprise any mechanisms to force Turkey to implement them, the Greek side obtained a significant diplomatic advantage. These resolutions clearly outlined the framework for the future settlement of the Cyprus issue, meanwhile expressing the will of the international community according to which any future settlement that sought the approval of the international community had to comply with the principles of these resolutions.

### **Turkey's State Policy on Cyprus**

Influenced by the dramatic change in the situation, after the Turkish invasion the views of the Greek Cypriots on the settlement of the Cyprus issue also underwent significant changes. Returning to Cyprus on December 7, 1974 and addressing the people Makarios stressed the need for talks between the two communities "to iron out differences and resolve the Cyprus issue" (Иванова и др.). With the aim to settle the Cyprus issue, the government of Makarios proposed to the Turkish Cypriot community to establish a federal government in Cyprus, promising extensive autonomy to the Turkish community, albeit with a strong central government.

However, the Turkish Cypriot community not only refused to accept these proposals, but striving to strengthen its position in further negotiations, announced the creation of "the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" on February 13, 1975. The statement of the leader of this "entity" R. Denktash said: "Turkish Cypriots have decided that Cyprus should become a federated republic, and the Constitution of the Republic... is amended in a similar manner to become the Constitution of the Federated Republic of Cyprus, and until the said Federal Republic is established". On the same day, Denktash submitted a proposal to the UN Secretary-General's Representative to establish a bi-communal, bi-regional state in Cyprus consisting of Turkish and Greek federal states. This proposal was to limit the functions of the federal government, and to give broad powers to the Turkish and Greek federal states. It is noteworthy that this proposal did not say anything about the return of the Greeks who had fled to the south following the actions of the Turkish army, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cyprus, as well as the principle of defining the territories of the two federal republics (Սոփխերյա, *Թուրքիա և Կիպրսյան հարցի 41*).

According to Potskhveria, a Soviet researcher on the Cyprus issue, this decision was unequivocally made by the leaders of the Turkish community with the participation of official Ankara. Although Turkish Prime Minister Sadi Irmak stated that the proclamation

of the Turkish Republic in Cyprus “does not pursue the goal of dividing the island” and that he had learned about the intention of the Turkish Cypriots only the day before, Ankara had had this idea in the 1960s, since the first serious crisis of 1963-1964 (Փոփքերի, *Внешняя политика* 265). The international community, however, sharply criticized the actions of the Turkish Cypriot community. According to the Soviet TASS news agency, “the unilateral steps taken by the leadership of the Turkish community to form a state in the part of the island occupied by Turkish troops are in fact aimed at enhancing this situation” (Armenia’s National Archive, *f. 326, l. 5, a. 11, p. 61-62*). In addition, in Soviet-American and Soviet-British joint statements of February 18, the parties expressed their support for the sovereignty, freedom, territorial integrity of Cyprus, and recognized only the government of Makarios as the sole legitimate authority of the island (Armenia’s National Archive, *f. 326, l. 5, a. 11, p. 63-64*). France, Italy, Yugoslavia and several other countries also expressed their support for Makarios’ government. The unilateral actions of the Turkish Cypriots were also criticized by UN Security Council Resolution 367 (UN Resolution 367) of 12 March, which called for respect for the sovereignty, freedom, territorial integrity and neutrality of Cyprus and urged to refrain from any attempt to divide the island or annex it to any other country.

According to UN resolutions, inter-communal negotiations have been underway in Cyprus since 1975, however, were actually fruitless for almost two years. The first serious success in inter-communal negotiations was registered in early 1977. After a long break Makarios and Denktash met in Nicosia and agreed to adopt four basic guidelines according to which further negotiations should be conducted. According to this agreement:

Cyprus was to be an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, federal republic.

The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.

Questions of principles, like freedom of movement, residence, freedom of settlement, and the right of property were open for discussion.

The powers and functions of the central Federal Government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the State (Migdalovitz 6).

This successful negotiation process, however, was soon temporarily halted because of Makarios’ sudden death. S. Kyprianou, who had held the position of Foreign Minister for many years (1960-1972) and was an associate of Makarios, replaced the latter on the post of Cyprus President. The next meeting of the new President of Cyprus Kyprianou and Denktash took place only in spring of 1979. During this meeting the parties expressed readiness to continue the negotiations in accordance with the 17 February, 1977 guidelines agreed upon by Makarios and Denktash and UN Resolutions relevant to the Cyprus Issue. Moreover, agreement was reached on ten more points most significant of which were:

There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens of the Republic.

The talks would deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects.

Priority would be given to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices.

The demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus was envisaged, and matters relating thereto would be discussed.

The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other country and against any form of partition or secession (Dodd 141-142).

Despite certain progress in the negotiations and the adoption of the principles for settlement, the differences between the parties, their contradicting attitudes towards certain matters constituted a major obstacle for reaching a compromise between the parties. For example, British magazine “The Financial Times”, referring to the Cyprus issue, noted that it was difficult to remain optimistic about the future of inter-communal negotiations, given the mutual accusations between the two communities (Armenia’s National Archive, *f. 326, l. 5, a. 27, p. 19*). The level of self-government to be given to the communities, the issues related to the federal government, the establishment of “three freedoms”, refugees and the withdrawal of Turkish troops still remained the main reason for the controversy.

The Turkish Cypriot community proposed to create a bi-communal, two-zone federal republic, where the Turkish Cypriot community was to be recognized as an equal co-founder in line with the Greek Cypriot community. The federal or central government was to be formed on the 50-50 ratio basis and it should not be strong enough to threaten self-government of the constituent communities (Solsten 178). The Greek community opposed this proposal, arguing that the federal system in Cyprus should be established in compliance with international norms, where the central government would be strong enough to ensure the unity of the country. This is how Former Head of the Greek Cypriot delegation G. Clerides described this position of the Turkish community: “It is not clear from Denktash’s expressions whether he wants a federation or a confederation in the Greek and Turkish parts of the island. I have the impression that when he speaks of a federation, he means a confederation” (Շմարով 101-102). It should be noted that many researchers of the Cyprus issue agree with this statement, and estimate the demands of the Turkish community meant a confederation (Ker-Lindsay 13; Гаджиев 77-78).

The next issue of concern related to the “three freedoms” – freedom of movement, settlement and property. Turkish Cypriots did not want to accept these “freedoms” because they feared that the spread of these “freedoms” throughout Cyprus would threaten their self-government. Greek Cypriots, in turn, sought to preserve the common economic system in Cyprus by spreading these “freedoms”, which was a vital basis for the further unification of the island.

The issue of refugees and withdrawal of Turkish troops also played an important role in the inter-community disputes. Greek Cypriots, getting to the negotiating table, demanded “first of all” to resolve the resettlement issue of Marash-Varosha. The Turkish Cypriot side, in turn, to discuss the resettlement of Marash-Varosha, demanded that the Greek Cypriots stop trying to raise the issue of Cyprus on the international arena (Armenia’s National Archive, *f. 326, l. 5, a. 23, p. 14r.s.-15r.s.*). As for the withdrawal of Turkish troops, Turkish Cypriots strongly opposed, as they considered Turkey to be the only country that was able to provide their security. For Greek Cypriots, however, the main security threat was Turkey, not Turkish Cypriots (Коппитерс и др. 85).

### **Turkey’s State Policy Aimed at Changing the Demographic Picture of Cyprus**

To assess the threats posed to Cyprus by Turkey and to understand the nature of its policy concerning Cyprus, it is particularly important to study Turkey’s actions aimed at changing the demographic picture of the island. After it had occupied Northern Cyprus and the Greeks had fled south, Turkey faced a sharp shortage of workforce in the north of the island, which was not made up for even by the transmigration of Turkish Cypriots from the south of Cyprus. In addition, Turkey had the problem of consolidating itself in the newly occupied territories, especially given that Turkish Cypriots occupied an incomparably large area and that the Greek population continued to dominate the island.

Thus, in order to settle these two issues, the authorities initiated an immigration process from Turkey to Cyprus.

It is noteworthy that back in 1967, with the same aim to change the demographic picture in Cyprus, Rauf Denktash offered to organize a secret transmigration of Turks, which, however, was not called to life (Şahin ve diğerleri 608). After the occupation of the northern part of the island, there were no more obstacles to immigration from Turkey. Within the framework of the agreement reached between Denktash and Ziya Muezzinoglu, Coordinator in charge of Cyprus affairs, and at the request of the “Turkish Federal State of Cyprus” the Turkish Foreign Ministry published 50 copies of “top classified” guidelines on sending labor force from Turkey to fill in the gap of the Turkish Cypriot sector (KTFD İstemi, zerine izer TIn Türkiđi ile Kapatılmasına ölişkin Yönetmelik) (Şahin ve diğerleri 608). According to that guideline, 234,000 people lived in the Turkish part of Cyprus before the war, and after the war, that number decreased to 70,000, of which 20,000 were Greeks. Hence, this document envisaged to organize the resettlement of 10,000 people to fill in the existing labor force gap in agriculture (Şahin ve diğerleri 609).

However, these rumors about the possible transfer of labor force from Turkey received certain reaction from the Greek side. The Greek side filed a complaint to the International Labor Organization, demanding that measures be taken against Turkey, claiming that such immigration would change the demographic picture of the island, would increase unemployment and would aggravate the social situation (Şahin ve diğerleri 609). The protests voiced by the Greek side, however, had no effect on the readiness of the Turkish side and, according to the data, already in 1976 mass immigration to Cyprus started.

The first large group of immigrants consisted of people who had once emigrated from Cyprus, and, in answer to the call of the Turkish Cypriot authorities to return home, had decided to come back. It should be emphasized, however, that there is no information about the exact number of those people. The Turkish authorities, who were being criticized in the international arena for the resettlement to Cyprus organized by them, tried to present the immigration of Turks, who had no connection with the island, to Cyprus as an opportunity to “return home”. Even special passports were issued for many of those people, where the name of the Turkish village closest to the place of their future residence in Cyprus was mentioned as their birth place (Şahin ve diğerleri 611).

Meanwhile, it should be noted that the immigrants, together with those who moved from the south of Cyprus, mostly settled in houses abandoned by the Greeks. This decision, in fact, harmonized with the state policy of Turkey, and this is proved by the “constitution” adopted in June, 1975 by the “Turkish Federated Republic of Cyprus” which declared all Greek Cypriots in Northern Cyprus to be foreign nationals while their property was expropriated in favor of people of Turkish origin (Иванова 37).

As for the technical implementation of immigration, after certain preparatory work in Turkey and registration being completed, resettlement of people began in May 1975. The first travelers to Cyprus set out from the province of Arakli in Trabzon in stringent secrecy, traveled by bus to Mersin, from there by boat to Magosa, and then to their new place of permanent residence, the village of Bahceli in Girne (Şahin ve diğerleri 613). This level of secrecy accompanied also further resettlement. In most cases people were provided with their accommodation in new homes at night to attract as little attention as possible. The labor force for work on farms, as well as servicemen and their family members resettled to Cyprus in 1974-1975 within the framework of this elaborate state program, were granted the status of “special immigrants”. In accordance with the law, they were provided with homes and certain means of subsistence.

The organization of this immigration, however, was not always as smooth as desired. According to I. Şahin, the outlined settlement policy turned into a genuine chaos in only a few years (Şahin ve diğەرleri 616). The main reason contributing to the overall confusion was the fact that the immigrants came mainly from the poorest regions of eastern Turkey and had a rather low level of vocational and educational background. This was amplified by the differences in the perceptions and everyday lifestyle of those newcomers from Turkey and local residents, which caused deep internal contradictions between the two groups. Referring to the many problems among the locals and newcomers, Fazıl Kucuk, one of the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community, for example, openly stated that the backward people arriving from Turkey were downgrading the cultural/civilizational level in Cyprus and should be sent back (Şahin ve diğەرleri 622).

Actually, the issue of settlers soon grew so profoundly that it became the main concern among internal issues of the Turkish part of Cyprus for quite a long time. This complication resulted in a situation when almost 55,000 native Turkish Cypriots began to leave the occupied areas of Cyprus en masse and move to Turkey or Europe (Рытов). Touching upon this problem, which already in 1986 was rather critical, Özgür, a famous Turkish-Cypriot politician, stated that if “the situation continues, it will soon be impossible to talk about the presence of Turkish Cypriots in Northern Cyprus” (Stavrou 96). However, unlike this observation of the Turkish Cypriot opposition, the leadership of the Turkish community did not see any problem in the departure of the Turkish Cypriots. The “president” of the Turkish Cypriots, Denktash, said quite impressively about this issue: “Gelen Türk, giden Türk” (Moutsis 123). (“Those who come are Turks and so are those who leave.”)

The active phase of the official transfer of the population from Turkey to Cyprus, was in fact, completed in 1979. It is interesting that the data on the number of immigrants to Cyprus are quite contradictory. There is still no clear information on the number of immigrants from Turkey during 1975-1979. Authorities of the Greek Cypriot part claim that 50,000 people immigrated to the island, the Turkish authorities say that number did not exceed 10,000, while according to the Western embassies in Nicosia, about 20,000 people moved to the island during that period (Şahin ve diğەرleri 609). It should be mentioned here that on the eve of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the population of the island was estimated to be about 641,000 people, of which 506,000 were Greeks, and only 118,000 were Turks. There were also small communities of Armenians and Maronites (Gürel ve diğەرleri 11).

It is noteworthy that in his rather extensive article on the population of Cyprus, Ahmet Atasoy, based on official data, notes that the information of state authorities on migration is very limited. Official sources do not consider immigration among the population growth factors of 1977-1996, meanwhile they highlight natural growth (Atasoy 38). Besides the 1975-1979 immigration, the author attributes certain significance to students' immigration in 1996-1997, when several institutions of higher education launched in Cyprus and many young people not only from Turkey, but also from other Middle Eastern countries came to the island to study there. Quoting the available official data, A. Atasoy draws major attention to the fact that 141,634 people immigrated to Cyprus in 1974-2006, of whom 67.1% or 94,977 were from Turkey (Atasoy 45).

The policy of changing the demographic picture in the occupied territories of Turkish Cyprus had its own influence on the electoral processes of the Turkish Cypriot community as well. It should be noted that the impact of the Turkish occupation in the north of Cyprus was felt quite shortly. The north of the island, traditionally the most developed economic region in Cyprus, soon found itself in an economic crisis due to the Turkish occupation. These economic hardships, as well as the issue of the above-

mentioned settlers, gave rise to a significant increase in the influence of the forces opposing Denktash's government throughout the Turkish community of Cyprus.

The most influential among those forces opposing Denktash's authorities were the left-wing Communal Liberation Party and the Republican Turkish Party. These parties were against the deepening of economic and political ties with Turkey, urged to reach an agreement with the Greek community on a federation, and to ensure the unity of the island. Furthermore, these parties also opposed the immigration of settlers.

The weakening of Denktash's political position and the growing influence of the opposition became especially evident during the "elections" in the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus". For example, if in 1976 "parliamentary elections" Denktash's National Unity Party won 30 of the 40 seats in the "parliament", while Denktash received 77.6% of the votes in the "presidential elections" of the same year, in the 1981 "elections" Denktash's party won only 18 out of 40 seats in the "parliament", and in the "presidential elections" Denktash won by only 51.8% (Dodd 147). Meanwhile, the votes of the settlers, who mainly voted for him, and whose electoral vote by the humblest calculations was estimated to constitute at least 1/3 of the total number of votes, must be of paramount importance in Denktash's victory (Stavrou 97).

In line with the developments in the north of Cyprus, significant changes took place in both Turkey and Greece in the early 1980s. Another military coup took place in Turkey in 1980, the military came to power again. While in Greece A. Papandreou, a supporter of a more active policy in the Cyprus issue, assumed power in 1981. When Papandreou came to power, according to the Western press, he firstly increased financial support to Cyprus, and then made a proposal to demilitarize the island, withdrawing the Greek and Turkish military forces and replacing them with UN forces. Moreover, from February 27<sup>th</sup> to March 1<sup>st</sup> 1982, Papandreou paid an official visit to Cyprus, which was the first historic visit of the Head of the Greek Government to the island (Шмапов 116-117). In addition, Papandreou's efforts significantly contributed to intensification of the process of internationalization of the Cyprus issue.

The first serious success of the policy of internationalization of the Cyprus issue was registered in Resolution 37/253 (UN Resolution 37/253) adopted by the UN General Assembly on May 13 1983. This resolution criticized actions aimed at altering the demographic picture of Cyprus, the lack of progress in the negotiation process and non-commitment to the resolutions formerly adopted. The core topic of the Resolution, however, was the demand to withdraw all the occupation troops from Cyprus, which was really painful for the Turkish side.

The Turkish response to this Resolution followed shortly. On June 17, 1983 the "parliament" of Turkish Cypriots made a decision to "recognize" their right to self-determination and hold a referendum on independence (Гаджиев 60). Moreover, Turkish Foreign Minister I. Türkmen also "recognized" the right of Turkish Cypriots to self-determination during his visit to the north of Cyprus on August 19-21 and highlighted that the right could be exercised "at any moment in time and no one had the right to forestall it" (Еропов 33). Interestingly, the Turkish side had already used this threat to declare independence in the past. Thus, for instance, back in 1980, absolutely dissatisfied with the Greek position in the negotiations, Denktash had threatened that in case no agreement was reached, they would seek the recognition of their state in the world (Шмапов 104).

At this point, however, there were sufficient prerequisites for the Turkish side to carry out this threat. On November 15, 1983 the Turkish Cypriot community declared the establishment of an independent "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" in the occupied territories of Cyprus. In his book Denktash noted that he had meticulously calculated the moment when to declare independence trying to take advantage of the internal political

situation in Turkey where the outgoing government of B. Ulusu would not be capable of preventing this step, and the incoming government of T. Özal would have to “face the fact”. Denktash also confessed that opposition Republican Turkish Party and Communal Liberation Party objected to declaring independence and wanted to contact the Turkish ambassador to clarify Turkey’s position on the issue under consideration. However, becoming aware of the dissatisfaction, Denktash summoned leaders of all parties on the night before the declaration was planned and threatened that “any party that would challenge independence, could be outlawed” (Иванова и др.).

The international community, nevertheless, strongly opposed this declaration. On November 18<sup>th</sup>, 1983 the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting on Cyprus issue and adopted Resolution 541 (UN Resolution 541). The Resolution regarded the decision of Turkish Cypriots legally invalid and called on all states not to recognize any other Cypriot state but the Republic of Cyprus. All major countries of the world – the United States, the USSR (Armenia’s National Archive, *f. 326, l. 5, a. 19, p. 62-63*), France, Great Britain, China, etc., joined the UN and condemned this decision.

This sharp international response, however, did not have much effect on the Turkish policy. Even though the Turkish authorities stated the declaration of independence had been “unexpected”, Turkey quickly recognized the independence of “Northern Cyprus” and pledged to provide assistance. The declaration of independence was, in fact, conditioned by two factors. The first, actually, was that Denktash’s political position in the Turkish Cypriot community was diminishing while, conversely, his political ambitions were growing. “Independence” seemed to offer Denktash more favorable conditions to retain and consolidate power. Besides, it also promised to fulfill Denktash’s desire to be president of an “independent state”. The proof that Denktash’s did cherish presidency can be found in his memoirs where he wrote that back in 1940 a fortune teller in Cairo said that he would create a state, which came true 35 years later (Güler 110).

The second factor promoting “independence” was the growing international pressure on Turkey to withdraw its troops, reaching its apogee in Resolution 37/253 (UN Resolution 37/253). In fact, the Turkish military brass played a great role in declaring Northern Cyprus independent. The well-known researcher of the Cyprus issue F. Hadjiev also seems to support this option when he notes that “the Turkish civilian government might not, indeed, have been aware of Denktash’s actions. However, from the previous practice of policy in Cyprus it was evident, that the leadership of both communities seldom took any action without the “approval of the armed forces of the ‘neighboring states”” (Гаджиев 80-81). This assertion is, in fact, quite close to reality, especially if we consider the traditionally core role played by Turkish military brass in politics and the fact that General Kenan Evren, leader of the military coup of 1980 and former Chief of General Staff, was the President of Turkey during that period.

## Conclusion

Analyzing Turkey’s state policy in Cyprus after the occupation of the northern part of the island, we can say that it was actually the continuation of Turkey’s aggressive policy towards Cyprus launched in the 1960s, which, just as before, aimed at the partition of Cyprus and the establishment of Turkish presence in the north of the island.

Turkey’s actions aimed to change the demographic picture of the island and to strengthen the Turkish element in the occupied territories were of paramount importance in the Turkish policy towards Cyprus after the occupation of the northern part of the island. The state-sponsored immigration to Cyprus organized by Turkey sought to fill in the shortage of workforce in the north of the island after the Greeks had fled south, and



then to gain significant influence within the Turkish Cypriot community taking advantage of the “electoral votes” of Turkish settlers.

The immigration organized by Turkey, however, was not unequivocally accepted within the Turkish Cypriot community. The badly-skilled settlers from Turkey's poor eastern regions were accepted rather negatively because of their somewhat different lifestyle and Turkey's policies that resulted in economic hardships caused resentment. These problems brought to a large wave of emigration among the Turkish Cypriot community. Turkey, and its assistant Denktash, however, saw no problem in the emigration of Turkish Cypriots; Turkish Cypriots were easily replaced by settlers from Turkey. The reason was, in fact, that Northern Cyprus and its “independence” were primarily perceived in Turkey's state policy as a means of gaining a geopolitical advantage over Greece.

Thus, in conclusion, we can state that not only the Greek Cypriots fell victim to the Turkish policy towards Cyprus, but also, paradoxically, the Turkish Cypriots, for the sake of whose “protection” Turkey had undertaken the invasion of Cyprus.

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## ԹՈՒՐԵՒԱՅԻ ՊԵՏԱԿԱՆ ԸՂՂԱԸԿԱՆՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ ԿԻՊՐՈՍՈՒՄ ԿՂՁՈՒ ԶՅՈՒՄԻՄԻ ՕԿՈՒՊԱՑԻԱՅԻՑ ԶԵՏՈ (1974-1983 ԹԹ.)

### ՈԱՑԻԿ ԽԱՂԱՏՐՅԱԼ

*Երևանի պետական համալսարանի արևելագիտության ֆակուլտետի թյուրքագիտության ամբիոնի ասպիրանտ, ք. Երևան, Հայաստանի Հանրապետություն*

Սույն հոդվածը նպատակ է հետապնդում վերհանելու Կիպրոսի հյուսիսի օկուպացիայից հետո կղզում Թուրքիայի վարած քաղաքականության նախափուլերը, որոնց ազդեցությունը Կիպրոսի ապագայի վերաբերյալ չափազանց կարևոր է:

Հետազոտության խնդիրն է ուսումնասիրել Թուրքիայի իշխանությունների կողմից պետական մակարդակով տարվող ժողովրդական պատկերի փոփոխմանն ու օկուպացված շրջաններում թուրքական տարրի ամրապնդմանն ուղղված քաղաքականությունը, որը Կիպրոսի այդ հատվածում հետևողականորեն իրականացվում է տևական ժամանակ և ունի շարունակականության կայուն հիմքեր:

Աշխատանքը շարադրված է փաստերի համադիր քննությամբ, պատմաքննական վերլուծության սկզբունքների կիրառմամբ:

Կատարված ուսումնասիրության արդյունքում կարելի է փաստել, որ Կիպրոսի հյուսիսի օկուպացիայից հետո Թուրքիայի կողմից պետական մակարդակով իրականացվող կղզու ժողովրդագրական պատկերի փոփոխմանն ուղղված քայլերը, որոնք սկիզբ էին առել Թուրքիայում դեռևս 1960-ական թվականներից և դրսևորվում էին Կիպրոսի նկատմամբ, այդ ազդեցիվ քաղաքականության շարունակությունն էին: Դրա նպատակը Կիպրոսի բաժանումն էր և կղզու հյուսիսում թուրքական ներկայության հաստատումը, ինչին հասնելու ճանապարհին Թուրքիան պատրաստ էր անզամ անտեսել բուն թուրք-կիպրացիների շահերն ու ցանկությունները:

**Հիմնաբառեր՝** Կիպրոս, Թուրքիա, ՄԱԿ-ի բանաձևեր, Հյուսիսային Կիպրոսի Թուրքական Հանրապետություն, Դենկթաշ, թուրքական օկուպացիա, միջհամայնքային բանակցություններ, ներգաղթ, վերաբնակիչների խնդիր:

## ГОСУДАРСТВЕННАЯ ПОЛИТИКА ТУРЦИИ НА КИПРЕ ПОСЛЕ ОККУПАЦИИ СЕВЕРНОЙ ЧАСТИ ОСТРОВА (1974-1983 гг.)

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В данной статье ставится задача раскрыть основы политики Турции на Кипре после оккупации северной части острова, последствия влияния которой очень важны для его будущего.

Целью исследования является изучение политики Турции по изменению демографической ситуации и усилению турецкого элемента на оккупированных территориях на государственном уровне, которые осуществляются на этой территории Кипра уже долгое время и имеет прочный фундамент преемственности.

Работа написана путем комплексного рассмотрения фактов с применением принципов исторического анализа.

В результате проведенных исследований можно зафиксировать, что политика и шаги по изменению демографической ситуации после оккупации севера Кипра, проводимые Турцией на государственном уровне – это продолжение ее агрессивной политики против Кипра с 1960-х годов. Цель ее состояла в том, чтобы разделить Кипр, установить турецкое присутствие на севере острова, и на пути к этому Турция была готова игнорировать интересы и пожелания самих турок-киприотов.

**Ключевые слова:** *Кипр, Турция, резолюции ООН, Турецкая Республика Северного Кипра, Денкташ, турецкая оккупация, межобщинные переговоры, иммиграция, проблема переселенцев.*